Epistemic Deflationism
2004; Wiley; Volume: 42; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00992.x
ISSN2041-6962
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and Theoretical Science
ResumoThe Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 42, Issue 1 p. 103-134 Epistemic Deflationism Duncan Pritchard, Duncan Pritchard University of Stirling Duncan Pritchard is a lecturer and Leverhulme Trust Special Research Fellow in the department of philosophy at the University of Stirling in Scotland. He has published widely in epistemology, including recent articles in the American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, and the European Journal of Philosophy. He is the editor (with M. S. Brady) of Moral and Epistemic Virtues (Blackwell, 2003) and is currently in the process of completing a book entitled Epistemic Luck.Search for more papers by this author Duncan Pritchard, Duncan Pritchard University of Stirling Duncan Pritchard is a lecturer and Leverhulme Trust Special Research Fellow in the department of philosophy at the University of Stirling in Scotland. He has published widely in epistemology, including recent articles in the American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, and the European Journal of Philosophy. He is the editor (with M. S. Brady) of Moral and Epistemic Virtues (Blackwell, 2003) and is currently in the process of completing a book entitled Epistemic Luck.Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00992.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Armstrong, D. 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