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Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair by Michael R. Beschloss, and: The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984 by Paul B. Stares (review)

1987; Johns Hopkins University Press; Volume: 28; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/tech.1987.a889327

1097-3729

I. B. Holley,

European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 877 be regarded as part of a conspiracy or self-conscious program of domination” (p. 149), it is clear that images are produced and selected for publication with an implicit understanding of the corporate mes­ sage directed at the intended audience. Moreover, that message may be inferred from the photograph as well as from any accompanying text. As with any such interpretation, however, care must be taken to avoid projection of the scholar’s own views. Bayla Singer Dr. Singer is visiting assistant professor of humanities at Illinois Institute of Tech­ nology. Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair. By Michael R. Beschloss . New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Pp. xvi + 494; illustrations, notes, appendix, bibliography, index. $19.95 (cloth); $8.95 (paper). The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945—1984. By Paul B. Stares. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. 334; tables, notes, appendixes, bibliography, index. $25.00. When Stalin’s post—World War II search for security by controlling the tier of neighboring East European states signaled the beginning of the Cold War, Western governments were confronted with a dilemma. Electronic means could track bombers and missiles back to their bases, but the closed character of Soviet society made it extremely difficult to get precise information on such military installations. The obvious answer was to rely on overflights; during World War II, some 90 percent of Allied intelligence came from aerial intelligence. Beginning in 1949 shallow border penetrations were made by conventional fighters, but these were unable to reach the critical ICBM launching sites. The solution, devised by Lockheed’s designer Kelly Johnson, at CIA urging, was the U-2. The U-2 was a technological wonder: With a wingspan twice its fuselage length using titanium and other lightweight materials, it could fly for more than eleven hours above 70,000 feet for 4,750 miles on about a thousand gallons of fuel. This was achieved with a Pratt & Whitney turbojet engine that was cut off at altitude while the plane glided for immense distances. No less important was the ancillary equipment: 12,000 feet of lightweight Kodak film and Hycon cameras capable of recording a swath 750 miles wide. By 1955 the U-2 was ready, but technical capability and political feasibility are two different matters. President Eisenhower declined to use the U-2 without first approaching the Russians with an Open Skies proposal as a means for insuring verification in any arms control treaty devised. If the Russians accepted, it would be unnecessary to violate their airspace; if they declined, U-2 deep penetrations would seem morejustifiable in world opinion. The Russians rejected the Open Skies proposal, so the presi­ 878 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE dent gave a reluctant go-ahead to the U-2 flights, well aware that violating Soviet airspace was a serious provocation but reassured by CIA officials that the plane flew too high to be shot down and even if it were, the pilot would almost certainly not survive. The subsequent fate of the U-2 is well known. After many successful flights that produced massive amounts of highly useful photographic intelligence, one of the planes crashed from causes still in dispute and the Soviets salvaged the wreckage after taking the pilot alive, he having eschewed the suicide kit provided by the CIA. This loss, coinciding with the May 1960 summit meeting in Paris, produced a diplomatic disaster. Not knowing the pilot still lived, U.S. spokesmen lied about the flight only to be exposed by the Russians, angry and humiliated by their inability for so long to prevent the U-2 incursions. The summit was wrecked, the United States lost credibility, and the détente nourished by Khrushchev’s U.S. visit began to vanish. Worse yet, the Soviet military faction, furious at Khrushchev’s budget cuts and force reductions, reasserted its power and started the supreme party leader’s slide from office, reinvigorating the Cold War. Students of technology may see in the U-2 episode a warning against technological arrogance, against the easy assumption that the capacity to develop means to achieve a desired end sanctions the use of such means...