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Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Mixed Duopoly

2011; Fuji Technology Press Ltd.; Volume: 15; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.20965/jaciii.2011.p0425

1343-0130

Nataliya Kalashnykova, Vladimir A. Bulavsky, Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov, Felipe J. Castillo Pérez,

Digital Platforms and Economics

In this paper, we consider a model of mixed duopoly with Conjectured Variations Equilibrium (CVE). The agents’ conjectures concern the price variations depending on the increase or decrease in their production outputs. We establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called an exterior equilibrium) for any set of feasible conjectures. To introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium, we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures (referred to as influence coefficients) and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (understood as a CVE with consistent conjectures). To prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non-differentiable demand functions, we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function derivative with respect to the market price.