US Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present and Future
2001; The MIT Press; Volume: 81; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
ResumoAfter tracing the history of Army decisionmaking doctrine, the author proposes wide-ranging examination of our procedures, organizations and culture. In the end, the military decisionmaking process emerges as a valuable tool for coordinating intuition with analysis, task with purpose, plans with operations, and the present with the future. RUDIMENTARY military staff organization and procedures have developed since 2000 B.C., beginning probably with the armies of early Egypt. But, according to James D. Hittle, a historian of the military staff, the modern staff system did not emerge until late in the 19th century, even later for the US Army. Hittle postulates that modem staff systems have certain features: * A regular education system for training staff officers. * Delegation of authority from the commander. * Supervised execution of orders issued by or through the staff. * A set method of procedure by which each part performs specific duties.1 Hittle's proposed characteristics would certainly describe the successful formation of the Prussian Generalstab (general staff) under General Helmuth von Moltke in the latter 19th century. The Generalstab was largely responsible for orchestrating Germany's rapid defeat of France in 1870. During the industrial age, military theory began viewing armies as machines of the nation-state. Detailed algorithms of mobilization, rail schedules and troop movements became the business of army staffs as keys to decisive victory. In von Moltke's time, the Germans proved that an army that could plan detailed requirements, orchestrate capabilities rapidly and implement them precisely would win large-scale wars of national mobilization. The Generalstab's power eventually usurped civilian policy because the exhaustive, inflexible military decisionmaking process (MMP) and planning actually drove political decisions. The best example of this was at the beginning of World War I when Germany executed the Schlieffen plan. Named for Alfred von Schlieffen, head of the Generalstab from 1892 to 1906, the Schlieffen plan called for swift victory against France through a flanking attack across neutral Belgium. The greatest flaw in the plan was the Generalstab's assumption that victory would come in six weeks, thereby allowing Germany to respond to the expected sluggish Russian mobilization on a potential eastern front.2 The Schlieffen plan case shows that excellence in planning alone will not overcome a flawed military strategy or concept of operations; operations may fail not only by being unsuccessfully implemented, but also by being successfully implemented then proven inadequate.3 The US form of government makes forming a Generalstab-like military staff unlikely, even distasteful. Civil authority over the military is vested in the US Constitution, making the military purposely subservient to civilian decisionmakers and the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, modern nations have adopted ideas from the German staff model. History of Modern US Army Staff Officers' Doctrine As the Schlieffen plan was being developed and the world drew closer to World War I, the US Army lacked published staff doctrine. The 1910 publication, Regulations for Field Maneuvers, did not include a description of staff processes; a 1914 field service regulation (FSR) mentioned the need for a commander and staff estimating process but did not describe one.4 Following World War 1, the 1924 version of the FSR included doctrinal formatted orders with required annexes, maps and tables. Still, the FSR stated only that leaders should first make an estimate of the situation, culminating in a decision upon a definite plan of action.5 No procedural steps were provided to explain this process. In 1932 the Staff Officers' Field Manual compiled principles, information and data to be used as a guide for the operation of staffs of all units and territorial commands, in peace and war, rather than a set of rules and regulations to be rigidly and blindly followed. …
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