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Nathan S. French. A Theocentric Interpretation of :הדעת טוב ורע The Knowledge of Good and Evil as the Knowledge for Administering Reward and Punishment

2022; Eisenbrauns; Volume: 32; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.5325/bullbiblrese.32.3.0322

2576-0998

Leslie C. Allen,

Theology and Philosophy of Evil

Brevard S. Childs, observing that the biblical author never explained what the unique and miraculous “tree of the knowledge of good and evil” signified, took it as a fluid concept that one should not try to solidify, apart from perhaps drawing a few broad lines.7 Walter Vogels has deduced from lack of agreement as to the meaning of the defining phrase that “it keeps its secret still.”8 Nevertheless, he proceeded to review suggested options and offer his own interpretation. On a much larger scale, Nathan French has adopted a similar procedure in this revision of a 2018 doctoral dissertation supervised by Lena-Sofia Tiemeyer at Aberdeen University.The first chapter briefly sets out his procedure for studying a truly “enigmatic” phrase. The second chapter lays a foundation by presenting and appraising nine commonly held interpretations and then three individual proposals that are judged valuable. The first of the two groups covers distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful, moral discrimination, wisdom, omniscience, cultural knowledge, sexual knowledge, maturity, moral discernment, and magic. The second group embraces speaking good and evil as an authoritative word, political knowledge, and societal rules and social conventions or divine justice. At the close, three parameters are declared as desirable for interpreting the phrase: that the knowledge is divine, first possessed by the divine beings (Gen 3:5, 22); the function of good and evil when Yhwh Elohim is their subject or causation in the Eden narrative and the surrounding context; and the reason such knowledge is forbidden on pain of death.The third chapter develops the book’s thesis by studying the relation of ancient Near Eastern texts to divine retribution in the Hebrew Bible and to the functions of the lexemes “good” and “bad/evil” in blessing and cursing, as legal sanctions for obedient and disobedient behavior. The fourth chapter is key in that it presents a “theocentric” interpretation of the knowledge in the Eden narrative. Thus, טוב is interpreted as God’s utilitarian provisions, while in Gen 1 it also refers to divine benefits. Genesis 2:16–17 is understood as a divine test, like Deut 8:2, 16, following scholars such as Tryggve Mettinger who discover in the narrative Deuteronomic/Deuteronomistic influence. French draws no diachronic conclusions, finding merely “a connection at least on some level,” rather than direct borrowing either way (p. 124). The opening of the couple’s eyes is related to knowledge of good and evil in that nakedness and shame are a judgment for disobeying the divine command, a judgment further worked out in Gen 3:14–19. In this way, they acquire such knowledge for themselves.The rest of the book mainly discovers further parallels between the Eden narrative and the DtrH in order to substantiate interpretive proposals already made. It must be observed that Mettinger’s perspective has not gone unchallenged. Most notably, Terje Stordalen, finding rather affinity with wisdom literature, argued that in many respects the Eden narrative and Deuteronomy/DtrH are theologically poles apart and so any literary connection between them is unlikely.9 French could have presented his work as a kind of counter-challenge; at least Stordalen’s essay deserves attention.It should be asked whether the author has unreasonably blended two separate levels of semantic reference in his approach. In Deut 30:15, he translates טוב as “blessing (lit. good)” and רע as “cursing (lit. evil)” (p. 157; cf. p. 113). In so doing, he is equating the lexemes with terms used later in v. 18. However, the NRSV and NJPS render them “prosperity” and “adversity,” respectively, while the NAB, NJB, and NIV translate the words similarly, all evidently judging that the rhetorical appeal to human advantage in v. 15 is heightened by an even more persuasive appeal to divine recompense in v. 18. Moreover, French wrongly cites J. A. Thompson to the contrary (p. 157 n. 9). What Westermann said about Delitzsch’s interpretation as obedience and disobedience in the Eden narrative is also true in this case: “The knowledge is completely subordinated to the command.”10 The same question arises for the pair of lexemes in the Eden narrative. If one seeks clues from the lexeme טוב, used there a number of times, its occurrences do fall easily into Wellhausen’s category of Israelite culture, although, as in French’s case (pp. 291–93), elements of other interpretations may also be pertinent. “Not good” in Gen 2:18 leads on by way of remedy to the institution of marriage in v. 24. “Good” in v. 9 refers to human food, and in v. 12 to gold as a metal precious to humans. If so, a rendering “good and bad” is to be preferred to “good and evil,” since not simply moral factors are involved.In the “not good” situation of 2:18, Hugh C. White usefully referred to Yhwh Elohim’s exercise of a personal capability to know good and evil, while the human couple wrongly made themselves the subjects of the knowing.11 The woman perceived the forbidden fruit as “good for food” (3:6), in self-justification misapplying to the symbolic tree what was said of ordinary trees in 2:9a. Similarly, the knowing of nudity and shame can be interpreted as a good realization of the tree’s knowledge by referring to cultural modesty. Positive usage for opened eyes elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible counters a negative interpretation of 3:7a.12 There is an upgrade from animal ignorance to fully human awareness.13 One may compare 2:7, 19 for animal/human correspondences. But such an enlightened human feature also applied to “us” who belonged to the separate class of supernatural beings, according to Isaiah’s vision (Isa 6: 1–2, 8; cf. Ezek 1:11, 27). A human norm is regarded as reflecting a heavenly norm. Then paradox appears in the narrative, in the forbidding of something culturally good that was eventually endorsed with proper clothing. There is a comparable paradox in 2 Sam 17:14b, where Ahithophel’s “good counsel” ran counter to Yhwh’s providential will revealed by divine command.Only the first two of French’s desirable parameters, cited above, are met by this alternative explanation. However, two out of three may be all one can expect in a narrative that as a whole has been called a “theological puzzle.”14 In general, there is some overlap with Proverbs, which sets limits on human wisdom by demanding fear of Yhwh as a basis and disallowing being wise in one’s own eyes.15