Book Reviews
2017; United States Army War College; Volume: 47; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.55540/0031-1723.2844
ISSN0031-1723
Autores Resumoin Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War is less what he describes as "a story about trying to infl uence large institutions to change, ideally in the right direction for the right reasons," than an autobiographical excursion describing his role as member of the team tasked with creating the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and his experiences during the months immediately following its publication.Additionally-if secondarily-the book is a consideration of the publication's impact on operations in Iraq.There is also a very brief synopsis of US involvement in Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.Despite the several foci, there are a number of worthy insights provided vis-à-vis COIN operations in Iraq.These observations include that all soldiers and marines are potentially intelligence collectors, that better synchronization of special operations units' activities with conventional units' activities remains a crying need even after more than a decade's presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust between representatives of an external coalition force and members of the host nation population is fundamental to success, and that haste in holding elections during a counterinsurgency is unwise, the last only too evident in the often counterproductive behaviors of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad.While few of these perceptions, drawn from Crane's personal experience and interviews in Iraq, will be new to those familiar with the war, many are suffi ciently valuable to bear the repetition.Also notable in this regard is a point too infrequently recognized, one no less valid as operations continue today: "The most adept sociocultural briefi ngs . . .came from soldiers and [m]arines who had probably conducted enough fi eld research . . . to earn a PhD back at a civilian university."In COIN, no less than other forms of confl ict, the wisdom of the soldier is both invaluable and an ore too little mined.Crane obviously took copious notes during his weeks as a member of the FM 3-24 writing team and in-theater travels thereafter.His frequent listing of partners in the undertaking and myriad others attending conferences, working groups, or otherwise infl uencing the doctrine's creation and application in the fi eld is impressive.The cataloging makes it clear the manual was raised by a quite populous village.Crane's fi rsthand participation in this community, combined with both his training and practice as a historian, undeniably makes him an appropriate vehicle for the tale's telling.There are times, however, in which he seems a bit too willing to give credit to those closest to him in the endeavor.One such participant is noted for his consistent championing of the need for a counterinsurgency force to continue to
Referência(s)