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Settled objectives and rational constraints

1991; University of Illinois Press; Volume: 28; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

2152-1123

Hugh J. McCann,

Free Will and Agency

interest partly for their antireductionist implica? tions, since other motivational states, in particu lar states of desire, are not similarly encumbered. Part of the human condition is to have incompatible desires, and we are not criticizably irrational if we want to do what we believe we cannot. Equally important, however, are the implications for the theory of practical rationality. Very roughly, whether an intention is rational would seem to depend first and fore? most on whether the objective it embodies is one whose pursuit offers an acceptable chance of our changing things in ways we take to be for the better. Constraints like those cited may be viewed as instructions on when the chance is acceptable: that inconsistent objectives are al? ways unreasonable, and that it is never rational to pursue a goal unless we think the chances favor success?or, on the weaker view, unless we at least do not expect to fail. Any of these latter claims would, if true, constitute an impor? tant principle of practical rationality. Unfortunately, all are false. There are a num? ber of examples in which it is rational for agents to try to achieve goals they believe they will not accomplish, and some of the examples involve mutually incompatible objectives. Moreover, it turns out that when, unexpectedly, such attempts succeed, the sought-after goals are achieved in? tentionally, notwithstanding the fact the above constraints would forbid their being intended. Now ordinarily at least, we expect a person who A's intentionally to have intended to A. Thus a plausible response to the examples in question is to treat them as exceptions to the norm, and allow that in them we may intend objectives that would ordinarily be ruled out. But some authors balk at this, and instead reject what they call the View?i.e., the principle that anyone whoA's intentionally intends to A.4 My purpose here is to defend this principle. Rejecting the Simple View, I shall claim, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of inten?