The Philippines’ Surprising Veer West
2023; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 65; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00396338.2023.2218699
ISSN1468-2699
AutoresJames Crabtree, Evan A. Laksmana,
Tópico(s)International Relations in Latin America
ResumoAbstractMany observers expected Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr, to maintain a hedging approach towards the United States and China following his mid-2022 election. Instead, he has highlighted differences with Beijing and sought closer ties with Washington, completing a long-awaited expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US and authorising unprecedentedly large joint military exercises between the two countries. While China’s coercive behaviour towards the Philippines in the South China Sea is a major factor, Marcos has proven to be instinctively pro-American; the Armed Forces of the Philippines have generally supported the US alliance; and the US has worked harder to engage Manila. Unless Beijing dials back its activities in the South China Sea, Manila and Washington’s rejuvenated security relationship looks likely to endure as long as Marcos is in office.Key words: Armed Forces of the PhilippinesChinaRodrigo DuterteEnhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)Ferdinand Marcos, JrPhilippinesSouth China SeaSubic BayTaiwan Notes1 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Investing in the Special Friendship and Alliance Between the United States and the Philippines’, 1 May 2023, https://www.white-house.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/01/fact-sheet-investing-in-the-special-friendship-and-alliance-between-the-united-states-and-the-philippines/.2 Quoted in, for example, Bill Ide, ‘Duterte Announces Philippine “Separation” from US’, Voice of America, 16 October 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/duterte-declares-philippine-separation-from-us/3559129.html.3 See Rosalie Arcala Hall, ‘Hobbesian Flirtation and Viral Entanglements: Shifts in Philippine Civil–Military Terrain Under the Duterte Administration’, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2022 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), pp. 293–306.4 Quoted in Jean Mangaluz, ‘Marcos: Philippines Will Not Lose One Inch of Its Territory’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 February 2023, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1731684/marcos-vows-not-one-inch-of-ph-territory-to-be-lost#ixzz80r7lIzxO.5 The other five bases are the Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu and Lumbia Air Base on the island of Mindanao.6 See ‘Marcos Says US Access to Philippines Bases Not Meant for “Offensive Action”’, Reuters, 5 May 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/marcos-says-us-access-philippines-bases-not-meant-offensive-action-2023-05-04/; and Frances Mangosing, ‘US, PH Chart Defense Aid in Next 5 to 10 Years’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 April 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/213394/us-ph-chart-defense-aid-in-next-5-to-10-years#ixzz80qQjV700.7 Quoted in Job Manahan, ‘EDCA Sites May Be Used by PH, US for “Emergency Situations”: AFP’, ABS-CBN News, 12 April 2023, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/12/23/edca-sites-may-be-used-by-ph-us-for-emergency-afp.8 See Mallory Shelbourne, ‘Balikatan 23 Features New Marine Littoral Force in First Major Joint Exercise’, USNI News, 12 April 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/04/12/balikatan-23-features-new-marine-littoral-force-in-first-major-joint-exercise.9 See ‘Philippines Files Protest to China Over Use of Laser, “Aggressive Activities” by Vessels’, Straits Times, 14 February 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippines-files-protest-to-china-over-use-of-laser-aggressive-activities-by-vessels.10 See Renato Cruz de Castro, ‘The Death of EDCA and Philippine–US Security Relations’, ISEAS Perspective, no. 42, 11 May 2020, pp. 1–9, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_42.pdf.11 Congress of the Philippines, ‘An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7898 Establishing the Revised AFP Modernization Program and for Other Purposes’, Republic Act No. 10349, 19 September 2012, https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2012/ra_10349_2012.html.12 See Marlly Bondoc, ‘Duterte Approves P300-B Phase 2 of AFP Modernization Program’, GMA Online, 20 June 2018, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/657620/duterte-approves-p300-b-phase-2-of-afp-modernization-program/story/.13 On the resource and bureaucratic challenges of AFP modernisation, see Julio S. Amador III, Deryk Matthew Baladjay and Sheena Valenzuela, ‘Modernizing or Equalizing? Defence Budget and Military Modernization in the Philippines, 2010–2020’, Defence Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, January 2022, pp. 299–326; and Renato Cruz De Castro, ‘The Dilemma Between Democratic Control Versus Military Reforms: The Case of the AFP Modernization Program, 1991–2004’, Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 1–20.14 See White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, October 2022, pp. 37–8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.15 Quoted in ‘Philippines Grants US Access to Four Military Bases’, Financial Times, 2 February 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/a82c85ff-4e00-499f-8fde-214988660cab.16 See US Department of Defense, ‘The United States and the Republic of the Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines’, 3 May 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/03/2003214357/-1/-1/0/THE-UNITED-STATES-AND-THE-REPUBLIC-OF-THE-PHILIPPINES-BILATERAL-DEFENSE-GUIDELINES.PDF.17 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Investing in the Special Friendship and Alliance Between the United States and the Philippines’.18 Quoted in, for example, Bryant Harris, ‘US, Philippines Vow Joint Defense “Anywhere in the South China Sea”’, Defense News, 3 May 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters/2023/05/03/us-philippines-vow-joint-defense-anywhere-in-the-south-china-sea.19 See Richard Javad Heydarian, ‘Marcos vs Marcos in Sibling Spat Over US– China Policy’, Asia Times, 7 March 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/marcos-vs-marcos-in-sibling-spat-over-us-china-policy/.20 See Peaches Vergara and Deryk Baladjay, ‘PH Foreign Policy, National Security Ambitions for Next Admin and Beyond’, Rappler, 9 May 2022, https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinion-philippine-foreign-policy-national-security-ambitions/.21 Jake Sullivan, ‘2021 Lowy Lecture: Jake Sullivan’, Lowy Institute, 11 November 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2021-lowy-lecture-jake-sullivan.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames CrabtreeJames Crabtree is Executive Director of IISS–Asia.Evan A. LaksmanaEvan A. Laksmana is IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia Military Modernisation.
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