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Das Militar und der Aufbruch in die Moderne, 1860-1890 (review)

2006; Society for Military History; Volume: 70; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/jmh.2006.0211

1543-7795

Peter H. Wilson,

European Political History Analysis

Reviewed by: Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860–1890 Peter H. Wilson Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860–1890. Edited by Michael Epkenhans and Gerhard P. Groß. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte Bd. 60. Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003. ISBN 3-486-56760-8. Pp. xxix, 353. Є34.80. The central thesis of this edited collection is that war was transformed between 1860 and 1890 and that this helped pave the way into modernity. Though the French Revolution had laid the necessary ideological foundations with the levée en masse of 1793, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that its full implications became apparent, thanks to industrialisation. These arguments are briefly sketched in the editors' introduction and a short essay by Hans-Ulrich Wehler. They are explored by fifteen papers grouped unevenly into three thematic sections, each with helpful introductions by Winfried Baumgart, Stig Förster, and Bernd Jürgen Wendt respectively. The first tackles the intertwined questions of political control of armed forces and the military's influence on policy making. Konrad Canis argues that Bismarck narrowly succeeded in containing the German military's aspirations for greater autonomy. William Philpott and Frédéric Guelton outline the constitutional checks on military influence in Britain and during the first decade of the French Third Republic. Nikolaus Katzer and Lothar Höbelt present contrasting studies of Russia and Austria-Hungary, both of which attempted reform after serious international defeats. Whereas military influence on policy grew under Tsar Alexander II, it was contained in Austria-Hungary as that country became locked into international alliances that precluded war against certain powers. Dirk Bönker surveys the limited influence of the U.S. armed forces prior to the navalism of the 1890s. The next six papers deal with the relationship between military and social change, beginning with Frank Becker's detailed challenge to the standard assumptions about middle-class militarism in post-unification Germany. Erwin A. Schmidl passes a fairly positive verdict of the Austro-Hungarian army as an integrative factor in the crumbling Dual Monarchy, in contrast to Jan Kusber's bleaker assessment of a corrupt, inefficient, introspective Russian army that was poorly equipped to deal with internal disorder. Jörg Nagler makes some interesting points about the close ties between the U.S. armed forces and the country's conservative governing elite, arguing that this assisted professionalism despite congressional parsimony. Junichiro Shoji's piece widens the perspective to include Japan where modernisation involved not only the violent suppression of the traditional Samurai elite, but a longer process of overcoming deep-seated resistance to change. The remaining four studies tackle military and technological change. Dieter Storz argues that the significant advances in integrating new [End Page 847] weaponry and tactics that were behind German successes in 1866–71 were followed by a period of relative stagnation compared to other countries. Günther Kronenbitter discusses how Austria-Hungary's response to defeat in 1866 led to its reliance on two major arms suppliers in Steyr and Pilsen. Kurt Hackemer also notes a growing collaboration between big business and the U.S. Navy after the American Civil War. Andrew Lambert's discussion of later nineteenth-century Britain tackles rather broader issues and essentially summarises his on-going reappraisal of British imperial strategy between 1815 and 1914, arguing that it shifted fundamentally after 1856–68 from garrisoned outposts to a centrally controlled "expedition strategy." These papers were first presented at the 44th international conference on military history organised by the German Military History Research Office (MGFA) and the Otto von Bismarck Foundation. While they do not constitute the last word on the topic, they offer a relatively coherent discussion of the role of armed forces in the modernisation of the major nineteenth-century world powers. The general conclusion is that armed forces were not agents of modernisation and only those countries that preserved political control, notably the U.S., were able to adapt successfully to later emergencies. The volume's principal shortcoming is that none of the essays are directly comparative and that other parts of the globe, notably Latin America and the smaller European states, are...