A Plague of Locusts? A Preliminary Assessment of the Threat of Multi-Drone Terrorism
2022; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 35; Issue: 7 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09546553.2022.2061960
ISSN1556-1836
AutoresZachary Kallenborn, Gary Ackerman, Philipp C. Bleek,
Tópico(s)Nuclear Issues and Defense
ResumoABSTRACTEmerging technologies provide new opportunities for terrorist organizations. Future terrorists may use multiple drones—either en masse or coordinated with each other in cruder or more sophisticated ways—to cause harm, potentially at scale. This study explores the topic via theoretical exploration and threat assessment. The first half explores relevant literatures on terrorist innovation; suicide bombing; airpower; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The second half builds on the literature review to provide a systematic, albeit preliminary, threat assessment, examining the threat as a function of motivations and capabilities, and elucidates the characteristics of groups that may be drawn to this technology. Policy recommendations to ameliorate this emerging threat conclude.KEYWORDS: Terrorist innovationdronesmass casualty terrorismthreat assessmentdecision-making AcknowledgementsThe authors are grateful to feedback provided by Steve Biddle, David Hambling, Paul Scharre, Derrick Tin, attendees of the 2021 International Studies Association annual convention, and the reviewers and editors of Terrorism and Political Violence. Any remaining errors are the authors’ own. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the authors’ current or former employers, funders, or affiliated organizations.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. This article deals primarily with the implications of multi-drone attacks in the context of terrorism. Many of the arguments raised might also hold for other violent non-state actors, such as insurgents, criminal organizations and covert state forces, but close analysis of these is left to future research efforts.2. We recognize that the term drone is vague and often not or not well defined. For the purposes of this study, we use the U.K. MoD’s definition of an unmanned aircraft: “… an aircraft that does not carry a human operator, is operated remotely using varying levels of automated functions, is normally recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.” We also acknowledge that this definition leaves some ambiguity about precisely what does and does not meet the criteria. We interpret the definition to exclude cruise missiles and projectiles.3. The most credible source for this claim is a book by two investigative journalists, which includes considerable detail about it. The book appears carefully sourced, substantially based on primary sources, but the specific sources for the drone-related information cannot be identified. Secondarily, the claim is supported by cursory content allegedly obtained from one or more primary sources, cited during a U.S. government-convened symposium by a non-governmental expert. Many other sources mention similar claims, but none appear to be based on primary-source information and they mostly cite each other. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, Cult at the End of the World (London, UK: Arrow, 1997), 152; Kyle B. Olson, “Overview: Recent Incident and Responder Implications,” in Proceedings of the Seminar of Responding to the Consequences of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Office of Emergency Preparedness (Washington, DC: U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services, July 11-14, 1995), 2/42.4. We discuss below why we do not include unmanned ground or maritime vehicles in this paper.5. Mark Pomerleau, “How $650 Drones are Creating Problems in Iraq and Syria,” C4ISRNet, January 5, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2018/01/05/how-650-drones-are-creating-problems-in-iraq-and-syria/.6. Arthur Holland Michel, “Iran’s Many Drones.” (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Center for the Study of the Drone, Bard College, November 25, 2013), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/irans-drones/; Mona Alami, “Analysis: Hezbollah Enters Drone Age with Bombing Raids in Syria,” Middle East Eye, March 20, 2017, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-Al-Qaeda; Steven Stanlinsky and R. Sosnow, “A Decade of Jihadi Organizations’ Use of Drones—From Early Experiments by Hizbullah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda to Emerging National Security Crisis for the West as ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” Middle East Media Research Institute, February 21, 2017, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-Al Qaeda; Don Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones, and Supporting Technology,” Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, October, 2016, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Drones-Report.pdf; David Kravets, “Man lands drone carrying radioactive sand on Japanese Prime Minister’s Office,” Ars Technica, April 26, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/man-arrested-for-flying-drone-carrying-radioactive-sand-in-tokyo/.7. Gregory D. Koblentz, “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 177–196, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770969?journalCode=rwaq20.8. Ibid.9. Don Rassler, “The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threat,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 2018, ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf; David Hastings Dunn, “Drones: Disembodied Aerial Warfare and the Unarticulated Threat,” International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013): 1237–1246; T. X. Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower: the Insurgent and the Drone,” War on the Rocks, October 18, 2016, warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-democratization-of-airpower-the-insurgent-and-the-drone/.10. Isaac Kaminer, “Robust Counter UxS Strategies Against Multi-Domain Super Swarms,” U.S. Naval Postgraduate School: Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research, https://nps.edu/documents/113838019/119143709/Kaminer_RobustCounterUxS_v1.pdf/ec414cfa-cc57-c7c3-d44d-8592a561c492?t=1585694994514.11. Zachary Kallenborn, “Future Warfare Series No. 60: Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass Destruction?” United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, May 6, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/29/2002331131/-1/-1/0/60DRONESWARMS-MONOGRAPH.PDF; David Hambling, “The U.S. Navy Plans to Foil Massive ‘Super Swarm’ Drone Attacks by Using the Swarm’s Intelligence Against Itself,” Forbes, August 26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/08/26/how-us-navy-plans-to-foil-massive-super-swarm-drone-attacks/?sh=2d937e203a35; Stuart Russell, Anthony Aguirre, Ariel Conn, and Max Tegmark, “Slaughterbots—A Response: Lethal Autonomous Weapons are not Science Fiction; They are a Real Threat to Human Security that We Must Stop Now,” IEEE Spectrum, January 23, 2018, https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-you-should-fear-slaughterbots-a-response; for a contrary view, see Paul Scharre, “Why You Shouldn’t Fear ‘Slaughterbots,’” IEEE Spectrum, December 22, 2017, https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots.12. “Syria: Drone Swarm Attacks Russian Military Base,” TRIPWire, January 12, 2018, https://tripwire.dhs.gov/news/209478.13. “Yemen’s Houthis Attack Saudi Oil Heartland with Drones, Missiles,” Reuters, March 8, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-saudi-int/yemens-houthis-attack-saudi-oil-heartland-with-drones-missiles-idUSKBN2B00I2.14. Shawn Yuan, “Probe in Drone Attack on Iraq PM Yet to Identify Attackers,” Al Jazeera, November 29, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/iraq-presents-investigation-development-on-pm-attack.15. David B. Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones were 2016ʹs ‘Most Daunting Problem,’” DefenseNews, May 16, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic/2017/05/16/socom-commander-armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem.16. Keith Griffith, “Who Flew Drone Swarms Over America’s Most Powerful Nuclear Reactor Last Year? Federal Probe Proves Inconclusive After Mysterious Security Breach in Arizona,” Daily Mail, July 30, 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8577381/Drone-incursions-Palo-Verde-nuclear-power-plant-leave-investigators-baffled.html; Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick, “The Night a Mysterious Drone Swarm Descended on Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant,” The Drive, July 29, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34800/the-night-a-drone-swarm-descended-on-palo-verde-nuclear-power-plant.17. We do not believe that it is useful to provide a precise definition for “mass casualty,” because the amount of harm is highly variable depending on the context in which analysis is being conducted. For example, epidemiological investigations of the effects of explosives on buildings have defined mass casualties as incidents with thirty or more casualties, while other studies focusing on terrorist bombers use a threshold of twenty-five casualties (Jeffrey Arnold, Pinchas Halpern, Ming-Che Tsai and Howard Smithline, “Mass Casualty Terrorist Bombings: A Comparison of Outcomes by Bombing Type,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 43, no. 2 (February 2004): 263–273; Chris Quillen, “A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25, no. 5 (2002): 279–292. For the purposes of this article, by “mass casualty” we simply mean an unusually large number of casualties compared to a typical terrorist attack, potentially equivalent to the deadliest terror attacks.18. See Quan Quan, Introduction to Multicopter Design and Control (Singapore: Springer, 2017); Kelley Sayler, “A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer,” Center for a New American Security, June 2015, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-World-of-Drones_052115.pdf?mtime=20160906082154&focal=none; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints,” Security Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 50–84, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134189; Paul Scharre, Army of None (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2018).19. For the purposes of this article, “autonomy” simply refers to the ability of a drone—or any machine—to act on its own without human control. Some functions may be autonomous, but not others. Other conceptions of autonomy focus on the autonomy of the system as a whole, such as SAE International Standards J3016, “Levels of Driving Autonomy,” which evaluates the autonomy of self-driving vehicles from level 0 (no autonomy) to level 5 (full autonomy). Even in the system-based typology, certain functions may still be human-controlled, such as changes to the system’s code. Other conceptions focus on the autonomy within critical features, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross’s definition of “autonomous weapon” as a weapon system that “[selects] and [applies] force to targets without human intervention.” Jin Zhou, “The Impact of Different Levels of Autonomy and Training on Operators’ Drone Control Strategies,” ACM Transactions on Human-Robot Interactions, November 15, 2019, https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3344276; “ICRC Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems,” International Committee of the Red Cross, May 21, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems; “Path to Autonomy: Self-Driving Car Levels 0 to 5 Explained,” Car and Driver, October 3, 2017, https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a15079828/autonomous-self-driving-car-levels-car-levels/.20. Among numerous others, see for example; Qiannan Cui, “Brief Analysis of Drone Swarm Communication,” 2017 IEEE International Conference on Unmanned Systems, October 27–29, 2017, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8278390.21. DOD Strategic Capabilities Office, “Perdix Fact Sheet,” June 1, 2017, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Perdix%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.22. David Hambling, “What are Drone Swarms and Why Does Everyone Want One?” Forbes, March 1, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/03/01/what-are-drone-swarms-and-why-does-everyone-suddenly-want-one/?sh=33b6bf382f5c.23. Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm is Coming, and We Need to be Ready for it,” Modern War Institute at West Point, October 25, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready/; Antonio L. Alfeo, “Design and Simulation of the Emergent Behavior of Small Drones Swarming for Distributing Target Localization,” Journal of Computational Science 29 (2018): 19–33, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1877750318302898; Peter Fankhauser, “Collaborative Navigation for Flying and Walking Robots,” 2016 IEEE / RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, October 9–14, 2016, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7759443.24. Amy Hocraffer and Chang S. Nam, “A Meta-analysis of Human–System Interfaces in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Swarm Management,” Applied Ergonomics 58 (2017): 66–80, www.researchgate.net/profile/Chang_Nam5/publication/303782432_A_meta-analysis_of_human-system_interfaces_in_unmanned_aerial_vehicle_UAV_swarm_management/links/5767f71f08ae1658e2f8b435.pdf; Drones can also be deployed using swarming tactics, regardless of whether they are drones en masse or drone swarms. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define swarming as “a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions.” John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” RAND, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27341/Swarming_and_the_future_of_conflict.pdf?sequence=1; Sean J. A. Edwards, “Swarming and the Future of Warfare,” RAND, 2005, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD189.pdf.25. We also limited ourselves to UAVs to keep a more manageable scope and to avoid extensive caveating that limits readability.26. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Swarming Destruction: Drone Swarms and Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 5–6 (2019): 523–543, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1546902; Anthony Tingle and David Tyree, “The Rise of the Commercial Threat: Countering the Small Unmanned Aircraft System,” Joint Force Quarterly 85 (2017), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-85/jfq-85_30-35_Tingle-Tyree.pdf.27. Dan Gettinger and Arthur Holland Michel, “A Brief History of Hamas and Hezbollah’s Drones,” Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, July 14, 2014, dronecenter.bard.edu/hezbollah-hamas-drones/; Rassler, “The Islamic State and Drones”; Gilli and Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?”; Dunn, “Drones: Disembodied Aerial Warfare and the Unarticulated Threat.”28. Robert J. Bunker, “Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications,” United States Army War College Press, August 2015, ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1287; James Rogers, “Future Threats: Military UAS, Terrorist Drones, and the Dangers of the Second Drone Age,” in A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Joint Air Power Competence Center), https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Comprehensive-Approach-to-Countering-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems.pdf.29. For example, see Andrew Silke and Anastasia Filippidou, “What Drives Terrorist Innovation? Lessons from Black September and Munich 1972,” Security Journal (2019); Paul Gill, “Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 573–585; Audrey Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019); Evan Perkoski, “Terrorist Technological Innovation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019); Nicole A. Tishler, “Trends in Terrorists’ Weapons Adoption and the Study Thereof,” International Studies Review, 20 no. 3 (2018); Gary Ackerman, “The Theoretical Underpinnings of Terrorist Innovation Decisions,” in Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al Qaeda and Beyond, edited by Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015); Gary A. Ackerman, “‘More Bang for the Buck’: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD Dissertation, King’s College London, 2014); Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).30. Andrew Mumford ed., “How Terrorists Learn: Adaptation and Innovation in Political Violence,” Special Issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017); James J. F. Forest ed., Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).31. Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel T. Hunter and Lily D. Cushenbery, “Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organizations,” Journal of Creative Behavior 47, no. 2 (2013).32. Brian Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, Reflections on Providing for “The Common Good,” 101, no. 5 (1986): 777–778; Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1992): 15; Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation.33. Ackerman, “‘More Bang for the Buck.”’34. Gary A. Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of Mortars,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016):12–34; Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, Brian A. Jackson, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Kim Cragin, “Hizballah, the Party of God,” in Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2, Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups, edited by Brian A. Jackson et al (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 37-54.35. This notion is widespread in the general innovation literature, e.g., see Eric Abrahamson, “Managerial Fads and Fashions: The Diffusion and Rejection of Innovations,” The Academy of Management Review, 16, no. 3 (1991); David Strang and John Meyer, “Institutional Conditions for Diffusion,” Theory and Society, 22 (1993).36. Ackerman, ‘“More Bang for the Buck,’” 250; Rashmi Singh, “A Preliminary Typology Mapping Pathways of Learning and Innovation by Modern Jihadist Groups,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 627; this was confirmed in a set of case studies published as: Gary A. Ackerman ed., “‘Designing Danger’: Complex Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors,” Special Issue of the Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016).37. Cronin, 2019.38. Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008); Michael Kenney, “‘Dumb’ Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 10 (2010); Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, Vols. 1 and 2.39. Emily Goldman and Andrew Ross, “Conclusion: The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas—Theory and Practice,” in The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Ackerman, ‘“More Bang for the Buck.’”40. Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Free Press, 2003).41. Clayton M. Christensen, Erik A. Roth and Scott D. Anthony, Seeing What’s Next (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 20–21; 290.42. Strang, David and Sarah Soule, “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998): 265–290; Rui Baptista, “The Diffusion of Process Innovations: A Selective Review,” International Journal of the Economics of Business 6, no. 1 (1999): 107–129; Eric Abrahamson, “Managerial Fads and Fashions: The Diffusion and Rejection of Innovations,” The Academy of Management Review 16, no. 3 (1991): 586–612; David Strang and Michael W. Macy, “In Search of Excellence: Fads, Success Stories, and Adaptive Emulation,” American Journal of Sociology, 107 (2001): 147–182.43. James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).44. Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation.45. Gary A. Ackerman, “Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016).46. John Sawyer, “Competition in the Market for Political Violence” (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University 2010); Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 1; Brian Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 3 (May 2001); Gill et al., “Malevolent Creativity”; Nina A. Kollars and Paul D. Brister, “The Terrorists That Couldn’t: Seeing Terrorist Innovation as a Risky Venture,” Homeland Security Review 8, no. 3 (2014). Perhaps this is the reason that certain researchers have suggested that a hybrid organizational structure (such as a “core-periphery” network) is most favorable for innovation (Nancy K. Hayden, “Innovation and Learning in Terrorist Organizations: Towards Adaptive Capacity and Resiliency” (paper presented at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Systems Dynamics Society, July 2013), https://www.systemdynamics.org/assets/conferences/2013/proceed/papers/P1407.pdf2013). Richard English has argued that the PIRA were so successful in innovating because they possessed a “combination of high-level centralization with locally autonomous initiative [that] probably maximized their capacity for … constant attempts at innovation.” Richard English, “Terrorist Innovation and International Politics: Lessons From an IRA Case Study?” International Politics 50, no. 4 (2013): 496–511.47. Kallenborn and Bleek, 2019; Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and the Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/.48. Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Analysis of Trends and Motivations,” RAND, October 1999, 46–50, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P8039-1.pdf; Debra Bennett, “Terrorists and Unconventional Weapons: Is the Threat Real?” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 12, no. 1 (2004): 20–50; Paul Cornish, “The CBRN System: Assessing the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons in the United Kingdom,” Chatham House, February 2007, 3; Gregory D. Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 501–20; John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 46; John Mueller, “WMD Terrorism: The Prospects,” in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, edited by Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 84–89.49. Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 55–57; Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2000): 31–32, www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/atxchapter2_1.pdf; Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, “Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons” (CRS Report for Congress RL32391, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004); Reynolds Salerno et al., “A BW Risk Assessment: Historical and Technical Perspectives,” The Nonproliferation Review 11, no. 3 (Fall–Winter 2004), 40; Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2004).50. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 (2014): 228; Richard Danzig, Marc Sageman, Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani, and Zachary M. Hosford, “Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Center for a New American Security, July 2011, s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf?mtime=20160906080509; Jerrold M. Post, “Appendix: Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism,” In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000).51. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Avatars of the Earth: Radical Environmentalism and CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 43, no. 5 (2018): 351–381; Gary A. Ackerman, “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 143–170.52. Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction?”: 501–20. Government officials mostly characterize the threat as extremely serious; for example, from a senior former government official and prominent scholar, see Rolf Mowatt-Larssen and Monica Duffy Toft, “Recommendations to the New President on Countering WMD and Terrorism,” Just Security, November 17, 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/34603/recommendationspresident-countering-wmd-terrorism/ (accessed May 16, 2018). Some analysts and scholars are more skeptical; for example, see John Mueller, 2012, 84–89.53. For example, in recent years, the Islamic State embarked on an ambitious program to develop chemical weapons, and used crude weapons, to limit effect, on multiple occasions. In the 1990s, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, based in Japan with significant presence in several other countries, pursued chemical, biological, and in a very limited way, even nuclear weapons, and caused modest casualties with chemical weapons on several occasions. Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/middleeast/isis-chemical-weapons-syria-iraq-mosul.html; Joby Warrick, “Exclusive: Iraqi Scientist Says he Helped ISIS Make Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post, January 21, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/exclusive-iraqi-scientist-says-he-helped-isis-make-chemical-weapons/2019/01/21/617cb8f0-0d35-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html; Arabinda Acharya, “ISIS’ Chemical Weapons: Where They Came From, How They are Used, and What Will Come Next,” Foreign Affairs, February 29, 2016; Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo”; Kaplan and Marshall, 1997.54. Kallenborn and Bleek, 2018.55. Gary Ackerman, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, R. Karl Rethemeyer, and Victor Asal, “Terrorist Groups and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/terrorist-groups-and-weapons-mass-destruction.56. Markus K. Binder and Gary A. Ackerman, “Pick Your POICN: Introducing the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 9 (2021): 730–754. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1577541.57. Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction?”; Mowatt-Larssen and Toft, 2016; Mueller, 2012, 84–89.58. Kathleen Vogel, Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).59. Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich, and Alexis Orton, “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf.60. Target discrimination is a complex issue when it comes to drones and autonomous weapons. At least two forms of discrimination exist: target engagement and target selection. Target engagement refers to the ability to, basically, put a harm agent like a bullet in the body of the target. Target selection refers to the ability of the weapon to decide whether the target is appropriate. While improved machine vision and integrated sensors almost certainly will improve target engagement, globe leading roboticists agree that autonomous weapons cannot effectively decide which targets are appropriate.61. Exploring whether drone swarms should be categorized as so-called weapons of mass destruction, see Kallenborn, “Future Warfare Series No. 60.”62. Of course, other motivational factors are still relevant depending on the type of weapon on the drone, the target, and the manner of attack. Nonetheless, assuming these details are equivalent between CBRN terrorism and multi-drone terrorism, multi-drone terrorism likely has fewer motivational barriers in general.63. Asal, Ackermann, Rethemeyer, 2012.64. For example, in the early 1990s the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult produced B. anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, in both wet slurry and dry powder forms. Cult members working on the program consumed about a liter per day of a pink liquid infused with penicillin, but that seems likely to have provided at best limited protection had the cult managed to obtain or produce a virulent strain of the bacterium, especially since cult members reported accidentally inhaling substantial quantities of the dry powder. Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo,” 27 and endnote 126.65. Rashmi Singh, “Suicide Terrorism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, edited by Andreas Gof
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