Facing Death without a Soul: A Response to George Adams
2012; Duquesne University Press; Volume: 47; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
2162-3937
Autores Tópico(s)Indian History and Philosophy
ResumoGeorge Adams's essay in this issue contrasts what he calls personalist spirituality with his understanding of Buddhism, particularly his ideas about the difficult Buddhist notion of anatman. (1) Adams's main thrust is to problematize the idea of anatman as nihilistic in contrast to his ideas about an eternal self. The crux of Adams's argument is this: simple terms, I cannot bring myself to accept a tradition suggests the beings whom one encounters in love--friends, children, life partners--shall experience a short embodied existence and then exist no more. (2) Underlying Adams's argument is an emotional commitment to what Buddhists call an eternalistic ideology (sassatavada): the self exists as a substantial entity and continues to exist after death. Adams's view not only frames his argument, but, as I will show, it also imposes limits on the kind of discussion he is able to have about it. There are some general problems with Adams's exposition. He presents Buddhism as monolithic. He cites translations of Pali canonical and post-canonical works, the medieval Indian Buddhist writer Santideva, and unnamed Zen sources. To assume all of these sources share a single view on the self is not sustainable. My response is based on my understanding of early Buddhist texts, but there is considerable disagreement on how to interpret the early Buddhist treatment of anatman. (3) Another problem is the repeated use of vague terms are never defined. What does Adams mean by spiritual, for instance? He uses it throughout his essay in combinations such as ... offensive, dimension, troublesome, and dilemma. Loving the Impermanent Adams suggests that the experience of another self as known through love makes the Buddhist silence on the status of the self spiritually troublesome.''4 Buddhism is not silent on the status of self; it is a conditioned phenomenon and therefore impermanent. And, Buddhism is far from silent on the experience of love. For example, in the Karaniya Metta Sutta we find these lines: Just as a mother would give her life to protect her only child, Likewise, keep all beings everywhere in mind. (5) Adams's article overlooks this inspiring aspect of Buddhism. He seems to imply loving other human beings is not really possible except when one believes they exist permanently. One basis for a loving relationship, expressed in the typically negative terms of the Pali texts, is found in the Raja Sutta: Going around all the directions in imagination, I find nothing more dear to me than myself. The self of other individuals is similarly dear to them, Therefore don't harm another self is loved. (6) That is to say, a nonviolent (that is, a loving) relationship is based on the ability to empathize with the person qua person just like ourselves. Elsewhere, our commonality is predicated on a common fear of death: All fear punishment; everyone is frightened of death; Making oneself equal to others, one should not harm or cause to harm. (7) Adams further says Buddhist equanimity is gained only at the high price of desensitizing oneself to the sense of spiritual wrongness of sentient beings' being casually by the universe. (8) This is a particularly troubling claim, because it seems to suggest Buddhists are incapable of fully experiencing love and compassion. In practice, Buddhists are deeply concerned about the welfare of beings. Contra Adams, Buddhism seeks to sensitize people to suffering and its causes, to provide them with an imperative to do something about it, and tools to accomplish the job. Adams's concern about beings discarded by the universe is surely a consequence of his eternalist beliefs. He argues personal survival is a necessity, though we never discover why. …
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