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Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy

2015; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 24; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636412.2014.1001198

1556-1852

Stacie E. Goddard, Ronald R. Krebs,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

AbstractThis introductory framing paper theorizes the role of legitimation—the public justification of policy—in the making of grand strategy. We contend that the process of legitimation has significant and independent effects on grand strategy's constituent elements and on how grand strategy is formulated and executed. Legitimation is integral to how states define the national interest and identify threats, to how the menu of policy options is constituted, and to how audiences are mobilized. Second, we acknowledge that legitimation matters more at some times than others, and we develop a model specifying the conditions under which it affects political processes and outcomes. We argue that the impact of legitimation depends on the government's need for mobilization and a policy's visibility, and from the intersection of these two factors we derive five concrete hypotheses regarding when legitimation is most likely to have an impact on strategy. Finally, we explore who wins: why legitimation efforts sometimes succeed in securing public assent, yet at other times fall short. Our framework emphasizes what is said (the content of legitimation), how it is said (technique), and the context in which it is said. We conclude by introducing the papers in this special issue, revisiting the larger theoretical stakes involved in studying rhetoric and foreign policy, and speculating about how changes in the technologies and sites of communication have, or have not, transformed legitimation and leadership in world politics. NotesHowever, on normative change, see Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 613–44; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). There is also a large, relevant literature on the legitimation of global institutions: see, among others, Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (June 2003): 249–75; Achim Hurrelmann et al., eds., Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Dominik Zaum, ed., Legitimating International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).Contributions to this linguistic turn have drawn inspiration from many sources. From Ludwig Wittgenstein's language games, see K. M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006); from Louis Althusser's mechanisms of articulation and interpellation, see Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); from Jacques Lacan's writings on representational force, see Janice Bially Mattern, Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force (New York: Routledge, 2005); from Jürgen Habermas’s model of communicative action, see Thomas Risse, “‘Let's Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 1–39; Jennifer Mitzen, Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); from Erving Goffman and symbolic interactionism, see Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); from Charles Tilly and relational analysis, see Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Stacie E. Goddard, Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); from rhetorical pragmatics, see Markus Kornprobst, Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise, and Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Contributors to this special issue are similarly diverse in their sources of inspiration and in their theoretical commitments.Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 1–2.Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13. See, similarly, Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 1.See, among others, Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379–408; Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 207.Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 229, 247.Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 17; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,” Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (January 2002): esp. 123–25.On the distinction between legitimacy and legitimation, see Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–29.Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 3–13; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993 [1948]), 4–12. Among structural realists, see Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 7–53; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 29–54. For this view of neoclassical realism, see Brian C. Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (April 2008): 294–321.On liberalism, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513–53. In the security domain, liberal approaches typically examine the (economic) sources of individual and interest group preferences and the institutions that aggregate them; see Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security, 1949–51 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).See, relatedly, Weldes, Constructing National Interests.Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34.Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.If one were to include the costs imposed by foreign audiences, the argument would become a tautology. We would then know a signal was costly because other states responded as if it were meaningful and imposed costs in response. The logic of domestic audience costs avoids tautology by separating who is imposing the cost (domestic audiences) from who is interpreting the signal (foreign audiences).Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, Morningside ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989 [1970]).For a classical realist view, see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Among contemporary realists, see, among others, Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 5–48; John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For Snyder, for instance, leaders’ rhetoric is powerful: their myths of empire mobilize publics, and then, via “blowback,” those mobilized publics compel leaders to pursue imperialist dreams beyond the point of rational expansion. But myths of empire, in Snyder's account, always seem to be legitimate and to resonate, and thus the real causal work is done by the structure of domestic interests that makes such rhetorical motifs appealing.For typical approaches, see Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156–79; Robert B. McCalla, “NATO's Persistence after the Cold War,” International Organization 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445–75. Important exceptions, which focus on the management of alliance relations, include Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 155–89; Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).The traditional literature on the factors shaping grand strategy is immense. On the international strategic context, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). On international norms, see Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention; Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo. On state structure, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). On domestic political interests, see Patrick J. McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, The War Machine, and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest. On domestic culture and ideas, see Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). On domestic politics, see Snyder, Myths of Empire; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus; Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). On regime type, see the huge literatures on the democratic peace and audience costs.Generally, on the imperative to legitimation, see Jon Elster, “Strategic Uses of Argument,” in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, ed. Kenneth Arrow et al. (New York: Norton, 1995), 244–52; Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 571–610.Though those too are bulky concepts, resting on layers of sedimented meanings. However, they are shorthands for very concrete processes: goods being manufactured and sold, people moving from villages to cities, capital-intensive weaponry being acquired.Mark Blyth, “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 4 (December 2003): 695–706.On the human penchant for imposing cognitive order, see Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life (New York: Free Press, 1991), esp. 9–28; Arie W. Kruglanski, The Psychology of Closed Mindedness (New York: Psychology Press, 2004); Leonid Perlovsky, “Language and Cognition,” Neural Networks 22, no. 3 (April 2009): 247–57; Richard M. Sorrentino and Christopher J. R. Roney, The Uncertain Mind: Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000).The seminal philosophical work is Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60, no. 23 (November 1963): 685–700. On the centrality of reason-giving in practice, see Charles Tilly, Why? What Happens When People Give Reasons … and Why (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).Jon Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution-Making,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104.Serena A. Perkins and Elliot Turiel, “To Lie or Not to Lie: To Whom and Under What Circumstances,” Child Development 78, no. 2 (March–April 2007): 609–21; Turiel, The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context, and Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 107–18; Turiel, “Moral Development,” in Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science, Volume 1: Theory & Method, ed. William F. Overton and Peter C. Molenaar (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2014).See James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); for a psychological perspective, see Turiel, The Culture of Morality, esp. 67–93.Chaïm Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 16.While the emphasis here is on the agentic side of the equation, we acknowledge that political agents are discursively produced: structures of discourse constitute the identities that individuals bring into the political arena and indeed their conception of the legitimate. On productive power, see Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 39–76.See, for instance, Frank Schimmelfenig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 47–80; Schimmelfenig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).Our view stands in contrast to that associating effective legitimation with mass support for policy and thus with policy consensus: see, for instance, Alexander L. George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy,” in Change in the International System, ed. Ole R. Holsti et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 233–62.See similarly Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a Definition of Narrative,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25; Tine Hanrieder, “The False Promise of the Better Argument,” International Theory 3, no. 3 (November 2011): 409–10. On pragmatism and international relations, see Gunther Hellmann, ed., “The Forum: Pragmatism and International Relations,” International Studies Review 11, no. 3 (September 2009): 638–62; Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 701–31.Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (April 1986): 273–86.To say something is constitutive simply means to explain what makes a particular social world possible. As Richard Ned Lebow puts it, we call something “constitutive” when it affects “who becomes actors, how they are recognised as such, and how they must behave to sustain their identities and status.” See Lebow, “Constitutive Causality: Imagined Spaces and Political Practices,” Millennium 38, no. 2 (December 2009): 2. On constitutive effects, see also Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171–78.Risse, “‘Let's Argue!’”; Harald Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” in Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001); Marc Lynch, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2 (June 2002): 187–230. On the centrality of persuasion to much constructivist international relations scholarship, see Crawford, Argument and Change; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 141; Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 914; Rodger A. Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (March 2001): 37–61.Hanrieder, “The False Promise of the Better Argument.”Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 5. See also Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 254.See, among many others, Michael J. Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no. 3 (July 2002): 629.Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Tilly, “The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere,” International Review of Social History 40, supplement 3 (December 1995): 223–36. See also Stephen Holmes, “Lineages of the Rule of Law,” in Democracy and the Rule of Law, ed. José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–61.Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace,” 4–6.Secretary of State George Marshall had reportedly presented his brief for aid in “dry and economical terms” to the congressional leadership, with disappointing results. His undersecretary, Dean Acheson, then intervened, placing the situation in a broader narrative and employing memorable metaphors. Senator Arthur Vandenberg reportedly offered his support, if the president would make the case in public as Acheson had in private. See Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking Press, 1955), 139–44. Whether this is really what happened is debatable; see Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 69–71.Skeptical of the power of presidential speech to mold opinion are, among a large literature, George C. Edwards III, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Edwards, The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). See similarly Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); B. Dan Wood, The Myth of Presidential Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 120–56. However, on presidential agenda-setting, see especially Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-making: The Public and the Policies That Presidents Choose (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Roderick P. Hart, “Thinking Harder About Presidential Discourse,” in The Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric, ed. James Arnt Aune and Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 244–46; Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Jeffrey S. Peake, Breaking Through the Noise: Presidential Leadership, Public Opinion, and the News Media (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). For a review, see B. Dan Wood, “Presidents and the Political Agenda,” in The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, ed. George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 108–32.On rhetorical consistency constraints, see, for instance, the ongoing debate on audience costs. See also Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 58–85; Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 4–5.Niall Ferguson, “Obama's Egypt and Foreign-Policy Failures,” Newsweek, 13 February 2011; Jackson Diehl, “Obama's Foreign Policy Needs an Update,” Washington Post, 22 November 2010. In defense of Obama's implicit grand strategy, see Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (January/February 2011): 57–68. For a contrary view, in praise of foreign policy in the absence of grand strategy, see David M. Edelstein, “Why Grand Strategy Isn't So Grand: The Case for Strategic Pragmatism” (unpublished manuscript, Georgetown University, 2014).See, notably, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2007).Schweller, Unanswered Threats.These sorts of idealized views of democracy are common in the rationalist literature on the democratic peace. For a summary, see Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).This view of public opinion is well established. See Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Adam J. Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). For elaboration of the implications for international relations, see Elizabeth N. Saunders, “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force,” Security Studies (forthcoming); Saunders, “Good Democratic Leadership in Foreign Affairs: An Elite-Centered Approach,” in Good Democratic Leadership: On Prudence and Judgment in Modern Democracies, ed. John Kane and Haig Patapan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 158–177.On selectorate theory, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).As Waltz notes, his theory draws from analytic economic theory, where “economic units and economic markets are concepts, not descriptive realities or concrete entities.” See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 89. See also the discussion in Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon, “Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 23–29.See the discussion in George, “Domestic Constraints,” 249–51.Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 2003): 514.In his seminal theory of speech acts, J. L. Austin pointed out, rightly, that some utterances—such as saying “I do” at a wedding or making a promise—were themselves actions, and he argued that the key to their productive effect was their conformity to linguistic rules. This has found its way into international relations via theories of securitization. See John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); on securitization, see Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Thierry Balzacq, ed., Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011).See, similarly, Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (September 2007): 357–83; Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (June 2005): 171–201.Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework, 27, 32.Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Matthew Adamson and Gino Raymond (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 170. See also Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2007), 64–66.On settled and unsettled times, see Swidler, “Culture in Action.” See similarly Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 167–69.For further discussion of how one distinguishes settled and unsettled times, so as to avoid the charge of tautology, see Krebs's article in this special issue. See also Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), chap. 2; Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus,” International Organization (forthcoming).Such unsettled times are thus the structural condition most conducive to the exercise of agency. On these “critical junctures,” see Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 343; Hillel David Soifer, “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 12 (December 2012): 1572–97.Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 35–63. For an application to international relations, see Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (September 2006): 341–70.On metaphors and tone, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Roderick P. Hart et al., Political Tone: How Leaders Talk and Why (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). On genres, see Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: Routledge, 2003), chaps. 4–6; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Campbell and Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. 1–14.See, among others, Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 73–76; Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 173–94; Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 58–79; Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 108–48; Louise Richardson, “The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the Nineteenth Century,” in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 48–79; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” Security Studies 14, no. 4 (October–December 2005): 565–606.Janice Bially Mattern, “The Concept of Power and the (Un)Discipline of International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 691–98.Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1954), 61–63.On the echo chamber hypothesis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For evidence of selective exposure, see Natalie Jomini Stroud, Niche News: The Politics of News Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). However, for persuasive evidence to the contrary, see Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Ideological Segregation Online and Offline,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, no. 4 (November 2011): 1799–839; Michael J. LaCour, “The Echo Chambers Are Empty: Results from Erie to Arbitron,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2014; R. Kelly Garrett et al., “A Turn Toward Avoidance? Selective Exposure to Online Political Information, 2004–2008,” Political Behavior 35, no. 1 (March 2013): 113–34. Selective exposure may take place only among the most politically engaged; see Henry Farrell, “The Consequences of the Internet for Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (June 2012): 42; Markus Prior, “Media and Political Polarization,” Annual Review of Political Science 16 (May 2013): 123.Markus Prior, Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See, relatedly, Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).