Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89
2013; United States Army War College; Volume: 42; Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0031-1723
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoAfghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 By Rodric Braithwaite Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 417 pages $29.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and decade-long military operation of Russian forces in remote Central Asian country has been subject of numerous studies focused on how Soviet Army fought and lost asymmetric against Western-backed Afghan Mujahedin guerrillas. The US-led military intervention in Afghanistan, in wake of 9/11 al Qaeda-linked terrorist attacks in United States from bases in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, has spurred renewed interest in studying military history of turbulent land, particularly Soviet against Afghan resistance in 1980s. Rodric Braithwaite's Afghantsy: Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 is one of latest books on subject and most comprehensive story of Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The author uses a variety of primary sources, which are all listed with full citations in order of presentation at end of volume. As it is based almost exclusively on Russian sources, it is, in fact, Russian perspective of drawn-out conflict. From Soviets' road to Kabul to their entanglement in disasters of war and eventually to the long goodbye, Braithwaite walks reader through minutiae of Soviet soldiers' saga, for most part in their own words. is a story of how Soviet leadership, its military, and individual servicemen behaved in face of a difficult situation. Further, tome exemplifies effect of brutal on Soviet soldiers, their families, and Russian public at large. The author shares common assertion of Soviet military historians that Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was defensive in nature and aimed at ending a chaotic situation in Soviet Union's immediate neighborhood. However, author acknowledges invasion came against a backdrop of a long history of Russian interests in Afghanistan. It took Russians two hundred and fifty years to go to Kabul, he writes. The ambition to expand southward in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and efforts to secure its frontiers against undesirable neighbors and protect pacified areas from lawless tribes beyond them have long been hallmark of Russian strategy in greater Central Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ultimate prize of Great Game that Russian and British empires played in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and served as a peaceful battleground for East-West ideological battle during Cold War. The author takes note of a number of previous irritations in Russo-Afghan relations following Russian conquest of Central Asia: Russian troops' encroachment on Afghan territory in 1885 and capture of Panjdeh--a border town between Herat and Marv; Red Army's furious pursuit of Central Asian rebels across Afghan border in 1920s; and Stalin's military intervention in northern Afghanistan in 1929 to support beleaguered Afghan King Amanullah. The bloody Communist coup of 27 April 1978, was led by Moscow-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), overthrew Daud regime, and opened way for wider involvement of Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But, as General Lyakhovski, a Soviet chronicler of and an Afghan veteran, was quoted as saying: April coup was beginning of tragedy not only for Afghanistan but for Soviet Union as well. Although Braitwaite does not see reliable evidence that Russians were behind coup, PDPA leaders were closely linked to Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) since early 1950s and were under Soviet control. Whatever role Soviet Union did or did not play in staging coup, Communist takeover was not immediate reason to put in motion forthcoming Soviet invasion of country. …
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