The challenge of developing special economic zones in Africa: Evidence and lessons learnt
2022; Elsevier BV; Volume: 14; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/rsp3.12535
ISSN1757-7802
AutoresAndrés Rodríguez‐Pose, Federico Bartalucci, Susanne A. Frick, Amelia U. Santos‐Paulino, Richard Bolwijn,
Tópico(s)Regional Economics and Spatial Analysis
ResumoSpecial economic zones (SEZs) are mushrooming across the developing world. Increasingly, policymakers resort to zones with the aim of turning around their countries' economic fortunes. Zones are expected to deliver greater innovation, exports, knowledge and technological spillovers. Yet, little is known about the state of play of SEZs in Africa, where almost half of SEZ programmes are less than 10 years old. The recent proliferation of SEZs in the continent has rendered the need to ensure that SEZs deliver on their objectives more impelling, given the often non-negligible opportunity costs associated with SEZ development. This article addresses this knowledge gap and sheds light on African SEZ practices. The analysis of a novel dataset highlights that (i) African SEZs are on a steep upward trend and are changing in nature; (ii) the ability of African SEZs to attract industrial activity, proxied by firms, and generate employment remains limited; and (iii) African SEZ governance policies (over)rely on fiscal incentives and performance requirements. Case studies from Ethiopia, Morocco and South Africa suggest that those African SEZ programmes that have a well-targeted strategic focus, promote institutional collaboration and take a proactive approach to create linkages with the local economy are more likely to succeed. Las zonas económicas especiales (ZEE) están proliferando en todo el mundo en países en desarrollo. Cada vez más, los políticos recurren a estas zonas con el objetivo de cambiar el destino económico de sus países. Se espera que las zonas aporten más innovación, exportaciones, conocimientos y spillovers tecnológicos. Sin embargo, no se sabe mucho sobre la situación de las ZEE en África, donde casi la mitad de los programas de ZEE tienen menos de 10 años. La reciente proliferación de ZEE en el continente ha hecho más apremiante la necesidad de garantizar que las ZEE cumplan sus objetivos, dados los costos de oportunidad, a menudo no despreciables, asociados al desarrollo de las ZEE. Este artículo aborda esta laguna de conocimiento y esclarece las prácticas de las ZEE africanas. El análisis de un novedoso conjunto de datos pone de manifiesto que (i) las ZEE africanas presentan una marcada tendencia al alza y sus características están cambiando; (ii) la capacidad de las ZEE africanas para atraer la actividad industrial, indicada por las empresas, y generar empleo sigue siendo limitada; y (iii) las políticas de gobernanza de las ZEE africanas dependen (sobremanera) de los incentivos fiscales y los requisitos de desempeño. Los estudios de caso de Etiopía, Marruecos y Sudáfrica sugieren que los programas de ZEE africanas que tienen un enfoque estratégico bien orientado, promueven la colaboración institucional y adoptan un enfoque proactivo para establecer vínculos con la economía local tienen más probabilidades de éxito. 開発途上国では、経済特区(Special Economic zone:SEZ)が急増している。政策立案者は、自国の経済状況を好転させるために、経済特区を利用するようになってきている。経済特区は、より規模の大きなイノベーション、輸出、知識及び技術の波及効果をもたらすことが期待される。しかし、アフリカにおけるSEZの状況はほとんど知られておらず、アフリカのSEZプログラムのおよそ半分は実施されてから10年未満のものである。アフリカ大陸において最近SEZが急増しているが、SEZの開発に伴う機会費用は往々にしてかなりのものであることを考慮すると、SEZはその目的を確実に達成する必要性に迫られている。本稿では、この未知の領域を取り上げ、アフリカのSEZの実情を明らかにする。新しいデータセットを分析すると、以下の事項が明らかになった。1)アフリカのSEZは急激な増加傾向にあり、その特性は変化している。2)アフリカのSEZが企業に代わって産業活動を誘致し雇用を創出する能力には依然として限界がある。3)アフリカのSEZの管理政策は、財政的インセンティブとパフォーマンス要件に(過度に)依存している。エチオピア、モロッコ、南アフリカの事例を用いたケーススタディから、アフリカのSEZプログラムは、戦略の焦点を絞り、組織的な連携を促進し、地域経済とのつながりを生み出すための積極的なアプローチをとることで成功する可能性が高くなることが示唆される。 Special economic zones (SEZs) – geographically delimited areas where governments promote industrial activity through both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, infrastructure provision and improved services – are becoming an increasingly widespread economic development tool both in Africa and the rest of the emerging world. The adoption of zone-based developmental strategies, limited until the 1990s, has reached new heights in the last two decades. Developing countries' governments, under pressure to attract mobile investment and industrial activity, have resorted to SEZs to spur innovation, productivity, economic growth and dynamism. Recent estimates show that there are around 5,400 zones globally, up from 80 in 1975 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2019). Although they still account for a mere 4% of the global tally, SEZs in Africa are picking up pace rapidly. Many countries in the continent are seeking to revamp already existing SEZ programmes or establish new SEZ regimes. The raison d'être behind SEZs finds its roots in the consolidation of global value chains (GVCs) and the emergence of global production networks, leading to the agglomeration of separate production functions in the most cost-effective places (Baldwin, 2011; Iammarino & McCann, 2013). A handful of successful cases, mostly located in China and the Asian Tigers (such as the often-mentioned cases of Shenzhen and Suzhou) have reinforced the appeal of SEZs in the eyes of policymakers in emerging countries. Africa has embraced SEZs with increasing enthusiasm. The convenience of enacting growth-stimulating reforms in limited geographical spaces has elicited great interest in countries where severe economic and institutional deficits frequently make country-wide structural reforms difficult and/or impractical. Yet little is known about the state of play of African SEZs and their performance. The prevailing view is that African SEZs have generally underperformed for a plethora of reasons, including weak economic and institutional capacity (e.g. Farole, 2011; Watson, 2001). Yet, the recent expansion of SEZs in the continent, the reshuffling of global production patterns, and African economic integration spurred by the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement may be altering the state of play. There are many questions concerning African SEZs that, however, remain unanswered. What drives their proliferation? Are African SEZs delivering on their intended objectives? Or, instead, are they becoming public money blackholes? And importantly, how can policymakers ensure the success of future SEZs? This study draws on the dominant perceptions about African SEZs – that (i) they are driven by the aim to emulate successful cases; that (ii) African countries are not reaping the full benefits of zone-based development policies; and that (iii) the bottlenecks that hamper the full realisation of the benefits are related to the poor design of SEZ polices (e.g. Narula & Zhan, 2019; Newman & Page, 2017). To assess whether these views hold, in this paper we first explain the approach to studying SEZs adopted, before taking a snapshot of the state of play of African SEZs. This is followed by the identification of SEZ development trends and patterns. The experience of a group of selected African countries – Ethiopia, Morocco and South Africa – in setting up zones is used to dive in depth into the specific functioning and success of African zones. The penultimate section presents a set of policy implications and extracts African-specific lessons learnt, including recommendations to enhance levels of innovation, employment, exports and industrial upgrading. The conclusions pull the different strings together. This study is built on the premises that African zones are not reaping the full benefits of SEZ development and that the reasons for this are to be found in the poor design of SEZ policies. To investigate whether this is the case, the paper adopts a mixed-method approach to the analysis of African SEZs, consisting of both sample analysis and case studies. The study introduces significant novelty stemming from its primary sources of information. We use novel data, presenting hitherto unseen information pertaining to African SEZs. The next section presents an overview of the situation of SEZs in Africa. We then focus on two dimensions: (i) the performance of African SEZs in terms of their ability to attract firms and create employment and (ii) the characterisation of African SEZ programmes, with special emphasis on the incentives provided under the SEZ regime and the requirements imposed on SEZ-based firms. To do so, we use data sourced from the UNCTAD Universe of SEZs database, which provides novel data on 237 African SEZs on aspects including functionality, size, governance and legal status. The database, originally constructed in 2019, was updated in 2020. The classification of SEZs reflects UNCTAD's definition of 'special economic zone'. In particular, to be included in the dataset, SEZs need to possess three attributes: (i) a clearly delimited geographical area, (ii) a distinct regulatory regime vis-à-vis the rest of the country and (iii) infrastructure support (UNCTAD, 2019). Such classification follows similar criteria to those used by previous catalogues of zones (e.g. Bost, 2019) but may differ from datasets developed by other international organisations due to different interpretations of the broad definition of SEZ. We assess the performance of SEZs through the application of three parameters of interest: (i) the number of firms hosted by individual zones, (ii) their employment contributions and (iii) the characteristics of SEZ policies. The choice of these variables is motivated by the literature covering SEZ performance (e.g. Farole, 2011). Whereas the dataset provides basic information on all 237 zones, data availability issues emerge when looking at more specific attributes of zones and SEZ policies. Relatedly, concrete details on the number of firms, employment and SEZ policies are not available for all 237 SEZs. The analysis therefore focuses on subsamples of the total population for which data are available and reliable. Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the appendix provide details and descriptive statistics on the samples used for the analysis of the three parameters of interest. Such an approach is not caveat-free. We deal with selected, non-randomized samples limited by the availability of data. This implies that a certain degree of sampling bias is present. In practice, underperforming zones are less likely to feature in the samples, in which well-established zones from countries, such as Ethiopia, Morocco and South Africa, feature prominently. This contrasts with anecdotal evidence that has in the past reported African zones with lower numbers of firms and employment created (Newman & Page, 2017). That being said, the approach adopted also has several strengths. First, non-probability sampling techniques are key to develop an understanding of what remains an under-researched population, African SEZs. (Etikan et al., 2016). Second, the sample retains a good level of representation of African subregions, with countries in all five macro-regions of the continent – north, central, east, west and southern Africa. Finally, although the sample is one of 'best cases', it still displays considerable variation, as illustrated by the standard deviation in Table A1. This analysis is followed by the use of three case studies to investigate the more qualitative features of African SEZ practices. The case study methodology is essential to produce contextual, real-world knowledge about the practical aspects of SEZ development (Yin, 1994). The three case studies selected in this paper were identified based on their representativeness and relevance to our study's objectives. They rely on both primary and secondary data. The primary data stem from interviews as part of a project by the London School of Economics. A total of 103 interviews were conducted with SEZ firm managers in developing countries. Additional novel primary data originate from consultations held with African regional actors as part of a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Geography and the determinants of firm exports in Indonesia GIZ joint project SEZs for Economic Diversification in Africa. Secondary data were sourced from the literature specific to the target country/SEZ, including academic publications, policy reports, white papers and grey literature. SEZs have blossomed in Africa in recent times (Farole, 2011; Newman & Page, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019). Although most African countries are latecomers, with most SEZ programmes starting only in the 1990s and 2000s, currently 38 African countries have at least one SEZ, while others have plans to establish new ones (UNCTAD, 2020). Overall, there are estimated to be 237 SEZs established by law in Africa (UNCTAD, 2020). Yet, this value well exceeds the number of fully operational SEZs. At the time of writing, 56 zones are under construction, while others remain at an early stage of development. In addition, there are approximately 203 single-factory free points (UNCTAD, 2020). The African region hosting the most SEZs is Eastern Africa, with around 50% of all African zones, followed by Western Africa (24%) and Northern Africa (10%). The African countries with the highest concentration of SEZs are Kenya (61 SEZs), Nigeria (38), Ethiopia (18) and Egypt (10) (Figures 1 and 2). The number of SEZs on the continent has expanded from a mere 20 in 1990 to 237 in 2020. Although Africa remains the continent with the highest share of countries without SEZs (16 in total), the pace of SEZ development gathered at breakneck speed in the 2010s, when 40% of all African SEZ programmes were set up, in part thanks to the greater involvement of countries like China in the process. The recent proliferation of SEZs can be ascribed to two trends. On the one hand, countries that already had mature SEZ programmes, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco and South Africa, have pursued expansion and diversification strategies for their SEZ portfolios. On the other, new SEZs are in development in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana and Guinea, with the aim of boosting foreign direct investment (FDI) and facilitating industrial upgrades. SEZs in Africa are becoming one of the dominant industrial policy tools, as the tally of SEZs currently planned (53) keeps on growing (UNCTAD, 2020). The vast majority of African SEZs (89%) are multi-activity zones, that is, zones that do not specialize in a specific sector (Figure 3). Countries at different income levels have adopted the multi-sector model. Zones in Cameroon, Ghana and Kenya encompass a large variety of industrial activities. That said, some sectors are more represented than others, with food processing and natural resource-intensive industries being the most widespread (UNCTAD, 2020). In contrast, only 10% of African SEZs target specific sectors or industries. Examples are Morocco's Casablanca Midparc Free Zone (the aeronautics) and Ethiopia's Kilinto Industrial Park (pharmaceuticals). The remaining 1% consists of logistics hubs, which provide commercial, warehousing and logistics services close to airports and seaports. The lack of specialization of most African zones raises questions about the capacity of SEZs in the continent to deliver on the indirect economic benefits that increasingly underpin the establishment of zones. This is particularly so since the relatedness between the technologies used among firms in a given territory is understood to determine the nature and scope of knowledge spillovers and the creation of networks, bringing about significant productivity gains at the firm level (Boschma & Frenken, 2012). In this regard, firms in related activities and/or along the same value chains benefit more from mutual spillovers than firms in unrelated sectors (Boschma, 2005). In the future, researchers and policymakers should consider establishing more specialized zones in the continent. Source: UNCTAD, 2020. Past research has generally exposed the poor performance of African SEZs in terms of FDI flows, firms attracted and employment generated (Farole, 2011). The reasons behind this outcome are multifaceted. They include a mismatch between SEZs' sectorial focus and the host country's comparative advantage; lack of provision of adequate infrastructure; poor environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance; lack of co-ordinated, high-level political support; unclear business strategy and, more broadly, a failure to embed a special business environment within the surrounding economy (Farole, 2011; Frick & Rodríguez-Pose, 2021; Watson, 2001; Zeng, 2016). In addition, the ability of African SEZs to generate linkages with the local industrial fabric has been limited (Farole, 2011; Frick & Rodríguez-Pose, 2021). Our sample of 71 African SEZs for which complete data are available 11 The 71 zones are presented in Table A1 in the appendix, while Table A2 provides some summary statistics. reveals the inability of African zones to match the socio-economic gains of zones in other world regions. In terms of operational firms per zone, African zones in the sample have on average 60 firms or fewer (UNCTAD, 2020). More than half host less than 50 firms. The share of zones with more than 200 firms is below 6% (Figure 4). The zones with the greatest number of firms are normally long-established, wide-area SEZs located in the more developed African countries, such as the Tanger Free Zone in Morocco (750 firms) (Tanger Med Zone, 2021) or Egypt's Alexandria Free Zone (405 firms) (General Authority for Investment, 2021). Another criterion to measure the performance of zones is their contribution to employment creation (Farole, 2011; Frick et al., 2019). The literature is inconclusive on the correlation between SEZs and employment creation. Some past research has documented the ability of SEZs to generate new employment in surrounding regions (e.g. Sanders & Brown, 2012), but other studies report a limited effect on employment creation (e.g. Cirera & Qasim, 2014). Using a sample of 53 SEZs to gauge contributions to employment, 22 When measuring the number of jobs created, values tend to be conservative as only direct employment is considered. Please refer to Table A2 in the appendix for the full specification of the sample. around half of the African SEZs under consideration have created between 1,000 and 10,000 new jobs (Figure 5). More successful examples are the Suez Free Zone in Egypt, Chambishi multi-facility economic zone (MFEZ) in Zambia, Morocco's Atlantic Free Zone and Nigeria's Calabar Free Trade Zone. The sectoral focus of the zone frequently determines its employment contributions. SEZs specialized in labour-intensive industrial activities, such as garments and textiles, report higher numbers of new direct jobs. Zones with a higher technological content create less employment. Ethiopia's SEZs, which mainly target labour-intensive industries, report some of the highest levels of employment creation across Africa. Bole Lemi Industrial Park, near Addis Ababa, has generated 20,000 new jobs in the garments, textiles and leather industries. On the whole, SEZs represent a tiny fraction of African employment (Table 1). Using the most recent estimates, African SEZs account for between 1% and 5% of total national industrial sector employment. The sole exception is Djibouti. Even in countries targeting labour-intensive industries, such as Egypt and Ethiopia, which have the highest SEZ employment in the continent, the share does not exceed 5% of national industrial employment. Overall, the jobs generated by African SEZs are well below those of SEZs in East and South-east Asian countries, where the SEZ contribution as a percentage of total national industrial sector employment is generally in double digits. Some small Central American countries, such as Honduras and the Dominican Republic, also register far higher SEZ contributions to industrial employment (around 30%) (Table 1). SEZ policies feature a plethora of investment and trade facilitation tools, investment attraction instruments, and value-added services. Traditionally, the provision of fiscal incentives has formed the backbone of most SEZ programmes. They range from offering exemptions from import duties on machinery and production inputs to reductions in corporate and local taxes. Many countries also subsidize utilities (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2015). The effectiveness of tax breaks within SEZ regimes has been hotly debated. Aggarwal (2005) stresses the role of fiscal incentives to attract foreign investors. Farole (2011) and Frick et al. (2019), however, do not find any significant correlation between tax breaks and zone performance. In this context, granting generous incentive packages may have become an 'hygiene factor', that is, while their economic returns may be limited, many countries and firms consider them as a conditio sine qua non for the establishment of SEZ regimes (ADB, 2015). As illustrated in Figure 6, African SEZ policies rely more heavily on fiscal incentives as their main investment lever than policies in other parts of the world (see Table A4 in the appendix for the list of SEZ policies considered). Almost 90% of the African SEZ regimes examined include fiscal incentives, compared with the global average of less than 80% (UNCTAD, 2019). Tax breaks take many forms. Countries, such as Kenya, offer exemptions of profit, corporate and income taxes. Egypt subsidizes skill development programmes targeted at the local workforce (UNCTAD, 2017). Mali ties the provision of fiscal packages to compliance with specific export targets (UNCTAD, 2019). Source: UNCTAD. More than 70% of the African SEZ policies under consideration – including those in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa – also adopt a special customs regime, including duty-free treatment of goods, plants and machinery. Investment protection measures feature in 40% of the African SEZ policies in our sample, while only one third of SEZ policies offer investment facilitation measures, such as a single window or a one-stop shop, to ease firm access to government services (ADB, 2015; Farole & Kweka, 2011; UNCTAD, 2019). Surprisingly, only 20% of African SEZ policies include infrastructure provision as an investment attraction tool, although inadequate infrastructure is frequently singled out by investors as a major deterrent for investment, both within SEZs and in the wider economy (Farole, 2011). Finally, only 7% of African SEZ policies provide social amenities, which may include health facilities, recreation facilities and educational institutions, and which are often credited to increase the attractiveness of a zone (Farole & Akinci, 2011). African SEZ programmes also vary in the requirements that firms need to meet to invest and set up shop in the zones. After studying the incentives and services offered in the sample of 30 African SEZ policies, the majority of policies include some requirements, either in terms of capital expenditure, development goals or specific performance requirements (Figure 7). Compared to SEZ policies around the world, African SEZ programmes are generally more restrictive. In particular, the share of African SEZ programmes requiring conditions that companies must meet to invest and operate is almost double the global average – slightly less than 80% in Africa versus 40% in the rest of the world (UNCTAD, 2019). Traditionally intended to protect local firms from foreign competition, performance-based criteria are, however, a double-edged sword, damaging the investment climate and failing to comply with World Trade Organization regulations (FIAS, 2008; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2009). Source: UNCTAD, 2020. Three main findings, each carrying its own set of opportunities and challenges, can be extracted from this overview of African SEZs. First, African SEZs are on a steep upwards trend, both in terms of the number of individual SEZs and countries adopting SEZ regimes. Furthermore, the nature of African SEZs is gradually shifting: the traditional enclave-like export processing zone model is giving way to larger SEZs relying on various investment levers, aspiring to achieve more comprehensive economic benefits. While the development of new and different SEZs can provide African countries with additional economic development tools to revitalize existing industrial fabrics, the growing army of African SEZs carries enormous opportunity costs for countries that are often afflicted by severe economic and institutional deficits. Second, the ability of African zones to attract firms and create jobs remains limited. The few African countries experiencing substantial SEZ-related employment generation are those at higher development levels, such as Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa. Overall, SEZ development has failed to significantly alter the economic fortunes of African countries at the bottom of the development pyramid. The new wave of interest for SEZ development in African countries with limited institutional capacity and experience in establishing SEZs further reiterates the risk of ending up with underperforming zones in the continent. Third, the greater restrictions imposed by African SEZ policies, relative to zones elsewhere in the emerging world, overshadow the more progressive attributes of SEZ governance policies — that is, social amenities and other value-added services, which are increasingly singled out by international investors (UNCTAD, 2019). Such attributes of African SEZs may fail to equip zones with a future-proof value proposition capable of competing with zones elsewhere in the world. Whether a zone becomes a springboard for greater innovation, employment, industrial upgrading and exports frequently depends on a limited number of critical factors. Past research has focused on three crucial areas for the success of SEZ programmes: (i) a well-targeted strategic focus (Farole, 2011; Frick et al., 2019), (ii) the role of institutional collaboration and integrated policies vis-à-vis stand-alone interventions (Hazakis, 2014; Mangal, 2019; Zeng, 2016) and (iii) the ability of a zone to exert a positive impact beyond its gates by reaping 'dynamic gains' (Frick & Rodríguez-Pose, 2021; Moberg, 2015). This section dwells on three case studies, each representing one of the three areas identified as key by the academic and policy literature. The countries represented are Ethiopia, Morocco and South Africa. The interconnected nature of a country's comparative advantage and SEZ programmes often features in successful stories of zone-based development strategies (Farole, 2011; Frick et al., 2019; Zeng, 2011). A recent survey of firms located in seven SEZs around the world further reiterated the importance of having a clear strategic focus based on a country's comparative advantage, while simultaneously establishing SEZs as catalysts for attracting investment. One in three investors stated that while they were primarily attracted to a country because the specific country's endowments matched their requirements, they would not have invested in the country without an SEZ policy (Frick & Rodríguez-Pose, 2021). This suggests that the potential economic gains of SEZs are maximized when the intended value proposition of a country's zones and those sectors in which the country retains a competitive edge vis-à-vis regional and international competitors are aligned. In contrast, past research showcased the limited positive socio-economic spillovers that occur when such alignment is not achieved (Newman & Page, 2017). This evidence, however, stands in stark contrast with the implementation of SEZ programmes. This frequently has resulted in what Castells (2014) called 'high-tech fantasies' or zones that lack the locational factors, such as a sufficiently skilled labour force and advanced research and academic institutions, normally required to attract higher value-added industries. Therefore, it is paramount to target industries in line with the country's specific conditions and skill sets (Boschma, 2005; Farole, 2011; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2013). In this context, countries not following an incremental approach – for example, by pursuing lower value-added industries initially then increasing the technological component of the target firms when the local economic conditions allow – have frequently enjoyed higher success rates (Rodríguez-Pose & Hardy, 2014). In Africa, a representative case of an incremental approach to SEZ development is that of Morocco, one of the few African countries that has succeeded in attracting significant investment flows through SEZs (Africa Economic Zones Organization [AEZO], 2019). Morocco's industrial sector was long dominated by low-tech exports in labour-intensive industries, such as garments and textiles, accounting for 15% of manufacturing gross domestic product in 2014 (OECD, 2018). Over the last decade, Morocco has increasingly become the destination of choice in Africa for investment in higher value-added industries, herding a growing share of activities with technological content in manufacturing exports and FDI (World Bank, 2021). The share of automotive exports rose from a mere 2% of overall exports in 2010 to 16% in 2016 (Global Manufacturing and Industrialisation Summit, 2018). Similarly, the share of medium- and high-tech exports grew from 23% of total exports between 2000 and 2007 to over 40% between 2008 and 2015 (Lahsini, 2017). The shift towards higher value-added industrial activities has been enabled through a strategy crafted on Morocco's comparative advantage. In this strategy, targeted SEZs became key economic development tools. A number of factors, including Morocco's political stability, its proximity to Europe, and low salaries for relatively highly skilled workers, make the country an attractive destination for FDI. In 2018, the minimum wage in Morocco was US $300 per month, compared with US $338 in Tunisia and US $430 in Turkey (Mills, 2019). Free trade agreements with large trading partners, such as the Europea
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