Artigo Revisado por pares

The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis

1974; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 68; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/1959502

ISSN

1537-5943

Autores

John Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina,

Tópico(s)

Media Influence and Politics

Resumo

Various analysts have noted that the decision to vote in mass elections is difficult to justify from the standpoint of an expected utility maximization model. Put simply, the probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome is so small that the expected gains from voting are outweighed by the costs in time and effort. Such analyses treat rational behavior as synonymous with expected utility maximization. In this paper we show that an alternative criterion for decision making under uncertainty, minimax regret, specifies voting under quite general conditions. Both two and three candidate plurality elections are considered. Interestingly, a minimax regret decision maker never votes for his second choice in a three candidate election, whereas expected utility maximizers clearly may. Thus, the model proposed has implications for candidate choice as well as turnout.

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