Plato on Identity, Sameness, and Difference
2004; Philosophy Education Society Inc.; Volume: 58; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
2154-1302
Autores Tópico(s)Classical Philosophy and Thought
ResumoAMONG THE CONCEPTS CENTRAL to Plato's metaphysical vision are those of identity, sameness, and difference. For example, it is on basis of a claim about putative cases of sameness among different that Plato postulates existence of separate forms. It is owing to apparent sameness between instances of forms and forms themselves that Plato is compelled somehow to take account of potentially destructive, vicious infinite regress arguments. Further, in reflecting on forms and their relations among themselves, it is their self-identity that seems to be threatened or at least compromised. In providing an account of possibility of cognition in Timaeus, Plato evidently sees need to incorporate principles of identity and difference into soul's very fabric. In this paper, I propose to explore some of systematic connections between these concepts. Translators have sometimes obscured fact that there are such connections. The Greek terms [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.], and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) are variously rendered, often in ways that obscure metaphysics. For example, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] is most commonly rendered in English as same, which, predictably, leads [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] to be translated as or similar. This has suggested to some that if two are or similar, then they are not the and similar are not, as I shall show, well-formed or perspicuous metaphysical concepts. There is no justification for foisting them on Plato; rendering terms thus often leads scholars to miss force of Plato's arguments. In addition, translating [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] as threatens to trivialize a fundamental concept in Plato, leading to complaints that to say that something is the as itself is to say nothing at all. Let us begin with quasi-technical use of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]. (1) Consider this passage, part of second regress argument in Parmenides: [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] Mary Louise Gill, most other English translators, translates this line: But if are by partaking of something, won't that be form itself? (3) The justification for like things is clear enough. When two are large, to take previous example in dialogue, Socrates wants to posit a single form of Largeness. (4) The implication of meaning of like things is that are like, in this case, large, with respect to property of largeness. One avoids saying that are the same because if there are two things, they cannot be, simply, same. Yet they clearly are like, according to this way of thinking, because they have identical property. If this were not so, that is, if two were because they each had a property that was other, then we could ask about what it is that makes each property other. Presumably, this would be because they are in some respect. In short, avoidance of a vicious infinite regress requires that likeness be functionally related to sameness. It requires that there be a fundamental sameness in virtue of which any claim about likeness can be made. Accordingly, it is sameness not likeness that needs to do all work in argument that is supposed to lead to postulation of separate forms. It is owing to fact that, say, one largeness in one thing is as another largeness in another that a form of Largeness is posited in first place. (5) If it were only likeness and not sameness that is fundamental datum, then, since anything can be held to be anything else in some respect, it would be entirely opaque what forms are that are supposed to explain this likeness. If we insist on logical priority of concept of sameness to concept of likeness in argument, we can see why Socrates' attempt to avoid first regress argument in Parmenides, so-called third man argument, by insisting that instances of forms are [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII. …
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