Mediated Partnerships
2010; Wiley; Volume: 78; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.3982/ecta6131
ISSN1468-0262
Tópico(s)Corporate Finance and Governance
ResumoEconometricaVolume 78, Issue 1 p. 285-308 Mediated Partnerships David Rahman, David Rahman Dept. of Economics, University of Minnesota, 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, U.S.A.; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorIchiro Obara, Ichiro Obara Dept. of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90096, U.S.A.; [email protected] Many thanks are owed to Harold Demsetz, Larry Jones, Michihiro Kandori, Narayana Kocherlakota, David Levine, Roger Myerson, Itai Sher, Joe Ostroy, Phil Reny, Joel Sobel, Bill Zame, a co-editor, and four anonymous referees for help with previous drafts. We are also grateful to numerous seminar audiences. D. Rahman gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education Grant SEJ 2004-07861 while at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and the National Science Foundation Grant SES 09-22253.Search for more papers by this author David Rahman, David Rahman Dept. of Economics, University of Minnesota, 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, U.S.A.; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorIchiro Obara, Ichiro Obara Dept. of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90096, U.S.A.; [email protected] Many thanks are owed to Harold Demsetz, Larry Jones, Michihiro Kandori, Narayana Kocherlakota, David Levine, Roger Myerson, Itai Sher, Joe Ostroy, Phil Reny, Joel Sobel, Bill Zame, a co-editor, and four anonymous referees for help with previous drafts. We are also grateful to numerous seminar audiences. D. Rahman gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education Grant SEJ 2004-07861 while at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and the National Science Foundation Grant SES 09-22253.Search for more papers by this author First published: 08 February 2010 https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA6131Citations: 27 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract This paper studies partnerships that employ a mediator to improve their contractual ability. Intuitively, profitable deviations must be attributable, that is, there must be some group behavior such that an individual can be statistically identified as innocent, to provide incentives in partnerships. Mediated partnerships add value by effectively using different behavior to attribute different deviations. As a result, mediated partnerships are necessary to provide the right incentives in a wide range of economic environments. References Alchian, A., and H. Demsetz (1972): "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, 62, 777–795. Aoyagi, M. (2005): "Collusion Through Mediated Communication in Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring," Economic Theory, 25, 455–475. Aumann, R. (1974): "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67–96. Aumann, R. (1987): "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, 55, 1–18. Cremer, J., and R. 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(2009): "Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 682–694. Citing Literature Volume78, Issue1January 2010Pages 285-308 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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