From Viceroy of India to Viceroy of Brazil? The Count of Linhares at Court (1636-39)
2001; Modern Humanities Research Association; Volume: 17; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1353/port.2001.0009
ISSN2222-4270
Autores Tópico(s)Early Modern Spanish Literature
ResumoFromViceroy ofIndiatoViceroy ofBrazil? The CountofLinhares atCourt(1636-39) ANTHONY DISNEY On 15December 1636a battered Portuguese Indiaman, theNossa Senhora de Saúde,limpedintotheportofMálaga after a longanddifficult voyage from Goa. On boardwasD. MigueldeNoronha, fourth CountofLinhares, who was returning to Europeafteran absenceof almosteightyearsas Viceroy ofPortuguese India.Assoonas newsofhisarrival inSpainreached Madrid,Linhares wassummoned tocourt. However, before hecouldleave forthecapitalthere also arrived inMálaga a smallvesselbearing muchneedednaval suppliesfromCádiz fortheonwardvoyageof theNossa Senhora deSaúdetoLisbon.Thecommander ofthis vessel wasD. Francisco Manuel de Melo, thenjustan ambitiousyoungservicenobleman,but subsequently oneofthemostimportant Portuguese literary figures ofthe mid-seventeenth century. The meeting thatensuedbetween Linhares and Melo wouldhavea majorimpact onthefutures ofbothmen.1 In thewinter of1636-37Linhares had longbeenoutoftouchwiththe lifeofthecourt,and was eagerfornews.Melo, on theotherhand,was wellinformed on courtpolitics, and withmatters concerning Portugal in particular. He hadanexceptionally acutemind andpersuasive tongue, and was willing andableto brief Linhares. In thecourseoftheir encounter in Málaga it seemsviewswereexchangedand thefoundations laid fora personaland politicalfriendship - a friendship thatmay well have developed further ontheroadthrough AndalusiaandNewCastile, foritis knownthatMelo wenttoMadridataboutthesametimeas Linhares, and thetwocouldeasilyhavetravelled together.2 Inanyevent, their association grewsteadily closer,andbytheyear'sendMelo was addressing Linhares fulsomely as, 'greatfriend'.3 Itwas a friendship thatassumedsomeofthe characteristics of a patron-client relationship, forthoughMelo was of good family he was thenrelatively poor, and also some twenty years younger thantheCount.Melo wouldlateracknowledge themany favours hereceived from Linhares.4 1British Library(hereafter BL) Sloane Ms.197fol.76; EdgarPrestage, D. FranciscoManuel de Melo (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1922),p. 21. LBothLinharesand Melo travelledfromMalaga to Madrid in January1637. See BL Sloane Ms. 197fol.76; Prestage, p. 22. D. FranciscoManuel deMelo, CartasFamiliares, ed. byMaria da Conceição Morais Sarmento (Lisbon:ImprensaNacional, 1981)p. 64. D. FranciscoManuel de Melo, AlteraçõesdeÉvora1637,ed. byJoelSerrão(Lisbon:Portugalia Editora,1967),p. 71. THE COUNT OF LINHARES AT COURT II5 AtthetimewhenLinhares first encountered Melo atMálaga Portuguese affairs at theHabsburgcourthad entered a difficult phase.As Linhares wouldhavebeenaware,undertheterms ofitsunionwithCastilehalfa century earlier,Portugalhad retainedits own separatelaws, customs, coinage, and exclusivelyPortuguese-administered empire.To handle Portuguese matters inMadrida CouncilofPortugal hadbeenestablished in1582,themembership ofwhich wasreserved exclusively for Portuguese.5 Butby1636FelipeIV's chief minister, theCount-Duke ofOlivares, hadfor several yearsbeentrying to undermine theintent oftheseprovisions. His aim was to integrate Portugaland the otheroutlying kingdomsmore closely withCastile,inordertomakethem paya larger shareofthecosts ofthemonarchy as a whole.Castile,he believed, had fortoo longborne theburden ofresponsibility ofa great poweralmostalone,anditwastime otherkingdoms contributed more,particularly in theprovision of manpowerandrevenue . Thisinturnrequired a modification oftheir liberties and theirlaws - in short,it demandedgreatercentralization and, effectively, Castilianization.6 Bythewinter of1636-37there wasanintense struggle inprogress within theCouncilofPortugal overtheextent to whichcentralization shouldbe accepted, withsomemembers deeplysuspicious oftheimplied erosionof Portuguese liberties. The thenpresident of the Council,the Duke of Villahermosa, was a long-time collaborator of Olivares.He had beena member oftheCouncilforoverthirty years, andhadactedas itspresident sincetheinception of Olivares'ssupremacy.7 So close to Olivareswas Villahermosa consideredto be, thatMelo called him 'the favourite's favourite'.8 It was in fact Villahermosawho in 1634 had suggested appointing PrincessMargaretof Savoy,the king'scousin,Viceroyof Portugal, a moveintended tofacilitate theintegration ofthekingdom into theSpanishmonarchy, inaccordance withOlivares'sstrategy. Butby1636 Villahermosa was playing a much-decreased roleintheday-to-day affairs oftheCouncil,probably becauseofheavyinvolvements elsewhere.9 This was to theadvantage ofDiogo Soares,theCouncil'sable and ambitious 5 JoaquimVeríssimoSerrão,Históriade Portugal,12 vols (Lisbon: EditorialVerbo,1979),iv, 14-19,251-53. As earlyas 1625-26 it was rumouredOlivares aimed to establish4oneking,one law, one coinage'.J.H. Elliott,'RevoltsintheSpanishMonarchy',inPreconditions ofRevolutioninEarly ModernEurope,ed. byRobertForster andJackP. Greene(Baltimore and London:JohnHopkins University Press,1970),p. 118. ' berrão,iv,68. 8*jf-1_jll.i-._-:~_--r»-A .1 . .1 17 . ' I 1 S->' • y~< ' lviciu,nueraçues,p. oz. mioinercontemporary, me venenanamDassauor'jiovanni vjiusunian , describedVillahermosaas one of the Count-Duke's three'più confidenti ministri'.See Spagna,Relazionidi Ambasciatori Venetial Senato: io (Turin:Bottegad'Erasmo,1965-[1998J ), p.69. Villahermosawas appointedto theCouncil of Statein 1633.J. H. Elliottand JoséF. de la Peña,Memorialesy Cartasdel Conde Duque de Olivares,2 vols (Madrid: Alfaguara,1978-80), 11, 130. Il6 ANTHONY DISNEY Secretary. WiththeapprovalofOlivares,Soareshad gradually contrived to concentrate management and controloftheCouncil'saffairs intohis ownhands,so thatbythetimeofLinhares's return Soareshadeffectively takenoveras itsdriving force, particularly running theagendaon fiscal matters. The extraordinary riseofDiogo SoaresinPortuguese affairs inMadrid during the1630s,andthehostility itprovoked from manyoftheresident Portuguese nobility, form anessential backdrop totherolewhichLinhares cametoplayatcourt, andthemanner inwhichhedidso. Soares,theson of a minorLisbonbureaucrat, arrived in Madridin 1631, and therehe quicklyattractedthe attentionof Olivares.10 Impressedby Soares's professionalism andhisapparent willingness toapplycentralizing reforms to Portugal, theCount-Duke swiftly brought himintotheregime's inner circle. InNovember 1631Soareswasappointed Secretary totheCouncilof Portugal, abruptly replacing Francisco deLucenawhohadserved competently inthatoffice forseventeen years.11 FromthenonSoaresreceived the unwavering protection and support ofOlivares,who particularly valued his services in matters relating to finance and taxation.It seemsSoares further strengthened his positionby encouraging the appointment of Princess Margaret ofSavoyas Viceroy ofPortugal, probably calculating thatshewouldprovelittlemorethana figurehead who could be easily manipulated. Thenin 1634hesecured theappointment ofhisbrother-inlaw andfather-in-law, Miguelde Vasconcelos, as Secretary totheCouncil of Statein Lisbon. In the finalyearsof Habsburgruleit was widely believed, bySpaniards as wellas Portuguese, thatSoaresandVasconcelos between them virtually controlled theadministration ofPortugal.12 SoaresandVasconcelos werenotoriously unpopular amongallclassesof Portuguese, andVasconcelos required almostconstant protection from the angerof thepopulace.Fundamentally thishostility stemmed fromthe pair's associationwith two much resentedaspects of the regime's centralizing strategy. Firstly, therewas thepolicyofincreasing taxation, mainly tohelppayforthewareffort andrelieve thehugeburden already imposedon Castile.Thiswas clearly an issuethattouchedall classesbutthere was a secondcontroversial issuethatparticularly concerned the 10On Soaressee D. FranciscoManuel de Melo, Epanáforasde VariaHistoriaPortuguesa, ed. by JoelSerrão(Lisbon:ImprensaNacional/Casa da Moeda, 1977),pp. 19-2.5and 76-77; Matías de Novoa, 'Historia de FelipeIV, Rey de España', in Colección de Documentos Inéditospara la Historiade España, 113 vols (Madrid: Imprentade Miguel Ginesta,1863-90) lxxvii, 332-34; Elliottand Peña,11, 128-30,n. 3. 11 José Emidio Amaro, Francisco de Lucena (Lisbon: Institutopara a alta cultura, 1945), pp. 96-98 and 104-06. ror example,theSpaniardl'ellicerclaimedloares was muyvalido del àenor laonde uuque [. . .] yel que despachaba absolutemente todo lo tocanteá aquel Reyno' JoséPellicer de Ossua y Tovar,'Avisoshistóricos.. .',11 December1640,inSemanarioErudito^ ed. byAntonioValladares de Sotomayor,34vols (Madrid:Don Blas Roman, 1787-91),xxxi, 250. THE COUNT OF LINHARES AT COURT II7 nobility. Thiswastheregime's determination tobreak thealleged pervasive influence of a powerful groupwithinthe Portuguese elite,whichwas particularly associatedwiththenameoftheCountofPortalegre, andwas usually referred tosimply as thePortalegre faction. According to Soares,by the early1630s the Portalegre factionhad managed tosecurea nearmonopoly overoffices, pensions andotherstate perquisites in Portugal, and itsvestedinterests had cometo constitute a seriousobstacleto implementing the regime'spolicies.13 The regime's intention to deal withtheproblem was foreshadowed intheterms ofthe Viceroy Princess Margaret's appointment, whereitwas declaredthatone oftheobjectives of heradministration would be to eliminate 'factions', and ensurethatfromthattimeonwards,honoursand grantsof office wouldbe madeon merit only.In actualfact,itis clearthatSoares,who was probably thedriving force behindthepolicy, was primarily intent on breaking downthepowerofthePortalegre group.14 The leaderofthePortalegre faction, D. Diogo da Silva,fifth Countof Portalegre, washimself anex-governor ofPortugal (1623-27).Although he had retired, and was apparently crippledwithgout,he remainedan influential force inPortuguese politics right downtohisdeathinMadridin 1640.Asteadfast opponent ofimposing additional taxation without calling thePortuguese Cortes,Portalegre eventually becamea popularsymbol of resistance. So respected werehisviewsamongtheregime's opponents, that theywere allegedlytreatedas something close to oracular.15 Other prominent members of thePortalegre factionincludedthe Marquisof Gouveia (who was Portalegre's younger brother), thecountsof Castro Daire,Pradoand São João,theBishopofLeiria,theelderly Duchessof Aveiro, D. Franciscode Mascarenhasand Manuel de Vasconcelos, who werebothmembers oftheCouncilofPortugal, Luisda SilvaoftheCouncil ofStateinLisbon,andthedismissed Secretary, Francisco de Lucena.The Countof Basto was probablyalso a member, as was theMarquis of CasteloRodrigo,theson ofPhilipIPs trusted minister, D. Franciscode Moura.16 According to Melo,theultimate objective ofSoares'scampaign againstthePortalegre group,whichwas wagedmostly in secret, was to remove greatnoblemen from government entirely and replacethemwith 13See secretreportpreparedby Diogo Soares, probablyin 1634,of whichtwo knowncopies survive, one in theBibliotecaNacional, Lisbon,codex pombalina647 fols61-67, tneotherin Évoracodex cv/2-19fols113-18. 14See article7 ofinstructions giventoPrincess MargaretinNovember1634,whicharepublished in AntonioCanovas del Castillo, Estudios del Remado de Felipe /V, 2 vols (Madrid: Pérez Dubrull, 1888), 1,332-33. In an anonymous'papel sobre cosas tocantesal reynode Portugal' (1638?)inSimancas,legajo2660,itisstatedthatPrincess Margaretwas senttoPortugal especially to end los parcialidadesq havia entrelos caballeros' (I am indebtedto SirJohnElliottforthis reference). 15Atleastthiswas whatSoaresalleged.Évora,codex cv/2-19fol.ii3v. Evora,codex cv/2-19fols113-18. Il8 ANTHONY DISNEY bureaucrats fullydependent on the crown.17 In thishe was probably echoing a viewwidely heldamongthenobility generally.18 Against thisbackground itbecomesclearwhyinthewinter of1636-37 Melo had beenso readyto courtLinhares. Forherewas a richgrandee, fresh from an apparently successful termas viceroy in Goa and eagerto playa roleinMadridcommensurate with hisrank, reputation andservices. Surely he might becomea rallying pointforthosemanyPortuguese who opposedtheinfluence ofDiogo Soares,ifhecouldbepersuaded tolendhis support?In any event,soon afterhis arrivalin Madrid Linhareswas summoned to appearbefore theking,and theaudiencetookplaceat the BuenRetiroon 12February 1637.Linhares, whopresented PhilipIV with an exquisitely beautiful diamondjewel forhis hat, and gave equally splendid gifts toother members oftheroyalfamily, waswarmly welcomed and the audiencewas, fromhis pointof view,a gratifying success.19 Probably Linhares hopedhecouldthen enjoya periodofre-adjustment recuperating , attending totheaffairs ofhishouseandfamily, savouring the court,baskingin recognition and honours,and beingdeferred to as a valuedcouncillor. The offer ofsomeillustrious office might followa little later.Whathe almostcertainly did notexpect,norwelcome,was what actually happened. Scarcely hadheleft theking'spresence on 12February whenOlivaresturned tohim,andalmostinthesamebreath as applauding thegenerosity andgoodtasteofhisgifts, askedhimtogotoBrazil.20 Whydid Olivarescome up withthisdemand,apparently withsuch unseemly haste? Theanswer liesinanintractable problem that hadplagued theregime foralmostsevenyears. In 1630theDutchWestIndiaCompany had suddenly seizedtherichBraziliansugarcolonyofPernambuco, and over the next half decade graduallyextendedits controlover the neighbouring captaincies. Soon abouthalfofsettled Brazilhad fallento the Dutch company.The damage to the Portugueseeconomywas considerable, whilethemonarchy as a wholeexperienced a humiliating lossofreputation. Since1633Olivareshadbeenengaged ina desperate and increasingly frustrating searchto finda credible commander to organize and lead a counter-expedition to recover thelosses.Atleastsixattempts had alreadybeenmadeto recruit a captain-general, butall, forvarious 17 Melo, Alterações,p. 70. Novoa, 'Historiade FelipeIV, p. 333. iyAntonioRodriguez Villa, La Corte y Monarquia de tspana en los Anos de 1636 y 103J (Madrid:Luis Navarro,1886),p. 95; FrSebastianGonzalez SJto FrPerera,Madrid,16February 1637 in Memorial HistóricoEspañol, 48 vols (Madrid: Academia de la Historia,1851-1918 ), xiv, 41-42. Villa,p. 96; Melo, Epanáforas,pp. 494-95. THE COUNT OF LINHARES AT COURT II9 reasons,had failed.21 Thus, by the timeof Linhares'saudience,the Pernambuco question hadbecomea serious embarrassment inurgent need ofa solution.Underthecircumstances Linhares'sreappearance at court probably seemedtoOlivaresnothing short ofprovidential. Forherewas a commodity theninvery short supply - a prestigious service nobleman of great experience, successful, rich, apparently resourceful, anda Portuguese. No wondertheCount-Dukedid nothesitate to shift his choiceforthe Pernambuco command toLinhares. However,Olivares'srequestplaced Linhareshimself in an extremely awkward position. Obviously hedidnotwishtoseemunco-operative; but hehadonlyjustcompleted anextremely longandhazardousvoyagehome after anabsenceofnearly eight exhausting years intheEast,andhadbarely set footon Iberiansoil. To accept the commandwould have meant embarking almostimmediately upon anotherprolongedand high-risk overseas assignment againsta powerful andwell-entrenched enemy. Ifthe expedition succeeded, hisreputation woulddoubtless be muchenhanced; but the chancesof failureand humiliation wereveryreal. Moreover, despitepreviousservicein NorthAfricaand India,Linhareshad little experience oflarge-scale navaloperations, and was probably unsure how wellhecouldmanagesuchan enterprise. Buthewas all toofamiliar with themonarchy's acuteshortage ofmilitary andnavalresources brought on byover-commitment, and wouldcertainly havesharedthemisgivings of theother proposed leaders whohadalready turned downthecommand. Under the circumstances Linhares'sreactionwas predictable.He protested a loyalwillingness tocomply, butrequested a muchlarger force thanOlivareswasprepared togrant. He raiseda string ofdifficulties, held outforextravagant personalconcessions, andgenerally prevaricated. But itwas a dangerous gametoplayandcouldnotbe prolonged indefinitely. So, through1637 and the earlymonthsof 1638,the questionof the Pernambuco commandhungthreateningly overLinhares'shead,a stubbornproblem thatsimply wouldnotgoaway.Meanwhile, onhisreturn to courtLinhares had beenappointed a member oftheCouncilofPortugal. Withtheexception ofVillahermosa, he easilyoutstripped all hisfellow Councilmembers intitleandrank- andoverevenVillahermosa hehad the advantageof being unequivocally Portuguese, by both birthand upbringing. Villahermosa's commitment to theCouncilwas in anycase 21D. Fadriquede Toledo, D. Filipe da Silva, the Marquis of Vellada, D. JorgeMascarenhas (twice),João PereiraCorte-Real,and D. Fernandode Toledo, amongothers, had all beenchosen successively,but for various reasons none had gone on to serve. See Villa, p. 83; Melo, Epanáforas,pp. 492-93; Memorial Histórico Español, xiii, 109, no and 363; C. R. Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Strugglefor Brazil and Angola 1602-1686 (London: Athlone,1952), p. 116;JonathanBrownand J. H. Elliott,A Palace fora King (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,1980),pp. 172-73; LorraineWhite,'Dom JorgeMascarenhas:FamilyTradition andPowerPoliticsinHabsburgPortugal*, Portuguese Studies,14 (1998),80-81. I2O ANTHONY DISNEY waning. So thespotlight inevitably shifted toLinhares who,within a short spaceoftime, waselevated tothecouncil'spresidency.22 Linhares wasthe first ex-viceroy to head thecouncilsincethegreatViceroy-Archbishop D. FreiAleixodeMenesesthirty years before. The suddenreturn ofLinhares toMadridandhisswift elevation tothe presidency oftheCouncilofPortugal posedsomething ofa problem for Secretary Soares. Though it is unclearwhether Soares knewLinhares personally before heleft for Indiain1628,thetwohadcertainly maintained friendly indirect contactduringthe latter'sabsence,and Linhareshad takencare to sendSoares severalexpensivegiftsfromIndia. One was conveyedhome fromGoa by the Secretary's son, Valentim Soares,in 1633. 23Itistherefore likely thatwhenLinhares returned toMadridSoares feltno particular hostility to him.Certainly he had nothing to associate LinhareswiththePortalegre group- butthenneither had he anyfirm evidenceof the Count's politicalreliability. In a secretreporton the Portuguese nobility in1634Soareshadmerely saidofLinhares thathewas inIndia,andwas a person'well-known forhisqualityandcharacter'.24 It is evident, however, thata Portuguese ofLinhares's stature advancing so swiftly within theCouncilof Portugal constituted a potential threat to Soares'scontrol ofitsaffairs. TheSecretary wasnotina position toprevent thatadvance,so initially heappearstohavetried to secureLinhares's cooperationthroughovertures of friendship. Though Linharesdid not immediately rejecttheseblandishments, the flirtation was nonetheless short-lived, andprobably never very convincing toeither party. Linhares, whosevalueswereemphatically thoseofthehigher nobility and who,as we haveseen,hadprobably alreadybeenheavily lobbiedbyMelo against Soaresandwhathestoodfor,was very unlikely to remain subservient to such an upstart forlong.His instinctive sympathies werealwayswith Soares'snobleantagonists, so thatdifferences withtheSecretary could hardly havebeenavoided.Within months their rivalry intheCouncilwas obvious,andbegantodevelopintoanintense personal animosity.25 As 1637 progressed, Linharesbecame increasingly associated,at a personal level,withindividuals identified withthePortalegre faction. One ofhisdaughters, Arcangela Maria,married theCountofSão João;another 22Melo somewhatenigmatically describesLinhares's riseto pre-eminence in the Council of Portugalinthewords,'por váriosacidentesfoiacomodado no lugarde conselheirosupremode PortugalDom Miguelde NoronhaConde de Linhares':Alterações,p. 82. 23 Anthony Disney,The Viceroyas Entrepreneur: theCountofLinharesatGoa inthe1630s, in Emporta, Commoditiesand Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C.1400-1750, ed. by RoderichPtakand DietmarRothermund (Stuttgart: FranzSteiner Verlag,1991),pp. 441-42. 24Évoracodex cv/2-19,fol.117. This is clear fromMelo s commentsin Alterações,pp. 69, 109 and in, but also rrom Linhares's well-knownreputationfor touchinesswhich had been repeatedlydisplayed in Morocco and India. THE COUNT OF LINHARES AT COURT 121 daughter married theCountofSarzedas.TheninDecember D. Fernando, Linhares's eldest son,married theonlydaughter oftheMarquisofGouveia, Portalegre's brother.26 Linhares hadtherefore acquired closetieswithsome ofthosemoststrongly opposedtocentralization - families whoseheads alleventually supported theBragançaRestoration. Infact, ifMelo istobe believed,alreadyin thespringof 1637,well beforeall thesemarriage allianceshad beenformalized, Linhares andSoareshad begunto operate as therespective leadersofopposinggroupson theCouncilofPortugal.27 Inthepolitical struggle that nowunfolded there islittle doubtthatLinhares had thelargerfollowing; buthis grouplackedreal coherence. Soares's groupwas better organized, and,ofcourse,theviewsitpromoted were generally moreconsistent withthoseofOlivares.Soares,theprofessional bureaucrat, pursuedhis purposewitha concentrated dedicationthatit seemsthe aristocratic Linharescould not match,and apparently the Secretary usuallygot his way.28 Linharesmayhave been hamperedby sickness. Certainly hislawyer in1638claimedhehadreached Madridfrom Indiainvery poorhealth, whileMelo also refers to Linhares beingillandeven , somewhat improbably, hints atpoison.29 Moreover Linhares had manyand variedconcerns, bothpublicand private, to occupyhismind after hislongoverseasabsence.He was therefore unwilling, andprobably unable, togivetheevolving political struggle with Soaresthesingle-minded concentration itrequired. Despite his increasingly tense relationship with SecretarySoares, throughout thespringand summer of 1637 Linharesremained in high favour at court,enjoying boththeesteemoftheKing,and theapparent confidence oftheCount-Duke.30 Politically thiswasthepeakofhiscareer. He was operating close to theverycentreof power,witha real say in determining policyforthegovernance ofPortugal andtheempire. Yethis position washighly vulnerable. Itistruethattheenemies ofSoares- men likeMelo - had eagerlyattachedthemselves to hiscoattails,and to a degreehad made himtheirspokesman.ButLinhareshad no organized politicalfollowing ofhisown,and was almosttotally dependent on the goodwill oftheKingandOlivares. Inturn, thisgoodwillwasclosely linked tohisappointment tothePernambuco expedition. Aslongas heremained a credible commander-designate ofthatenterprise hispolitical flanks were 26 Ajuda, codex49-XÜ-39, fol.60;Villa,pp.124and234. Melo,Alterações, pp.69-70. Melocommented, 'neste contenda excedia sempre a indústria doSoaresà diligencia doconde quefiado emsuagrandeza domaisfaziapoucocaso':Alterações, p.71. ANTTCartório dosJesuítas, maço17,doe.69;Melo,Alterações, p.94. Melo,Alterações, pp.70,71,97and98;D. LuísdeMeneses, CondedeEriceira, Historia de Portugal Restaurado, ed.byAntónio Álvaro Dória,4vols(Porto: Livraria Civilização, 1945-46), 1,90. 122 ANTHONY DISNEY virtually unassailable, evenbySoares.Butultimately thatcredibility would havetobeputtothetest, as Linhares himself surely realized. Linhares'sstrategy on the Pernambucocommandwas to prolong negotiations, andtry toholdoutfor thelargest force possible. He requested 20,000 men,whichwas almostsixtyper centmorethanthe original commander-designate, D. Fadriquede Toledo, had demanded.31 But to Olivares,withthemonarchy desperately shortofresources ofall kinds, thiswas outofthequestion.(Whenan expedition did eventually sail in September1638 its military strength was only 5,00o.)32Nevertheless Olivaresdidtry to havean adequateforce assembled, and seemsto have beengenuinely anxiousthroughout mostof1637to retain theservices of Linhares as commander. To do this, anextraordinary packageofpersonal inducements wasputtogether. A draft agreement hadalready beendrawn upas early as April, andthiswasexpandedandmademuchmoregenerous initsfinal form inDecember1637.Byitsterms Linhares was to be made Marquis of Viseu, 'generalda mar e terra',forthe durationof the expedition, andViceroy ofBrazil'ifhewishes it'.On hisreturn from Brazil hewouldeither himself be madeViceroy ofPortugal or,intheevent that Princess Margaret was stillinoffice, herLieutenant General.He was also tohavethehereditary office of'capitãogeralda marde Portugal'. Various financial benefits includedan annualsalaryof 12,000ducatsduringhis servicein Brazil,an immediate grant-in-aid of24,000ducats,an annual gratuity of5,000ducatsforhimself inperpetuity, and2,500ducatsforhis daughter-in-law. Whenhehimself assumedhismarquisate, hiseldestson wouldbecomeCountofLinhares, hissecondsonwouldreceive theoffice of Marshalof Portugal in perpetuity, and histhirdson wouldbe made Governor ofCeuta.The totalvalueofall thebenefits offered was saidto amountto 600,000ducats.33 Theseconditions werereinforced withsome remarkable displays ofroyalaffection. On oneextraordinary occasionthe kingallegedly saidto Linhares, after publicly embracing him,'Either I or youwillhavetogotoBrazil'.34 Suchterms andblandishments putLinhares underenormouspressure, and it is hardlysurprising thateventually, despiteall hisdoubtsand hesitations, he agreedto go. The decisiononce made,preparations movedforward - and bymidsummer courtgossip haditthatLinhares wouldsetsailthefollowing March.35 However, itwas at thispointthatan entirely unexpected factorsuddenlyenteredthe 31 Villa,p. 115;Luís AugustoRebelloda Silva,Históriade PortugalnosSéculosXVll e XVÌÌI, 5 vols (Lisbon:ImprensaNacional, 1860-71), m,462. Boxer,p. 116. This summary isbased on Newberry Library, Chicago,Ms. 161,and Villa,p. 124. 34 Villa,p. 161. Newberry, Ms. 161;Villa,p. 175. THE COUNT OF LINHARES AT COURT 123 equation,fornewsreachedMadridon 21 August1637oftheoutbreak of serious anti-government disturbances atÉvora. Initially, the eventsat Évora did not raise too much alarm. The government was informed thatan ad hocjuntaoflocal noblesledbythe elderly CountofBasto,a former governor ofPortugal, hadbeenorganized to calmmatters.36 The situation appearedmanageable, and as lateas 30 September Olivaresconfidently boastedthat,ifthepeopleofEvorahad notalready cometotheir senses, thena highcourtjudge,accompanied by a hangman, wouldsuffice to makethemdo so.37 ButtheEvoraprotesters hadinfact struck a deepandpopularchord, andduring thelatesummer of 1637 theirmovement spread rapidly.Withinweeks it had engulfed practically alloftheAlentejo andtheAlgarve, andevenextended north of theTagusas faras theBeiras.Essentially thedisturbances weretaxriots, a popularprotestagainstthe increasingly insistent efforts of the regime during the1630storaisethefiscal contribution ofPortugal to thecentral monarchy.38 In otherwords,they wereagainstprecisely thepolicieswith which Soareswasmostclosely identified within theCouncil. Whenthescaleofthetroublein Portugal beganto be realizedbythe central government in earlyOctober,theconflict betweenLinharesand Soareswithin theCouncilofPortugal intensified.39 Linhares arguedthat thedisturbances werea direct consequence oftheoppressive policiesthat Soareshadbeenchampioning, which haddriven thepeopletodesperation. It was a view shared by manyotherleadingPortuguese.40 Linhares apparently went ontoarguethatitwouldnowbeintheKing'sbestinterest to removeSoaresand Vasconcelos, as thetwo unpopular officials at the rootof theproblem.41 On theotherhand,Soares interpreted Evora as further proofof the need to distancegreatnoblemenfromthe royal administration, and relymoreon professional officials who werewholly dependent on thecrown.He mayalso have deliberately hintedat the allegedover-mightiness ofthehouseofBragança, albeitcautiously.42 Ifso, thiswas to raisetheregime's greatfear- thatwhathad begunat Evora couldescalateintoa nationalmovement tooverthrow theHabsburgs and re-establish a native Portuguese dynasty. 36The activities ofthejuntacan be tracedinthecorrespondence ofBastowithOlivaresand the Council of Portugal,containedin Basto's letterbookfor1631-38, in BL AdditionalMs. 28429, fols35-111. 37OlivarestoBasto, *oSeptember16$7,BL AdditionalMs. 28429,fols4OV. 38For the Évora disturbancessee Joel Serrao's introduction to Alterações,and António de Oliveira, Poder e Oposição Política no Período Filipino (1580-1640) (Lisbon: Difel, 1990), especiallyChapter4. fcriceira, 1,90. Bastoto Olivares,26 December1637,BL AdditionalMs. 28429,rol.80. Melo, Alterações,p.70-71. Melo, Alterações,p. 72. 124 ANTHONY DISNEY Olivares'shope in theautumnof 1637was thatthelocal Portuguese nobleswouldthemselves takethenecessary actiontoregain control ofthe disaffected areas.43 He also tookstepsto prepareCastilianarmiesin the wings,readyto intervene ifrequired. Discussionswiththemalcontents wereauthorized, and an attempt made at mediation;but thisproved abortive whenOlivares declared thetaxesunnegotiable, andordered Basto to see theywereimposedin full.44 Olivaresalso insisted on exemplary punishment, though itwouldbe punishment ofa handful ofringleaders only.Theremustbe a symbolic actofsubmission inexchange fora royal pardon.45 To arrange thisOlivaresdecideditwouldbe helpful to senda prominent Portuguese toÉvorafrom Madridwhocouldexplaintheterms, andpersuade thedissident leaderstosubmit. Castingroundfora suitable person tofulfil thisrolehischoiceonceagaindescended uponLinhares. Bythistimethedateforthedeparture ofthePernambuco expedition had definitely beensetforMarch 1638,and Linhareshad alreadybeen ordered toproceedtoLisbontomakepreparations. He was nowrequired to detourto Evora en route.Olivares'sinstructions werethathe must arrangefortwo mesteres fromeach of thedissident townsto cometo Madridinsackcloth andasheswithhalters roundtheir necks, andperform thegrovelling actofsubmission deemednecessary.46 Linhares dulyleft for Évoraon 7 December1637accompanied byhiseldestson,D. Fernando, andbyMelo. Two Évora-born notablesbelieved toha
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