Scientific publishing sanctions in response to the Russo‐Ukrainian war
2022; Wiley; Volume: 35; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1002/leap.1487
ISSN1741-4857
AutoresMaryna Nazarovets, Jaime A. Teixeira da Silva,
Tópico(s)Nuclear Issues and Defense
ResumoOn 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an open-ended military invasion of Ukraine. As the invasion is still ongoing, and since heavy fighting is still predicted to occur, it is currently impossible to assess all of the consequences, both for Ukraine and for the world. However, it is already abundantly clear that these actions are deeply destructive for many spheres of life, in Ukraine, and beyond. Given that the focus of this paper is on education, science and academia, we outline some of the most obvious consequences of this invasion on the conditions in which Ukrainian researchers and educators have found themselves, along with millions of their fellow citizens. The number of victims (injuries and deaths) among the Ukrainian civilian population continues to grow. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 10,506 known civilian casualties, including 4,677 killed and 5,829 wounded, on 24 June 2022 (UNHR, 2022a). The number of deaths of Ukrainian researchers, both those who were involved in hostilities and among civilians, is also growing (Stone, 2022a). However, actual figures are likely to be much higher, given that several areas of Ukraine are in an active phase of the war, making it impossible to accurately assess such numbers. An untold number of Ukrainian citizens are losing their homes and workplaces, including infrastructure, residential buildings, hospitals, educational and scientific institutions, and are thus deprived of opportunities to preserve a functional society and family, and consequently to earn a living and sustain a balanced lifestyle (CEDOS, 2022). As of 16–17 April, the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine, Serhii Shkarlet (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine [MESU], 2022a), as well as the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Education, Science, and Innovation, Serhii Babak (Babak, 2022), announced that 923 (1,071) educational institutions have been damaged while 91 (95) have been destroyed. The preliminary amount of damage caused to Ukrainian educational institutions due to hostilities is $US 5 billion (MESU, 2022a). As of 24 June 2022, 1,849 educational facilities were damaged while 212 were destroyed (Education in Emergency, 2022) although, as for injuries and deaths, more concrete numbers and accurate lists will only be known when the war subsides. Speaking of the losses borne by Ukrainian sciences, it is imperative to also mention the destruction of Ukraine's rich cultural and research heritage. There are documented examples where researchers are attempting to preserve important work, research samples, museum and archival collections, and other objects of national heritage, moving them to safer regions or placing them in underground storage (Stone, 2022b; Stone, 2022c). To the authors' knowledge, to date, there is no comprehensive list or information about how much research material, data, or libraries have been damaged or irretrievably destroyed. The current day-to-day state of life, including sudden sirens, bombing, displaced living quarters (e.g., underground in bunkers, shelters or metros), the need to take care of others or worry about war-related safety, and constant negative news and anxiety, do not create an environment that is conducive to focus, or to engage in productive work, study or research. Many citizens have left their homes and jobs to defend the country, and even those who are not directly involved in the country's military defence, and who may be fortunate to be in safer conditions in regions where there are no active hostilities, except for the constant threat of air and missile strikes, may have shifted their attention from usual peacetime activities to other more relevant ones, such as volunteer assistance to victims or the military, community support (e.g., food distribution, group support and counselling, etc.), or other socially important functions (Gaind et al., 2022). Three examples of the involvement of academics and educational establishments may illustrate this well. Early in the invasion, a volunteer centre opened in the Scientific Library of the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, where they weaved camouflage nets for the front, and received and distributed humanitarian goods (medicines, food, clothing, children's items, toys and hygiene products) (Lviv University, 2022). Secondly, teachers and students of the National University of Ostroh Academy are working in the volunteer centre in Rivne, which is also engaged in the logistics of humanitarian goods (Kostenkova, 2022). Thirdly, immigrants from regions where active hostilities are taking place live in the buildings of higher education institutions and their dormitories, for example in Poltava (Dorotych, 2022). Related to societal imbalance, the number of refugees (mostly women, children and the elderly) is growing, both within the country and those seeking refuge in other countries. Statistics for 21 June 2022, indicate that an estimated 5.2 million refugees, or almost 12% of the total population of Ukraine, had moved to another country, mainly in neighbouring Poland (~1.1 million), Republic of Moldova (~0.8 million), Romania (~0.8 million), Slovakia (~0.7 million) and other European Union (EU) and non-EU countries, including the Russian Federation (~1.3 million) (UNHCR, 2022b). Regarding the number of migrants to Russia, it should be noted that there is a large amount of evidence of forced deportations, kidnapping or the only open way out of the war zone (Deutsch & Berg, 2022). The most recently available statistics (24 June 2022) indicate that in addition to the ~5 million people who have left Ukraine, more than 7 million, the internally displaced persons, have relocated to safer regions in the west and centre of the country (IOM, 2022). For the most part, the conditions in which refugees find themselves do not allow them to return to a stable and peaceful life and fulfil their professional duties. The same restriction and limitations apply to major population-dense cities in the east and south of the country, such as Kharkhiv, Mariupol, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which are under occupation or in a state of active hostilities. When considering an optimal study and work environment, it is also important to consider the physical health of Ukrainian citizens. In addition to the risks of death and injury, there are also problems with the stable supply of food, water and medicine to regions where active hostilities are taking place. In such locations, the provision of medical care may be insufficient or even non-existent. Cognizant that a global pandemic COVID-19 is still ongoing, according to statistics available 24 July 2022. Ukraine had just over 5 million confirmed cases and 108,622 deaths, while ~34% of the total population had received two shots of the vaccine (WHO, 2022). There is also a risk of the outbreak of several other diseases (Stone, 2022). This may also impact public health around the world (McKee & Murphy, 2022) given that the Ukrainian population is in physical contact, due to mass migration, with populations of recipient countries. There are also obvious psychological consequences of this war that do not allow citizens to return to a peaceful and productive life, maybe even for a long time, including post-traumatic syndromes, depression, trauma, and nervous disorders of varying severity, any or all of which may impact an entire generation of Ukrainians, ranging from children to the elderly (Gonçalves Júnior et al., 2022; Jawaid Nencki, 2022; McKee & Murphy, 2022). Compounding the economic slowdown caused by COVID-19, the Russo-Ukrainian war will impact the economies of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the global economy overall (World Bank, 2022). Most recent estimates indicate that the gross domestic product (GDP) of Ukraine will shrink by 30%–50% in 2022 (Matters, 2022). Ukraine's GDP was $US 164 billion in 2021 while current estimated costs to destroyed civilian infrastructure are currently around $US 270 billion (Financial Times, 2022). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance and the Kyiv School of Economics estimated that, as of 11 April, overall financial losses caused by the war amounted to $US 564–600 billion (Interfax, 2022). However, as the war drags on, the situation is worsening every day. Food security of Ukrainian and global populations is one of the most profound socio-economic factors that have been, and will continue to be, severely affected by the war. Ukraine is one of the world's largest exporters of grains and cereals, so the destruction of industrial, agricultural and transport infrastructure, as well as a projected decline in yields in 2022, are already posing risks to food security in the Middle East and Africa, and rising food prices around the world (IGC, 2022; Nature Editorial, 2022a; World Bank, 2022). The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres, claimed that ~1.7 billion people, about 33% of which already live in poverty, are experiencing 'disruptions in food, energy and finance systems that are triggering increases in poverty and hunger' (UN, 2022). While keeping in mind the socioeconomic factors briefly discussed above that are also influencing the Ukrainian academy, the purpose of this article was to consider the public positions of several leading publishers, as well as the views and opinions of individual scholars and academics on how the scientific community should treat Russia-affiliated academics and research institutions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Based on information from various sources, we considered the situation of the Ukrainian academy before and during the ongoing war. We collected samples of appeals for help from the Ukrainian Academy to the world scientific community, as well as samples of academic sanctions by various institutions around the world that have been imposed on Russia. We also collected samples of public appeals from representatives of the Russian academy that reflect their attitude to the military actions of their country. We also collected and edited information on the reactions of international scientific publishers. Finally, we noted the position of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), whose recommendations scientific publishers may rely on when deciding on whether to impose personal or institutional sanctions. After the Revolution of Dignity, which took place in Ukraine on 30 November 2013 to 23 February 2014, there were hopes for an improvement in the state of the Ukrainian academy due to its focus on Europe and the departure from outdated Soviet traditions. However, those expectations were not met, and government spending on science remained low and was used inefficiently (Schiermeier, 2016), researchers' institutions were not modernized, and low salaries did not inspire the emergence of young scientists (Schiermeier, 2019). Moreover, Ukraine lost important scientific facilities in Crimea after its annexation by Russia in 2014 (Nazarovets, 2018), and about 12,000 scientists were forced to emigrate internally from parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts occupied by pro-Russian militants, having to adapt to new living and working conditions (Oleksiyenko et al., 2020; Schiermeier, 2016). Thus, even before 24 February 2022, there was a disappointing trend to reduce the number of research institutions and scientists that were engaged in research and development in Ukraine, from 115,800 people in 2013 to 51,400 in 2020 (Pysarenko et al., 2021). As of April 2022, there were 652 higher education institutions (The Only State Electronic Database on Education, 2022a) and 186 research institutions in Ukraine (The Only State Electronic Database on Education, 2022b). At the end of 2020, more than half (52.0%) of Ukrainian researchers worked in research institutions and higher education institutions of Kyiv, 15.5% in the Kharkiv oblast, 8.1% in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, and less than a quarter in the 22 other regions of Ukraine (Fig. 1). In 2020, 45.4% of researchers were women (Pysarenko et al., 2021). Source: Data according to United States Electronic Database on Education, 22.04.2022 The Times Higher (THE) Education World University Rankings 2022 (THE, 2021) includes 10 Ukrainian higher education institutions (from Sumy, Lviv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi cities), and even though 15 provided data, they did not meet the eligibility criteria to receive a rank (Table 1). Accordingly, the six regions (cities) mentioned above, where the main academic potential of Ukraine is concentrated, namely the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv and Kharkiv and Sumy, which are close to the border with the Russian Federation, have been under attack and have suffered active hostilities. Battle of Sumy from 24 February to 4 April (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sumy) Missile strikes on Sumy and Sumy oblast Battle of Kharkiv from 24 February until 21 April (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kharkiv_(2022)) Missile strikes on Kharkiv and Kharkiv oblast Battle of Kharkiv from 24 February until 21 April Missile strikes on Kharkiv and Kharkiv oblast Battle of Kyiv from 25 February to 2 April (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022)) Missile strikes on Kyiv and Kyiv oblast Battle of Kyiv from 25 February to 2 April Missile strikes on Kyiv and Kyiv oblast Battle of Kharkiv from 24 February until 21 April Missile strikes on Kharkiv and Kharkiv oblast Many research organizations from around the world, due to the war, have provided shelter to researchers from Ukraine, urgently creating special programs, internships, projects, and other initiatives. Several examples may be found in Table 2. However, it is obvious that the number of such proposals is very limited and much lower than the actual number of scientists in Ukraine. It is also worth noting that male researchers of military age (18–60 years) are not exempt from mobilization (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1993; Zelenskyy, 2022b), so their prospect of finding alternative prospects abroad is currently extremely limited. Mobilization in Ukraine is general, that is, it takes place throughout Ukraine and in four stages (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2014): the first three stages involve men with military experience, who served since 2014, or who graduated from military departments of higher education. The fourth stage involves all men who have no restrictions on health or age. The first stage began on 24 February (Zelenskyy, 2022a). As the mobilization plans are marked as 'secret', there is no official information on what stage of mobilization is currently underway, but as of 25 June, there is no evidence that the last stage is taking place (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2022). Thus, many male researchers that Ukraine is not yet involved in hostilities may find themselves 'trapped': on one hand, they cannot leave Ukraine to continue research in other countries, and, on the other hand, for the same reasons described above, they are unable to continue quality research in Ukraine. Realistically speaking, the male Ukrainian research community can likely only become fully active once the war ends, when physical reconstruction of damaged or destroyed research facilities occurs, and when there is stability in food security, society and mental health. Evidently, it is impossible to predict the prospects for the development of academia and science in Ukraine, even in the distant future, given the physical, socio-cultural and economic losses, and forced emigration, after which some professionals might not return, leading them to change their professional activities and objectives (Gaind et al., 2022; Naujokaitytė, 2022). International economic, trade and personal sanctions were imposed against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2014 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Even though the impact of those sanctions on the economic status of the Russian Federation was significant (Fjaertoft & Overland, 2015), their main task—the Kremlin's ability to finance the war and impose costs on Russia's political elite responsible for the invasion (European Council and the Council of the EU, 2022)—did not prevent a new open large-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In response, governments of select EU nations, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and other countries imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia, mostly economic, energy and technological in nature. In particular, on 3 June 2022, the EU adopted the sixth package of sanctions against Russia (European Commission, 2022a). Many multinational companies also announced a termination of their cooperation with Russia and/or withdrawal from its market. Some sports organizations around the world (FIDE, FIFA, UEFA, International Paralympic Committee, The Diamond League, etc.) have also banned Russian athletes from participating in international competitions (Funakoshi et al., 2022). There is also a wave of refusals to cooperate with groups or representatives of Russian culture (book publishing, music, theatre, art, etc.) (Logvynenko et al., 2022). Ukrainian scientists on the brink of survival sent numerous requests for support to the world's academic community, including global providers of scientific content, owners of abstract databases, compilers of rankings of higher education institutions in the world, and other leading institutions, with a request to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation's scientific community, to encourage the cessation of military aggression. Several examples may be found in Table 3. (1) NAQA, 2022 (2) Chumachenko, 2022 In response to the war, scientific institutions in many countries have stopped cooperation with the Russian Federation (Else, 2022; Matthews, 2022; Nature Editorial, 2022b; Stone, 2022c). In particular, the European Commission suspended the preparation of agreements for Russian institutions in the Horizon Europe research program and stopped the payment of money for existing projects with the prospect of terminating previous agreements (European Commission, 2022b; Zubașcu, 2022). The CERN Council (the European Organization for Nuclear Research) strongly condemned Russian aggression and suspended Russia's cooperation and participation as an observer at CERN (CERN, 2022). Clarivate condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine, announcing that it would cease the indexing of Russian and Belarusian—given that Belarus has supported the war against Ukraine, either serving as a base for missile attacks, or by allowing Russian troops and military equipment to enter Ukraine via its borders—journals in the Web of Science, while closing its Russian office (Clarivate, 2022). The agency Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), which ranks the world's higher education institutions, said it would stop interacting with customers in Russia and would not promote Russian universities or Russia as a place to study (QS, 2022). As one example of an individual research institute taking a stance, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on 25 February 2022, 1 day after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, broke off its multi-million partnership with Skoltech (Stone, 2022c). However, it should be noted that the governments of select countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, which are mostly economically dependent on Russia, have refrained from condemning Russia's actions (Ajala, 2022; Singarimbun, 2022). Similarly, not all scientific institutions around the world have supported the idea of a scientific boycott (Stone, 2022c). Today, the application of sanctions against the Russian Federation is considered an effective mechanism for approaching the end of this war and is one of the types of assistance requested by Ukraine. This is because, while condemning the invasion and expressing full support for Ukraine are important to Ukrainians, these measures alone cannot stop the war and its associated humanitarian catastrophe (Chumachenko et al., 2022). However, even after six waves of EU sanctions, the war continues, and some question whether the sanctions have been as effective as expected (Felbermayr et al., 2021; Stein & Hudson, 2022). One of the main arguments against the introduction of academic restrictions for scholars from Russian institutions is that there have been several public appeals from them condemning the war, which can be considered a bold step in condemning the repressive legislation of the Russian Federation (Koonin, 2022). In particular, the 'Open letter of Russian scientists and science journalists against the war with Ukraine', appeared on 24 February 2022 on the website of the independent Russian popular science newspaper 'Troitsky Variant—Science' (Holdren et al., 2022). We note that this letter has now disappeared from the newspaper's website, for some time it could still be found in the Google cache, but over time it also disappeared from there. A new version of the letter appeared on a completely different site (https://t-invariant.org/2022/02/we-are-against-war/), which was created only in February 2022, the last entry is dated as early May, and whose editorial board consists of researchers who do not work in Russia. The website claims that more than 8,368 scientists (12 May 2022) have already signed the letter, but due to the unofficial nature of the source, it is difficult to confirm or deny this information. Not all signatories of the letter have indicated their affiliation, and some indicated that they work in institutions outside the Russian Federation. According to the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge of the National Research University—Higher School of Economics, in Russia, there were 348,000 scientists in 2021 (ISSEK HSE, 2021). Thus, based on these values, only about 2% of all Russian scientists have signed the letter 'against the war'. Russian and Ukrainian researchers are linked by a long history of scientific cooperation, which has not stopped in some places, even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Therefore, several Ukrainian researchers claimed that they turned to their Russian counterparts immediately after the Russian invasion but did not receive any words of support from them (McNutt & Hildebrand, 2022; NASU, 2022a; Stone, 2022b). In particular, the National Research Foundation of Ukraine (NAQA, 2022) says that it emailed 49,000 Russian scientists with an appeal to speak out against the war and in response received mostly either silence or support for a military invasion of Ukraine. Whether it is tacit government support or fear of being convicted, we have no answer. Moreover, Russian scholars have published several official appeals in support of the Russian army and the decision of the President of the Russian Federation to launch an invasion of Ukraine. Several examples may be found in Table 4. That is, even though Russia has opponents of the military invasion of Ukraine, their number is relatively small compared with the number of citizens who fully support the war. This is evidenced not only by public appeals, some of which are listed above, but also by the results of social surveys (FOM, 2022; VCIOM, 2022). It is not known how much of this data can be trusted, or whether it has been adjusted in favour of the actions of the Russian government because there is currently no data available. The fact that some scientific institutions around the world, along with support for the Ukrainian academy, also provide support to researchers and students from Russia and Belarus, thereby allowing them to avoid the consequences of sanctions imposed on these countries, has caused some outrage, as well as misunderstandings, among Ukrainians (Rybiy, 2022). Ukrainian scientists have also appealed to scientific publishers around the world to stop publishing scientific work by authors from the Russian Federation (MESU, 2022b; NASU, 2022b). Some scientific publishers have supported Ukraine, condemning military aggression, providing financial assistance to war victims, giving Ukrainian researchers free access to their resources, etc. However, most scientific publishers did not respond to the call to refuse manuscripts from Russian authors. Opponents of boycotting Russian authors claim that it will do more harm than good by restricting the exchange of scientific knowledge around the world, and will not promote openness in the scientific community, and instead may amplify the global crisis by unfairly punishing unrelated individuals (Matthews, 2022; Nature Editorial, 2022b). We reviewed the positions of 25 scientific publishers. The list of publishers (Table 5) is based on the results of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) survey 'Availability of access to full-text information resources: RFBR survey results' (Lutai & Lyubushko, 2022), which lists publishers that Russian researchers consider important for their work, as well as a list of publishers who have signed the Multi-Publisher Statement on Ukraine (2022). Information about the reaction to Russia's war against Ukraine was found in 20 publishers (Table 5). These 20 publishers condemned the actions of the Russian Federation and offered support to Ukrainian researchers to some extent (charitable contributions, open access to content, etc.). Only 15 publishers announced the suspension of cooperation with institutions from Russia and Belarus. None of the publishers supported a publishing ban for authors from Russian institutions, relying on the Committee on Publication Ethics guidelines (COPE, 2022) for moral positional guidance. 31.03.2022 www.acs.org/content/acs/en/pressroom/newsreleases/2022/march/acs-publications-joins-other-publishers-in-condemning-invasion-of-ukraine.html https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 31.03.2022 (?) https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 02.03.2022 https://brill.com/page/ukraine https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 01.03.2022 www.cambridgeinternational.org/news/news-details/view/statement-from-cambridge-university-press-and-assessment-on-ukraine-20220301/ https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 4.03.2022 www.elsevier.com/connect/elsevier-condemns-russian-invasion-of-ukraine https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 31.03.2022 (?) www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/multi-publisher-statement-ukraine https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 31.03.2022 (?) www.future-science.com/about https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 31.03.2022 (?) www.karger.com/Company/multi-publishers-statement https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 14.03.2022 (?) https://global.oup.com/news-items/current/oup_ukraine_response? 07.03.2022 https://group.sagepub.com/press-releases/sage-publishing-response-to-the-invasion-of-ukraine 4.03.2022 www.springernature.com/gp/advancing-discovery/springboard/blog/blogposts-open-research/springer-nature-condemns-russian-invasion/20191448 https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 03.03.2022 https://newsroom.taylorandfrancisgroup.com/taylor-francis-statement-on-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/ www.geolsoc.org.uk/About/Press-Office/Press-Releases/Multi-publisher-statement-on-Russia https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 18.03.2022 www.theiet.org/membership/member-news/member-news-2022/iet-member-news-q1-2022/iet-statement-on-ukraine/ https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 02.03.2022 https://royalsociety.org/news/2022/03/joint-statement-academies-G7-states-on-russias-attack-on-ukraine/ 31.03.2022 (?) https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 31.03.2022 https://mailchi.mp/4851e2a74119/joint-publisher-statement 10.03.2022 https://newsroom.wiley.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2022/Wiley-Pledges-Support-to-Ukraine-/ On 31 March, 15 scientific publishers, including Elsevier, Cambridge University Press, De Gruyter, Springer Nature and others, issued a joint Multi-Publisher Statement on Ukraine to stop selling their products and services in Russia and Belarus (Multi-Publisher Statement on Ukraine, 2022). They also stated that they would not refuse to publish work by authors from these countries, based on COPE's recommendations. COPE's position was formulated on 1 August 1 2013 and concerned the work of editors of scientific journals with authors from the Islamic Republic of Iran. US sanctions against Iran, aimed at preventing the country from developing nuclear weapons, led some journals editors to boycott Iranian scientists' research (Arie, 2013). The situation at the time required a clear explanation of how publishers could act in a sanctioned environment. After discussions at a council meeting, COPE added to its Code of Conduct for journal editors advice warning the representatives of editorial offices against making decisions on publication based on information about the nationality, ethnicity, political beliefs, race, or religion of the authors. On 10 March 2022, in connection with Russia's aggressive actions on the territory of Ukraine, COPE re-announced these recommendations without changes, in fact condemning attempts to impose sanctions on Russian authors (COPE, 2022). However, despite the publishers' refusal to impose sanctions on Russian authors, there is still debate among academics. Proponents of sanctions say it is one of the most important and effective ways to use nonmilitary means to put pressure on Russian citizens to end the war (Else, 2022; Sher et al., 2022). In addition, further cooperation with Russian researchers while Russian military action persists may be perceived as unfair by affected Ukrainian researchers, while previous attempts at dialogue with Russian scholars did not prevent this war (Sher et al., 2022). In informal conversations and on social networks, there are reports that some editors have refused manuscripts containing at least one author from a Russian institution, and some reviewers have refused to review such manuscripts for personal reasons. One case, of the Journal of Molecular Structure, which is published by Elsevier, was widely discussed when its editorial board officially announced its decision to reject the manuscripts of authors from Russian institutions (Matthews, 2022; Retraction Watch, 2022). However, the editor-in-chief of the journal, Rui Fausto, clearly and justifiably stated that the position of the journal does not contradict the COPE recommendations, as it is not a ban on publication by Russian authors based on nationality, arguing instead that it is a ban on authors representing Russian research institutions that are funded by the Russian government. Another example demonstrates the opposite position: Carmine M. Pariante, editor-in-chief of Brain, Behaviour, and Immunity, which is also published by Elsevier, condemned Russia's actions, but did not support a boycott of authors from Russian institutions, believing that widening the gap between the various factions would not benefit science in the long run (Pariante, 2022). Publishers also question the fact that in the face of economic sanctions against Russia adopted by their countries, they cannot charge for subscribing to content from Russian institutions, nor can they charge APCs for publishing (Matthews, 2022). For example, ACS Publications stated that it condemns the actions of the Russian Federation and will no longer accept publishing charges or payments from Russian organizations for open access articles in any of ACS's journals. At the same time, it also claims to follow the COPE recommendations (American Chemical Society, 2022). Does this mean that the publisher has decided not to publish work by Russian authors or to publish them for free? This distinction is not clear to us. The conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which has a clear starting point 8 years ago, has intensified, leading to the invasion of the latter by the former in February of 2022. This has now amplified into a full-scale war. Alongside the human tragedy and the massive socio-economic consequences of this war, academics, and scientists—both Ukrainian and Russian—are being negatively impacted. In the case of Ukrainian academics, the death of family, friends and colleagues, a disrupted society, and a dysfunctional infrastructure are not conducive to work or to conduct research. In some cases, current circumstances have forced emigration, mainly to neighbouring EU nations, but socio-economic support there is not indefinite. In the case of Russian academics, negative stigmatization given their direct association—by choice or not—with the military aggression of the Russian Federation, is leading to their marginalization and, in extreme cases, sanctions. Due to strong scientific ties within the Russian and Ukrainian research space, the situation also has a negative impact on the work of researchers from other countries. Given the current situation, the issue of sanctions against authors working at Russian academic institutions needs additional and careful consideration. On the one hand, the introduction of publishing restrictions is directly related to the ethics of cooperation (i.e., development and legitimization), supporting Russian science, even in the context of the war's destruction by the Russian government, and the existential consequence on Ukrainian science and academia. It is obvious that some publishers, editors and reviewers feel morally responsible for not supporting cooperation with Russian researchers in such conditions. Therefore, COPE, as the organization to which publishers appeal in case of ethical issues, should pay more attention to this problem, as their previous recommendations did not provide an unambiguous reasoned answer that considered all ethical aspects of the situation. On the other hand, we believe that the legal component of publishers imposing sanctions on authors representing Russian academic or research institutions also plays a decisive role. It is important for publishers to act exclusively in a legal sense, and therefore to have clear answers to all points that arise in this war-related situation, including the issue of economic sanctions, regardless of whether they decide to impose sanctions, or not. In particular, publishers need to reflect on how to continue to cooperate with Russian scientific institutions, sponsors and authors, if their country has imposed economic sanctions against Russia. Do publishers who do not refuse to cooperate with sanctions and bans violate international laws due to their economic activities, such as charging access to content access charges, or article processing fees (Teixeira da Silva, 2022)? On what legal basis can publishers (or their journals' editors) refuse to review or publish a paper that is authored by an employee of a Russian institution, even more so if they are COPE member journals or publishers that claim to abide by COPE's guidelines? Undoubtedly, these questions arise because it is unclear is such prohibitions result in discrimination on certain grounds or in freedom-related restrictions based on basic human rights and freedom of choice in an academic setting. Although we do not propose to know an answer to the legal ramifications of publishing bans, we encourage legal scholars to weigh in and to provide clarity and advice to the academic community, possibly given the precedents of individual and institutional sanctions in the fields of sport, culture and the arts. There are separate questions about the consequences of publishing sanctions: Will they help to stop the war? What impact will they have on the development of science in the near and distant future? How will they affect the fate of individual researchers? We suspect that the answers to these and other questions will only be known once the war is over. War ultimately benefits no one, and the frictions and discord that are evidenced in academic publishing on this issue represent a microcosm of the wider socio-political and economic ramifications of this war. Ultimately, only peace and the cessation of war can allow societies of all parties involved to return to a state of 'normal' and to focus on constructive academic and social growth. At the same time, peace cannot be allowed to be achieved on the basis of a country's loss of its own territories, freedom and independence of its citizens, which are basic driving forces for the progress of science and academia. The first author would like to thank TIB - Leibniz Information Center for Science and Technology and Projekt DEAL for organizing Open Access to the paper. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. The authors declare no conflicts of interest of relevance to this topic. Maryna Nazarovets and Jaime A. Teixeira da Silva contributed equally to the intellectual discussion underlying this paper, literature exploration, writing, reviews and editing, and accept responsibility for the content, analyses and interpretations therein.
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