Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

International Economic Review

2010; Wiley; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/(issn)1468-2354

1468-2354

Carlos Carrillo‐Tudela, Guido Menzio, Eric Smith, Randall Wright, Pieter A. Gautier, James Albrecht, Leo Kaas,

This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers.Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments.Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker.When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future.The pair share the gains to trade.In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.