Nuclear stability in a world with overhead transparency
2023; Routledge; Volume: 42; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2023.2236489
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)Nuclear Issues and Defense
ResumoAbstractThe increasing number of Earth observation satellites are introducing a revolution in overhead transparency and making ground activity more visible than ever before. In the near future, swarms of satellites will provide imagery which is persistent, high-resolution, delivered in real-time and widely accessible. This data will be instantly and autonomously analyzed by artificial intelligence, and insights provided to users. In the global security environment defined by rising great power competition, increased transparency could have a significant impact on nuclear stability by breaking the secrecy nuclear weapon states rely on. This could stimulate a dangerous nuclear arms race. If political conditions align and states make that choice, new technological capabilities could also help create an environment of trust and predictability and facilitate the next generation of arms control. AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Zia Mian, Frank von Hippel, Pavel Podvig, Tong Zhao, Matthew McKinzie and Michaela Dodge for their comments and feedback.Notes1 Igor Moric, “Capabilities of Commercial Satellite Earth Observation Systems and Applications for Nuclear Verification and Monitoring,” Science & Global Security 30, no. 1 (2022): 22–49.2 Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).3 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Vintage Books, 1988). ISBN 0-394-52278-8).4 Ibid., 176–178.5 “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them,” (from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 1996).6 Speech by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Council on Foreign Relations event, January 12, 1954.7 Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, “Meeting the Threat of a Surprise Attack,” February 1955, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d9 (accessed March 7, 2023).8 Ibid.9 As were U-2 flights in the Soviet Union in 1960 and Cuba 1962.10 The American probably never seriously believed that the Soviets would accept the plan, but used the rejection to publicly demonstrate how Moscow was not interested in arms control. A version of “Open Skies” finally did go into force on January 1, 2002, effectively ending on 22 November 2020 when the United States withdrew.11 A contrast which is still true today as Russia and China are less inclined to willingly disclose information on their nuclear capabilities.12 Michael Krepon, “The Bomber Gap,” Arms Control Wonk, April 2012, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/403428/the-bomber-gap/ (accessed May 2023).13 Jeremi Suri, America's Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for Eisenhower Revisionists, Diplomatic History 21, no. 3 (1997): 417–451, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913390.14 John Sislin and Joseph Caddell, “From U-2 to Corona: How Intelligence Collection Norms Evolve,” War on The Rocks, May 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/from-u-2-to-corona-howintelligence-collection-norms-evolve/ (accessed May 2023).15 Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 38–73.16 From the National Intelligence Estimate, June 7, 1961, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d29 (accessed March 7, 2023).17 Arnold L. Horelick, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior World Politics,” RAND 16, no. 3 (1964): 372, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009577.pdf.18 Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok, “Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, April 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/missile-crisis-secret-history-soviet-union-russia-ukraine-lessons.19 In 1979, bhangmeters on the Vela 6911 satellite detected light flashes that were most likely produced by an atmospheric nuclear detonation of a clandestine joint Israeli-South African nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, but were not confirmed by any other sensor. See for example Science Applications International Corp., “Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection: The Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System,” 1997, https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/ADA329715.xhtml.20 Jeffrey Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 45th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 218–219.21 Richelson, “Spying on the Bomb”.22 In New START it was clarified that the obligation to not use concealment applies for launchers at test ranges, but does not extend to concealment at ICBM bases and to the use of shelters for strategic offensive arms, which would disrupt their normal operations. See New START Treaty text, U.S. Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm (accessed April 20, 2023).23 Moric, “Capabilities of Commercial Satellite Earth Observation Systems”.24 Igor Moric, “How Commercial Satellite Imagery Could Soon Make Nuclear Secrecy Very Difficult—If Not Impossible,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/07/howcommercial-satellite-imagery-could-soon-make-nuclear-secrecy-very-difficult-if-not-impossible.25 Theresa Hitchens, “How Space Force, NRO Are Sharing the Ground-Tracking Mission, for Now”. May 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/how-space-force-nro-are-sharing-the-ground-tracking-mission-for-now (accessed May, 2023).26 Col Ryan Colburn, “SDA Overview,” 2020, https://gsaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/2020s13_colburn.pdf. See also Joseph Trevitchick, “Work Begins On StarlinkLike Constellation Of Small Hypersonic Missile-Tracking Satellites,” The Drive, October 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36909/work-begins-on-starlink-like-constellation-of-smallhypersonic-missile-tracking-satellites (accessed March 7, 2023).27 Satellite Observation Portal, “History of the US High-Altitude SIGINT System,” July 2017, https://satelliteobservation.net/2017/07/31/history-of-the-us-high-altitude-sigint-system/ (accessed March 7, 2023). See also, Marco Langbroek, “A Nemesis in the Sky,” The Space Review, October 2016, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3095/1 (accessed March 7, 2023).28 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Considers Asking Satellite Firms to Host Payloads for Tactical ISR,” Breaking Defense, July 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/space-force-considers-askingsatellite-firms-to-host-payloads-for-tactical-isr (accessed March 7, 2023).29 See Online Appendix in Moric, “Capabilities of Commercial Satellite Earth Observation Systems”30 Sandra Erwin, "Satellite Imaging Industry Responds to Demand for Intelligence Fusion," Space News, April 2023, https://spacenews.com/on-national-security-satellite-imagingindustry-responds-to-demand-for-intelligence-fusion/.31 Sandra Erwin, "Amid Commercial Boom, U.S. Military Lacks Timely Access to Satellite Imagery," Space News, April 2023, https://spacenews.com/amid-commercial-boom-u-s-military-lacks-timely-access-tosatellite-imagery/.32 Jessica Cox and Heather Williams, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, 2021 - Issue 1, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019.33 Richard Marcum, Curt Davis, Grant Scott, et al. “Rapid Broad Area Search and Detection of Chinese Surface-to-Air Missile Sites Using Deep Convolutional Neural Networks,” Journal of Applied Remote Sensing 11, no. 4 (2017): 042614.34 For example see this 2020 video by Preligens: “Detection of Unusual Aircraft and Submarine Activity with Satellite Imagery”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ZJAlgqhod0 (accessed March 7, 2023).35 Sulgiye Park, Allison Puccioni, and Rodney C. Ewing, "Machine Learning Improves Satellite Imagery Analysis of North Korean Nuclear Activity," Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, January 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-01/machine-learning-improves-satellite-imagery-analysis-ofnorth-korean-nuclear-activity/.36 Neither would parity be desirable as equivalency of forces may invite a debilitating first strike.37 Janes report, “Nuclear site under construction in Iran: Janes produces ground-breaking data-driven study in partnership with Stanford,” Janes, July 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/newsdetail/nuclear-site-under-construction-in-iran-janes-produces-ground-breaking-study-in-partnershipwith-stanford (accessed March 7, 2023).38 Geoff Brumfiel, "Iranian Rocket Launch Ends in Failure, Imagery Shows," NPR, August 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/08/29/755406765/iranian-rocket-launch-ends-in-failure.39 For an example of detection of a submarine entering an underground base using optical imagery see Brad Lendon, "Satellite Photos Appear to show Chinese Submarine Using Underground Base," CNN, August 2020, https://cnn.it/3teP3w5.40 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Dan Lamothe, Shane Harris, and Paul Sonne, "Ukraine’s Rocket Campaign Reliant on U.S. Precision Targeting, Officials Say," The Washington Post, February 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/09/ukraine-himars-rocket-artillery-russia/.41 Charles L. Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 44–84 (41 pages), https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137449.42 Fred Charles Iklé, "After Detection–What?," Foreign Affairs, January 1961, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1961-01-01/after-detection-what.43 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 118–146 (29 pages), https://www-jstororg.ezproxy.princeton.edu/stable/2010353.44 Dara Massicot, "What Russia Got Wrong Can Moscow Learn From Its Failures in Ukraine?," Foreign Affairs, February 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-russia-got-wrong-moscowfailures-in-ukraine-dara-massicot.45 Chad P. Bown, "Russia's War on Ukraine: A Sanctions Timeline," Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2023, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/russias-war-ukrainesanctions-timeline.46 Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Bryce Farabaugh, Bethany Goldblum, and Andrew Reddie, “Under the Nuclear Shadow Situational Awareness Technology and Crisis Decisionmaking,” CSIS, March 2020.47 Warren P. Strobel, "Rise of Open-Source Intelligence Tests U.S. Spies," The Wall Street Journal, December 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rise-of-open-source-intelligence-tests-u-s-spies11670710806.48 Amy Zegart, "Open Secrets Ukraine and the Next Intelligence Revolution," Foreign Affairs, December 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart.49 For more on this see Peter Zimmerman, Remote Sensing Satellites, Superpower Relations and Public Diplomacy, Space Policy 6, no. 1 (1990): 19–32.50 From, for example, General Gribkov’s Testimony at the 1992 Havana Conference, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-11/features/cuban-missilecrisis (accessed March 7, 2023).51 Radchenko and Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," Foreign Affairs.52 Wu Riqiang, “How China Practices and Thinks About Nuclear Transparency,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, p228, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf.53 Henry Farrell, Abraham Newman, and Jeremy Wallace, "Spirals of Delusion How AI Distorts Decision-Making and Makes Dictators More Dangerous," Foreign Affairs, August 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/spirals-delusion-artificial-intelligence-decision-making.54 By using, for example, Sentinel-1 10-m resolution optical data which can be accessed here https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/.55 Hans Kristensen, Eliana Reynolds, and Matt Korda, “STRATCOM Says China Has More ICBM Launchers than the United States – We Have Questions,” FAS, February 2023, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2023/02/stratcom-says-china-has-more-icbm-launchers-than-the-unitedstates/.56 Eric Heginbothama, Jacob L. Heimband, Christopher P. Twomey, “Of Bombs and Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force Building in China and the United States,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 118 (2019): 538–557, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/10670564.2018.1557945.57 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 2023, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023Unclassified-Report.pdf.58 Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,” International Security.59 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Stops Sharing Data on Nuclear Forces With Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, March 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wont-share-data-on-nuclear-forces-with-russia46700a50.60 Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “If Arms Control Collapses, US and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arsenals Could Double in Size,” FAS, February 2023, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2023/02/if-armscontrol-collapses-us-and-russian-strategic-nuclear-arsenals-could-double-in-size/.61 Ulrich Kühn, “The Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control,” Zeitschrift für Friedens und Konfliktforschung 10 (2021): 319–344, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42597-022-00069-5.62 Pavel Podvig (ed.), Exploring Options for Missile Verification (Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2022), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/Misver/01.63 Douglas George, “The Estimative Process,” Intelligence and Arms Control, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1987.64 Glaser, When Are Arms Races Dangerous? 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Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American, April 1969, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-dynamics-of-the-arms-race/.75 Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence, International Security 41, no. 4 (2017).76 In the future, a synergy of novel acoustic sensors, multiband observation satellites, underwater drone swarms, lidar, magnetic and quantum sensors, and possibly other technologies may make SSBNs more vulnerable to a counterforce attack. See for example Roger Bradbury et al., “Transparent Oceans? The Coming SSBN Counter-Detection Task May Be Insuperable,” Indo-Pacific Strategy Series: Undersea Deterrence, May 2020, https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/202005/transparent_oceans_report_anu_nsc_2020_0.pdf.77 This is changing with the introduction of J-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs): Luke Caggiano, "China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles," Arms Control Association, May 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-05/news/china-deploys-new-submarine-launched-ballistic-missiles.78 CSIS, "Does China Have an Effective Sea-based Nuclear Deterrent?," China Power, December 2015, https://chinapower.csis.org/ssbn/ (accessed April 2023).79 Wu Riqiang, “How China Practices and Thinks About Nuclear Transparency,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2016), 228, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf.80 Pavel Podvig, "A Note on Mobile Missiles in the Kataev Archive," Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, May 2021, https://russianforces.org/blog/2021/05/a_note_on_mobile_missiles_in_t.shtml (accessed March 7, 2023).81 Li Bin, Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles, Science and Global Security 15 (2007): 1–30, https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs15libin.pdf.82 Even though Soviet TELs were not operated this way, TELs could also be periodically blended into civilian population to hide their signature or positioned into underground structures, and then emerge to position into their firing location. For more see Orletsky, David T., Yuna Huh Wong, et al., “Evaluating Future Trends in Support of the Air Force Strategic Environment Assessment: Discussion and Results from a Structured Workshop,” RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1701.html.83 For more on detection and monitoring of TELs in enemy territory see Alan J. Vick, Richard M. Moore, Bruce R. 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Bergman, The Utility of Hyperspectral Data to Detect and Discriminate Actual and Decoy Target Vehicles (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 1996), 84. Also, see Dimitris Manolakis, David Marden, and Gary A. Shaw, “Hyperspectral Image Processing for Automatic Target Detection Applications,” Lincoln Labs Journal 14, no. 1 (2015): 70–116.89 Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” The Journal of Strategic Studies.90 Michael Wollersheim, "Beyond Change Detection: Measuring the Changes That Matter," ICEYE, March 2022, https://www.iceye.com/blog/beyond-change-detection-measuring-the-changes-that-matter (accessed March 7, 2023).91 MacDonald, “Hide and Seek”.92 Major A. Andronov, "American Geosynchronous SIGINT Satellites," Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye (ISSN 0134-921X), No.12, 1993, pp. 37–43, https://fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/androart.htm (accessed March 7, 2023).93 See for example, Alan Yuhas, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Yousur Al-Hlou, "For Russian Troops, Cellphone Use Is a Persistent, Lethal Danger," The New York Times, January 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/04/world/europe/ukraine-russiacellphones.html.94 Thomas D. MacDonald, "Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability" (PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2021), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/139559.95 David Ignatius, “How the Algorithm Tipped the Balance in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, December 19, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/12/19/palantir-algorithm-data-ukraine-war/.96 Michael T. Klare, "The Pentagon’s Quest for Academic Intelligence: (AI)," The Nation, January 2023, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/the-pentagons-quest-for-academic-intelligence-ai/.97 John Grady, “Panel Details Global Artificial Intelligence Arms Race,” USNI News, December 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/12/09/panel-details-global-artificial-intelligence-arms-race (accessed March 7, 2023). To label the data used for training of the algorithm, crowdsourced microworkers were employed, Makena Kelly, “Google Hired Microworkers to Train its Controversial Project Maven AI,” The Verge, February 2019, https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/4/18211155/google-microworkers-maven-aitrain-pentagon-pay-salary.98 For more on “Scarlet Dragon” see Daniel Wasserbly, “AUSA 2021: US Army's ‘Scarlet Dragon’ Project Aims to Use AI, Satellites for Targeting,” JANES, October 2021, https://www.janes.com/defencenews/news-detail/ausa-2021-us-armys-scarlet-dragon-project-aims-to-use-ai-satellites-for-targeting, and Todd South, “Army’s ‘Scarlet Dragon’ Uses AI with Navy, Air Force and Marine Assets to Rapidly Find, ID and Destroy Targets,” Army Times, October 2021, https://www.armytimes.com/news/yourarmy/2021/10/07/armys-scarlet-dragon-uses-ai-with-navy-air-force-and-marine-assets-to-rapidly-findid-and-destroy-targets and Theresa Hitchens, Army, “NRO Pioneer Direct Sat Imagery Downlink In ‘Scarlet Dragon’,” Breaking Defense, October 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/army-nropioneer-direct-sat-imagery-downlink-in-scarlet-dragon/.99 See for example a video from Palantir, demonstrating how military operators can leverage AI to fuse data and optimize military operations: “Palantir AIP, Defense and Military,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEM5qz__HOU, 25 Apr 2023.100 David Ignatius, “How the Algorithm Tipped the Balance in Ukraine,” December 2022, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/12/19/palantir-algorithm-data-ukraine-war/.101 Missiles emit an infrared radiation signature during launch, from the rocket plume during flight and because the object temperature is higher than its background.102 Podvig, "A note on mobile missiles in the Kataev archive".103 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System (Washington, DC: Project 2049 Institute, 2010), 2.104 Fiona Cunningham, "Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China," NAPSNet Special Reports, July 18, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-ofchina/.105 Hans Kristensen, Eliana Reynolds, and Matt Korda, "STRATCOM Says China Has More ICBM Launchers than the United States – We Have Questions," FAS, February 2023, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2023/02/stratcom-says-china-has-more-icbm-launchers-than-the-unitedstates/.106 U.S. Department of Defense, “China Military Power Report: 2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” November 2022, https://www.defense.gov/CMPR/.107 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, March 2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/nuclear-notebook-chinese-nuclear-weapons-2023/.108 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Nuclear Notebook: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Have in 2022?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, February 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/202303/nuclear-notebook-chinese-nuclear-weapons-2023.109 In the case of North Korea, a U.S. first strike may be successful, but would involve a great deal of risk and would leave the United States vulnerable to an attack by other nuclear powers.110 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Nuclear Notebook: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia have in 2022?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, February 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/202202/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-russia-have-in-2022/.111 Eli Hayes, "The Bohu Laser Facility, Part 1: History and Organisation," Arms Control Wonk, December 2022, , https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1216848/the-bohu-laser-facility-part-1-history-andorganisation/ and Tara Copp, "DIA Warns China’s Space Tech Seeks to Block U.S. Radars, Jam Munitions," Defense One, April 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/04/dia-warns-chinasspace-tech-seeks-block-us-radars-jam-munitions/365549/.112 Joseph Trevitchick, "Chinese Nuclear Anti-Satellite Study Highlights Problem of Countering Starlink Like Constellations," The Drive, October 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinesenuclear-anti-satellite-study-highlights-problem-of-countering-starlink-like-constellations.113 For a more comprehensive overview of ASAT, see Wright et al. David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005). See also Tom Wilson, "Threats to United States Space Capabilities," Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 2001. Another useful, and more recent, resource on ASAT is Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Makena Young, "Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space: Protecting Space Systems from Counterspace Weapons," CSIS, February 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-against-dark-arts-space-protecting-space-systems-counterspaceweapons.114 James Acton and Thomas MacDonald, “Nuclear Command-and-Control Satellites Should Be Off Limits,” Defense One, December 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/nuclear-commandand-control-satellites-should-be-limits/187472/.115 Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics.”116 Ross Andersen, "Never Give Artificial Intelligence the Nuclear Codes," The Atlantic, June 2023 Issue, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/06/ai-warfare-nuclear-weapons-strike/673780/.117 Koller, The Future of Ubiquitous, Real-Time Intelligence – A GEOINT Singularity, The Aerospace Corporation, August 2019, https://csps.aerospace.org/papers/future-ubiquitous-real-time-intelligencegeoint-singularity.118 Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence”.119 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Europe Goes Nuclear; Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_DF35A31CD90545FE83A077DE010DD044.120 Clary, "Survivability in the New Era of Counterforce".121 In fact, the Korean War started after the first Soviet nuclear bomb was tested.122 Twitter account of Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948355557022420992 (accessed March 7, 2023).123 Fiona S. Cunningham, “Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations,” The Washington Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253.Additional informationNotes on contributorsIgor MoricIgor Moric (imoric@princeton.edu) is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Program on Science and Global Security (SGS) at Princeton University. His research focuses on emerging technologies that can increase the transparency and completeness of information on global nuclear stockpiles, and facilitate effective control of fissile materials and nuclear weapons. Prior to joining Princeton, he worked as a postdoctoral researcher on the MIMAC and PandaX dark matter detectors at Tsinghua University in Beijing and SJTU in Shanghai, respectively. During his PhD at CNES and Paris Sorbonne he worked on characterization and optimization of the space atomic clock PHARAO. He also holds an advanced master in “Space Systems Engineering” from ISAE-SUPAERO in Toulouse.
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