Japanese domestic politics and security cooperation with Australia: the limits of ‘normalisation’
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 65; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10357718.2011.535502
ISSN1465-332X
Autores Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoAbstract Security cooperation between Japan and Australia over the last several decades has been largely underpinned by common factors and interests in the international system. As with most bilateral relationships, however, cooperation has also been encouraged by domestic forces in both countries. The prevailing forces that characterised Japanese foreign policy in the post-war era were the politically and constitutionally entrenched pacifist norm, the powerful position of the bureaucracy relative to a powerful yet fragmented bureaucracy coupled with weak political leadership, and exceptional longevity of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government during their tenure in power from 1955 to 2009. These characteristic features of Japanese foreign policy also had particular implications for Australia-Japan relations. Concordantly, evolutions in Japanese politics since the end of the cold war have altered the environment in which policy towards Australia and the region is formulated. This article examines how Australia-Japan security cooperation has been affected by the erosion of intense pacifism towards 'normalisation', the assertion of greater power and leadership of the executive over the bureaucracy, and the historic defeat of the LDP government in 2009 leading to the ascension of the Democratic Party of Japan. It concludes that although changes in Japanese politics have not significantly challenged or bolstered security cooperation between Japan and Australia, those changes have proven too limited to significantly strengthen Japan's position in an increasingly volatile region. Keywords: Japanese politicssecurity cooperationnormalisation Notes 1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a series of conferences (in March and September 2009) on 'Australia-Japan Security Relationship and New Regional Security Architecture: Opportunities and Obstacles', supported by the Australia-Japan Foundation. The author thanks Professors William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten for constructive comments and support, and Jacob Berah for editorial assistance. Information gathered from the minutes of the Diet, available online at . For a discussion of the beginnings of the defence exchanges, see Matsushita (Citation2010) and Mori (Citation1986). 2. In Japan's defence White Paper, The Defense of Japan, the term bōei kōryu made its first appearance in 1993, and it became a subsection topic after the 1995 edition. However, the coverage of the topic in the Defense of Japan made a quantum leap in 1999, suggesting the increased importance of the topic in Japan's overall security policy. 3. Japan's defence White Paper did not mention Australia as a defence exchange partner until 1998. Between 1999 and 2003, Australia was mentioned as a defence exchange partner only after South Korea, Russia, China, and South-East Asian countries. Since 2004, defence exchange with Australia has been mentioned after South Korea, Russia, and China, but ahead of all other countries. 4. In his speech during an April 1997 visit to Canberra, Prime Minister Hashimoto stated that it was important to enhance bilateral cooperation in the security field. This was the first public statement made by a Japanese government official regarding security cooperation with countries other than the United States. The Japanese text of the Hashimoto speech is available in the 'Collected materials on Japan-Oceania relations', contained in the 'World and Japan' Database Project, and is available online at . 5. Koizumi agreed to advance 'defence cooperation' with Australia in May 2002, during his visit to Canberra. Since then, the term 'defence cooperation' has been applied to Japan's relations with the United Kingdom (from 2004), with India (from 2006), and somewhat more vaguely with the Republic of Korea (from 2004). Interestingly, the term 'defence cooperation' was not used with respect to Australia during the Fukuda Cabinet, but made a comeback under the Asō and Hatoyama Cabinets. 6. The 'Basic Principles of Defense Exchanges', adopted by the Ministry of Defense in April 2007, explain the situation in the following manner: 'With the transformations of the international environment, there have been significant changes in the functions that defence exchanges are expected to perform ... In the case of some partner states, defence exchanges are beginning to assume forms that are not clearly distinguishable from US-Japan defence cooperation. But for our purposes, we treat them separately.' The 'Basic Principles' is available online at . 7. Anybody who did so could be attacked for usurping power that legitimately belonged to the Emperor. Significantly, the Meiji Constitution spoke of 'ministers of state', but made no mention of the Cabinet or the prime minister. Thus, the prime minister was, at best, a primus inter pares, having only weak authority over other ministers. 8. According to data obtained by Diet Member Kōichi Takemasa, in a five-year period leading up to 2005, the Japanese government concluded only 67 treaties requiring Diet approval, and no less than 3510 agreements not requiring Diet approval. See the statement by Koichi Takemasa at the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 1 July 2005. The statement appears on line 50 of the Minutes, available online at: . 9. This was true, for example, with regard to such events as the first visit of Maritime SDF vessels to Australia (July 1962) and the first visit of the SDF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Australia (June-July 1966). When Japan was invited in 1976 to participate in the RIMPAC exercises in the following year, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) supported it, but the plan to participate was vetoed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Saeki et al. Citation1979). The decision to join the RIMPAC exercises in 1980 was taken by Prime Minister ōhira after consultation with senior bureaucrats in the JDA, MOFA, and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Kan-taiheiyō gōdō enshūno sanka Citation1979). But this decision was made through informal channels, and was never passed through the Diet or the Cabinet. 10. The PARC was far more active in debating the pros and (mostly) cons of an Economic Partnership Agreement with Australia. Information regarding the agendas of the LDP PARC meetings was gathered from the reports contained in the monthly LDP publication, Jiyu Minshu. 11. Information gathered from the website of the Cabinet Secretariat at . 12. In Japan, media attention to bilateral security ties with Australia has been low-key, and it has never made the front page of the major dailies. 13. Conservatives' failure to make a clean break with the past also partly explains the ideological rigidity of left-wing Japan (Ōtake 2005). 14. Although Toshiki Kaifu and Kiichi Miyazawa (the last two LDP prime ministers before the 1993 ouster) used the term 'apology' (owabi) in relation to Japanese colonial rule over Korea, Morihiro Hosokawa, the first non-LDP prime minister, was the first to characterise Japan's role during World War II as one of 'aggression'. It was Tomiichi Murayama, the socialist prime minister who governed with LDP support, who issued a statement which has since been invoked as the best proof of Japan's contrition with respect to its role in World War II. 15. Hatoyama was one of the original authors of the bill that would create within the National Diet Library a research unit entrusted to investigate war damages inflicted by Japan during World War II, and to look into the possibility of individual compensation. 16. The DPJ's vision was different from the kantei shudō of the Koizumi era. While the kantei shudō gave policy-making powers to a select group of bureaucrats gathered from various ministries under the prime minister, the DPJ's plan sought to give elected politicians a central role by revitalising the Cabinet as a decision-making organ. 17. Under the Asō Tarō Cabinet (2008-9), cabinet meetings lasted for just 18.5 minutes on average. Under the Hatoyama Cabinet, the average length of cabinet meetings was 33.4 minutes. The corresponding figure for the first three months of the Kan Cabinet is 35.3 minutes. These calculations are based on data provided by the Jiji Tsushin News Service, 'Shushō dōsei'. Past editions of Shusho dosei (starting from 28 August 2001) are available from the paid 'Kijisaku' database of Jiji Tsushin, accessible online at . 18. While policy councils continued to be held in some ministries for some 10 days after Kan became prime minister, no policy council meetings have been held in any ministry since 18 June 2010. Additional informationNotes on contributorsTadashi Anno Tadashi Anno (PhD, University of California, Berkeley) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sophia University
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