Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Militarization of Iran's Perception of Saudi Arabia

2023; Wiley; Volume: 113; Issue: 1-2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/muwo.12465

1478-1913

Abdolrasool Divsallar,

Islamic Studies and History

Since the World War II, rivalry has been the major state of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In recent years, both sates were involved in “proxy wars” in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and have even posed direct military threats to their territories. Tensions between the two countries increased in the post-2015 era. Scholars have explored the factors behind growing Saudi perception of Iranian threat. Geography and population, Islamic Republic's revolutionary political system, political-military interventions across the Arab world, and active nuclear and missile programs have contributed the most to the Saudi threat perception of Iran.1 On the other side, many have framed Iranian perspective of Saudi Arabia under sectarian lines2 and influenced by revolutionary politics.3 Few have tried to view Iran's decisions from the lens of strategic studies. Among them, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami argue that the perception of threat from Saudi Arabia has contributed to Iran's strategic thinking.4 However, still research is needed to explore Iran's view of Saudi threat and its impacts on country's strategic thinking, including in the military domain. For years, Saudi Arabia had a minimum presence in Iran's military doctrine because Tehran saw Riyadh as only a political rival which was not posing a direct security-miliary threat. The Saudi presence in Iranian military calculus was indirect and viewed through the lens of US-Iran conflict. Only as a broader military plan to inflicting cost on US assets in the region, Saudi Arabia have had a position in Iran's military thinking. However, this article suggests that the strategic neglect of Saudi Arabia in Iran's military planning has ended. Tehran has started to adjust its military capabilities for a war scenario with Saudis as as its most capable regional foe. This is because of Iranian assessment about a change in the nature of Saudi threat. Iran has gradually abandoned its traditional view of Saudi as a political rival only, and has instead viewing it as a hostile state which aims at securitizing Iran and posing a direct military threat to the country. Saudi Arabia is viewed as a policy challenge in strategic circles in Tehran and a long-term rising adversary that should be deterred.5 This sense of direct military threat from Saudi has never existed in Iran since the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Iran's foreign policy is primarily driven by its threat perceptions, and it therefore changes accordingly. Scholars have discussed that in response to the growing perception of Saudi threat and assertiveness, Iran has constantly seek to rebalance with its rising power and shifted its traditional détente strategy to contain Saudi Arabia.6 Supporting countries like Qatar and Lebanon in resisting Saudi pressure and exhausting the kingdom through indirect means and proxy wars have a particular role in this case. However, according to George Kenan, the strategy of containment was not aimed at the Soviet military attack but at its spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, and changes in the balance of power.7 In other words, as Kenan attested, the US attempted to contain Russian political power.8 But in Iran's Saudi policy, the military factor is playing a more significant role now. Rather than being composed of political, psychological, and economic instruments with a military in the background to contain the Saudi threat, Iranian actions are motivated by perception of being at war with the Kingdom and, as a result, military instruments are prioritized. The strong military flavor of Iran's strategy corresponds to the fact that Tehran is concered about building a deterrence posture against Saudi rather than only containg Saudi's spehere of influence. At least two instrumental reasons contribute to Iran's increased militarized response. The first factor relates to the composition of Islamic Republic's national power and its long-held strategic logic of reliance on available resources.9 This perspective highlights the level of asymmetry that exists between Saudi and Iranian power. Saudi Arabia has proved to be more capable in mobilizing global financial and political networks against Iran, influencing US strategy toward Iran, and influencing Iranian public opinion. But Islamic Republic cannot respond in kind as it is not an economic power and lacks the ability to engage in high-level political lobbying at the international level. Instead it has a functioning military with networks of regional non-state allies. Thus, it sees military instruments as the favourable domain to design its response strategy to Saudi Arabia. The second factor relates to the institutional characteristics of foreign policy decision making in Iran.10 Military-security complexes dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have a pivotal influence on foreign policy decisions. As compared to civilian policymakers, the IRGC has shown a better sense of objectivity and cohesiveness in drafting strategy, and the Iranian leadership views the Guard as more efficient in tackling existential threats. Power asymmetry and institutional factors have contributed to Iran's intensified militaristic approach. The article is organized as follows. The first section answers the question on how Iran's view toward Saudi Arabia has evolved. It argues that Tehran has concluded to be in the state of war and full hostility with Saudi Arabia, believing that Saudis are posing a comprehensive multidimensional threat. The second section responds to a less discussed question. It investigates what constitutes Iran's threat perception. The section maps Iranian elites’ assessment of the Saudi threat in details. The last section discusses how Iran is coping with the new situation. The article demonstrates that the Iranian military doctrine is incorporating Saudi threat and accordingly adjusting its warfighting capabilities. In the conclusion, I argue that Iran's strategy is unlikely to be affected by changes in presidents as they lack autonomy in foreign policy decision-makings and are unable to fundamentally influence strategic assessments of military-security complexes. Contemporary history of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations has been shaped by competition over maximizing regional influence while reducing spheres of influence of the other side, fears of losing regional status, and domestic political-security concerns. For a long time, Riyadh was worried that even if there was a friendly government in Tehran, the Kingdom will be consigned to the status of a junior partner, with the US favoring Iran, as was the case under the former US President Richard Nixon's Twin Pillars doctrine.11 Saudi's sense of weakness has contributed to its quest for supremacy, and Iran's fear of losing its historical status, along with its sense of religious duty, has prompted the country to take measures toward regional influence. As a result, both sides have been strategically reactive to any changes in the regional balance of power in favor of the other.12 This has caused constant cycles of balancing and re-balancing between Riyadh and Tehran. To achieve a power balance, both Riyadh and Tehran have used aggressive power-maximizing strategies combined with containment policies to limit each other's powers. Therefore, the conflict has revolved around which country can use its resources more effectively to curb the other.13 Inevitably, the outcome has been a perpetual perception of mutual threat and fear, many of which are directed toward endangering the political regimes’ stability and security. Strategies of power and anti-power have created a vicious cycle in which one side's defensive strategy is perceived as aggressive by the other side and adds to the existing level of insecurity. In addition, domestic factors related to statehood and nation building, as well as deviating attention from popular discontents have contributed to uneasy relations. The regimes’ need of legitimacy have made nationalism and religious identity part of the Saudi-Iran rivalry.14 Hostilities based on Persian or Arab nationalism and differentiation of religious identities provides both states with legitimacy, which help them to cover up deficiencies and malfunctions.15 Both Riyadh and Tehran have effectively manipulated their mutual threat perceptions under this notion to build the “other,” which serves for the unity and stability of their political systems. This notion opposes the idea that sectarian Sunni-Shia divide is the basis of the rivalry, arguing instead that ideology has been instrumentalized to justify power politics and increase political legitimacy. The Arab-Persian binary is deeply rooted in the political socialization of these countries. These feelings are an important element for the regimes to create social mobilization and public support of their policies. As Al-Rasheed observes, the new era of Saudi policy toward Iran reflects a complexity of domestic uncertainties rulers in Riyadh face.16 In this context, Iran-Saudi competition traditionally has been framed around political and religious issues, and the military dimension has been overlooked. Both sides have remained cautious to avoid posing a direct military threat to the other side. While the GCC was initially formed to counter Iran, its attempt to build a strong military leg was not successful for many intra- GCC reasons.17 There has also never been an internal agreement inside Saudi Arabia about the urgency of building a military alliance against Iran. From Tehran's perspective, even Riyadh's favoring of the US presence in the region was viewed from the lens of US-Iran political competition over regional security and the US threat. Incidents such as alleged Iranian-backed bombings of Khobar Towers in 1996 was a signal to the US rather than targeting of Saudi interests. Also, Iran's major regional policies, such as its opportunism after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq to expand its influence beyond borders, were initially designed to deter the US threat. Such policies, from the Iranian perspective at least, had minimum linkage to the power rivalry with Saudi Arabia, highlighting that Tehran has had no direct perception of a strategic threat from Saudi. Riyadh was viewed as a regional competitor and a bad actor that is facilitating the presence of Iranian enemies and restraining Iran's regional power, but not a direct military threat. In addition, the high level of political engagement between both countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s assured Tehran of the less militarized nature of the Saudi threat. Things gradually started to change in the post-2011 period. Ahmadinejad's provocative rhetoric combined with Iran stepping up its missile program and resorting to nuclear brinkmanship signaled Saudis about risks to regional balance. Also, Obama's decision to keep its regional allies out of the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program raised alarms in Riyadh about the possibility that regional security decisions could be made in their absence. While Obama administration's doctrine was calling for an increase in Saudi responsibility in regional issues,18 it conveyed a sense of US disengagement and shift toward Iran. The Arab Spring was a critical juncture for Saudi's regional policy, pushing it into a more direct confrontation with Iran. Riyadh and Tehran stood up in opposite sides of the uprisings, with Syria on top of the list of their confrontations. Tehran decided to put boots on the ground in another Arab state after Iraq in order to protect what it viewed as its strategic depth in the Levant from a possible collapse of Bashar Al-Assad government. Rihadh, however, saw this as an opportunity for toppling the Syrian regime and provided security assistance to opposition groups. Syria marked the first major military confrontation in the form of a proxy war between Saudi and Iran. Iran-Saudi relations raised ladders of escalation and faced an unprecedented level of hostility after the death of 464 Iranian pilgrims in Hajj stampede in 2015. Later the execution of Shi'ite opposition leader, Nimr Al-Nimr, in 2016 exacerbated tensions. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei compared the Kingdom to the pre-Islamic period of “Jahiliyah” and threatened a “harsh retaliation”.19 Saudi Arabia cut ties with Iran following the storming of its embassy by hardliners, which further assisted both sides’ rising threat perception due to a lack of a proper communication channel. This happened at a time when Iran's security assistance to Houthis in Yemen opened a never existing front in Saudi-Iranian relations, which was characterized by Iran's direct military activity against Saudi's national interests. Gradually the miliary dimention became a new sphere of interaction between Saudi and Iran. Saudis regarded the failed Houthi missile attack of the Riyadh airport in 2017 as an act of war by Iran and promised to take appropriate measures at the right time.20 Military front in bilateral relations has been further exacerbated by the complex missile-drone attacks which targeted Aramco facilities. The incident marked a critical turning point since it was the first time that Iran directly targeted Saudi territories. Contrary to previous operations, the attack was not a strategic signaling to the United States, but aimed at detering the Kingdom's policies with military means. Tehran's operation sent the strategic message of Iran's willingness for a military engagement with Saudi Arabia if deemed necessary. It signaled a new assessment in Tehran that Saudi is not only a political rival, but also a legitimate military target and a stand-alone threat for a future war. No longer Ryadh was viewed as subordinate to the US threat but has emerged as an stand alone threat. As senior security analysts in Tehran argue, Saudis are “securitizing Iran” and “globalizing Iranian threat” to force international powers [such as the US] to intervene and permanently eliminate Iran from power rivalries in the Middle East.21 Tehran perceives this as a direct threat that needs to be deterred with whatever means necessary, including the use of force. What has caused Iran's assessment of the Saudi threat to change? A proper elaboration of this question can be revealing to understand motives and rationale behind Iranian policy towards Saudi Arabia. This section uses four-dimentional assessment to answer the question. First, it looks at the Kingdom's domestic dimension and MBS new policies towards Iran. Second, it studies national power and capabilities that caused concerns of change in balance of power. Third, it assess regional dimension and Riyadh's regional military alliences building strategies. And fourth, it explores domestic security dimension and Islamic Republic's perception of Saudi's actions against its regime security. King Abdullah's death and Mohammed Bin Salman's (MBS) rise as the most prominent figure forged a new domestic coalition in Saudi that is characterized by adopting hawkish and assertive anti-Iran policies. Having been appointed as defense minister in 2015 and named as the direct successor to the throne in 2017, MBS has served as the kingdom's de facto ruler since 2015. His assertive anti-Iran policy was multifaceted and targeted Iranian leadership in a personalized manner. In a region where personal politics matter, MBS went as far as equating the supreme leader to Hitler. He stated: “I believe that the Iranian supreme leader makes Hitler look good…. the supreme leader is trying to conquer the world. He believes he owns the world. They are both evil guys. He is the Hitler of the Middle East.” With this blunt criticism of Iran's most powerful politician, MBS elevated his adversarial relation with Iran to a personal level and followed a policy of “open hostility”. During Trump's historic visit to Riyadh in 2017, MBS called Iran an “evil force” that all nations should align against; a new trend which was mostly absent in Saudi-Iran relations. Despite the attempts of many in Tehran to ease the situation by referring to his young age and lack of political experience, the scratch it made on Iran's perception of the Saudi threat never faded away. These comments were followed by decisive Saudi action to contain Iran in the region, both politically and militarily. The upheaval came when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel joined forces to coordinate their anti-Iran policy, lobbying the US to pull out from the Iran's nuclear deal known as the Jonit Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), Iran's most prominent political project to normalize relations with the West. With Trump in office, Saudis increased their lobbying activities in the US for tougher stance against Iran,22 including international isolation and regime change. These actions were taken far more seriously in Tehran than MBS's speeches. According to a study on Iranian elite's perception of the Saudi threat, published by an institute affiliated with former IRGC commander in chief Brigadier General Yahya Safavi, 45.3 percent of respondents believed that Saudi's lobbying power in Washington to push for more anti-Iranian policies is the most eminent threat. Only 40 percent saw it as a moderate threat.23 Saudi Arabia's public policy also has a significant military component. In May 2019, sources close to the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, urged the United States to strike at Iran after attacks on Saudi oil pumping stations and oil tankers off the coast of Fujairah. This was in many ways reminiscent of the uncompromising Bush doctrine threats against Iran that followed the al-Qaeda attacks on the US soil.24 Iranian officials are concerned about the growth of Saudi's national power, believing that the MBS reforms may introduce a long-term trend that could lead to a meaningful change in the regional balance of power in favor of Riyadh. Saudi's ambitious socioeconomic reforms highlighted in its Vision 2030 plan, as well as the country's rising military power, drew Tehran's attention. On the economic front, Saudi's National Investment Strategy aims to boost the private sector's contribution to GDP to 65 percent; increase FDI's contribution to GDP to 5.7 percent; increase non-oil exports’ contribution to GDP from 16 percent to 50 percent; and reduce unemployment rate to 7 percent. In practice, economic reforms facilitated Saudi's use of oil revenue as a foreign policy resource to support a more assertive foreign policy. On the other hand, a new understanding prevailed in Riyadh that Iran's economic power in the first decade of the twenty-first century contributed to its proactive foreign policy. Therefore, Saudi Arabia supported and pushed for US sanction as part of its efforts to contain Iran. From the view of Iranian officials, the use of coercive economic tools against Iran amounts to proclaiming an economic war. Mohammad Reza Pourebrahimi, the Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's Economic Committee, claimed that Saudis, Israelis, and Emirates have created a joint economic “War room.”25 The long-standing incompatible oil policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia within OPEC have always resulted in a level of economic tension, but Iran now views Saudi's actions as coercive economic measures to complement the “maximum pressure” and other similar campaigns by the United States. In one example, after turbulence in Tehran's foreign exchange market in March 2018, Ahmad Anaraki, Head of the Parliament's Inquiry Group for Financial Fluctuations, accused the Saudi government of smuggling US dollars out of Iran in order to create economic fluctuations and devaluate the Iranian currency.26 On the military front Iran seems to be worried about Saudi growing military power and defense industry. Saudi's military expenditure estimated to be $55.6billion in 2021.27 This is 6.6 of Saudi's GDP compared to Iran's spending of $24.6billion, which is 2.3 percent of its GDP.28 According to SIPRI, Saudi Arabia's imports in 2013-2017 grew by 225 percent compared with 2008–2012, making it the world's second largest arms importer. The disparity between the GCC and Iran's military expenditure began in 2006 and peaked in 2016, when the GCC spent $113.722 billion compared to Iran's $12.2 billion. On the other hand, Iran is not even on the list of top 40 arms importers in the world due to the arms embargo.29 Even the lift of arms embargo in 2020 did not pave the way for Iran to access modern weaponry. For decades, Tehran has failed to compete with the same or a higher rate of military investments to prevent the gap. But now under Vision 2030 plans to localize at least 50 percent of defense spending by absorbing new international partneship and technologcy for indigenious production is raising concerns in Tehran about long term prospects of Saudi military power. From the Iranian perspective, concerns over capacity gap is becaming more serious by Saudi's plan to boost long range strike capacity that can hit deep inside Iranian territories. For years Saudi' have had an overwhelming advantage over Iran's Air Force and possesed the ability to conduct surgical operations inside Iran.30 Yet acquisitions including Storm Shadow air-launched deep strike weapon, American SLAM-ER cruise missiles to equip its recently purchased F-15SA, Chinese DF-21 ballistic missiles and Wing Loong II drones have significantly imporoved these capabilities. In addition, China and Ukrane have assissted Saudi's ballistic missile program. China agreed for a joint production of CH-4 Caihong drones in Saudi Arabia,31 and cladestine cruise missile development with Brazilian assisstance seems to be underway.32 As one Iranian analyst writes “with international assistance and prioritizing investments in these fields, the leadership in Riyadh shows decisiveness to build a capable missile forces, improve its targeting and long range communication capabilities, and integrate missile and drone operation as part of its deterrence posture”.33 This is in a time that Saudi's are seeking indigenious production of Air defense assetss too.34 Mostly as a solution to boost capability in dettering large Iranian missile salvos and prevent a situation similar to 2021 when Patriot missiles depleted amid Americn hesitation to resupply. Tehran seems to fear that these advancements could weaken country's deterrence and endanger offensive-defensive balance between the two countries. An assessment which is a common view inside Iranian defense establishment and is shared by different political fractions. Under MBS, Saudi started to play a leading role in building a regional military alliance around what it called as Iranian threat -- the main source of threat for Arab nations that has gone beyond limits.35 With no surprise, this approach was aligned with Trump's MESA plan36 , which opened the way for US technical support to improve interoperability among Arab militaries. Saudi and Emiratis progressed in integrating command and control infrastructures (JC4ISR), creating joint air and sea command centers, and integrating early warning and air and coastal defense systems. In his trip to Jeddeh, President Biden affirmed that the United States’ is committed to advancing a more integrated and regionally-networked air and missile defense architecture.37 According to experts view, integration of regional missile defense assets is advancing and will likely to become the first phase of a larger unified GCC force.38 The Abraham Accords and Israel's inclusion in an Arab military plan is another game changer. Notwithstanding that Riyadh and other Arab capitals view a military alliance with Israel against Tehran accompanied with the risk of provoking a war with Iran with limited benefit,39 the MBS era has seen a shift in Saudi-Israeli threat perceptions toward Iran. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have made it clear by stating: “We do not view Israel as an enemy, but rather as a potential ally in the many interests that we can pursue together.”40 Israel sees the value in advertising that an alliance is already emerging.41 During a hearing of the foreign relations and security committee in the Knesset, Israeli Minister of Defense Benny Gantz went on to state that Israel is working on an initiative called “The Middle East Air Defense” with the US Central Command and other countries in the region to counter drone, rocket, and cruise missile attacks by Iran and its proxies.42 Despite doubts about the operational feasibility of a joint Arab-Israeli force,43 Israel's relocation to CENTCOM has already facilitated contacts and coordination between top military officials from Israel and GCC states including Saudi Arabia.44 Tehran seems to believe these developments may gradually change regional balance of military forces. For Tehran, the emerging Arab collective defense is a path toward building a new set of capabilities that will eventually provide the Arab states with a superior military advantage and disturbs the status quo. Also, this new trend is making the nature of Saudi threat different from the past. Previously Saudi was only in the background seat to support US coalitions and the US was at the forefront of a possible war against Iran. Riyadh was only seen as a host for US forces, their logistical hub, and politically aligned with a possible US decision. However, under the new situation where US military commitment to the Persian Gulf is changing, Saudi Arabia is taking a leading position to build a regional military coalition that aims at contain and if necessary, deter Iran militarily. For years, Saudi Arabia and Iran were involved in a media war to propagate their own narratives across the Arab world.45 But, following a region-wide trend of increased reliance on influence operations against the rival,46 Saudi Arabia under MBS initiated a set of activities to influence Iran's domestic politics and regime security. This new policy has strategically impacted Islamic Republic's perception of Saudi threats. For Tehran, Saudi's media campaign and support of opposition groups are in line with the US and Israeli regime change policy, with the common goal of toppling the Islamic Republic. A realization of the claims made by former top Mossad official Haim Tomer to the Jerusalem Post in 2018: “Israel, the US, and Saudi Arabia can all secretly help to advance regime change in Iran.”47 Firstly, Tehran is worried about Riyadh's propaganda machine that has been relatively successful in directly communicating with the Iranian people and shape public opinion about the Islamic Republic. By supporting Farsi speaking TV stations, such as Iran International, and media outlets, such as Farsi Independent, Saudi Arabia's successful public policy efforts in the post-2015 was overwhelmingly painful for Islamic Republic. The Guardian revealed that these networks were funded through a secretive offshore entity and a company whose director is a Saudi businessman, Saud al-Qahtani, with close ties to the Saudi crown prince.48 These platforms have been enormously effective in providing voice to Iranian opposition figueres living in exile. According to former head of the Islamic Republic's Broadcasting Network, Mohsen Zarghami, 70 percent of the population in Tehran follow these channels. The Saudi propaganda campaign includes detailed coverage of nationwide protests, advocating social resistance against the Islamic Republic, highlighting country's ethnic divides, and targeting regime legitimacy and popularity. In 2018, Iran International TV hosted a member of a seperatist group called Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA) to discuss their terrorist attack at a military parade in south of Iran, which killed 25 people. An incident which led Iran's official letter of complaint to UK Office of Coomunication (OFCAM) that regulates broadcasting industries in Britain.49 Saudi-backed media outlets have also worked with controversial members of other Iranian opposition groups including the Mojahedin-e- Khalgh (MEK) which was only delisted from US Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2012. Yet the coverage of 2022 nationwide demonstrations, sparked by the death of 22 year old Mahsa amini, was the most high profile case that brought the channel to the cetner of Saudi-Iranian dispute. IRGC's Commander in Chief said “Saudi Arabia is provoking our young population by its media outlets, they are intervening in our internal affairs, but they should know that they are vulnarble.”50 IRGC's threat of retaliation was complemented by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence listing of the Iran International TV channel as a terrorist organization.51 Tehran also send warnnings to Ryadh through diplomatic channels, asking Saudis to revoke financial support to the TV channel and making it as one of the conditions to restart Saudi-Iran talks. Secondly, Tehran accuses Riyadh to be one of the key supporter of the Islamic Republic's opposition and seperatists movements in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan Baluchestan regions and financing their clandestine operations. ASMLA, for example, seeking a separate state for ethnic Arabs in Iran's oil-producing southwestern province of Khuzestan, was found guilty in Danish courts of espionage for the Saudis, receiving £1.27m for their service.52 Islamic Republic officials view Saudi's actions as an attempt to combin disinformation campaigns with clandestine operations to benefits from the country's social challneges and state dysfunctionality. In an interview, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, former chairman of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said “the terrorists arrested in Iran have provided invaluable information to security authorities regarding the Saudi role and its support for terrorist groups.”53 In June 2017, when ISIS attacked the parliament in Tehran, killing 12 people, Iranian officials were quick to link past MBS comments to the attack. A month before, the Crown