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The Far-Right Redox Reaction: The Transformation of Populist Radical Right Parties from Marginal ‘Groupuscules’ into Considerable Political Forces

2023; Routledge; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/19448953.2023.2233355

1944-8961

Petros Papasarantopoulos,

Populism, Right-Wing Movements

ABSTRACTThe paper examines the factors for the ‘big moment’ of the far right, its Big Bang, i.e, when far-right parties transform from marginal ‘groupuscules’ into considerable political players. It is the moment when political supply and social demand interact, like two elements in a chemical reaction, and are transformed into far-right vote; the far-right redox. What are the conditions and the catalyst that allow the far-right redox to take place? Discussing the importance of the media as a resource for all political actors, and especially the far-right party family and analysing examples from three Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia), Greece and France, the working hypothesis is that a necessary and sufficient condition is the occurrence of a media-induced event that acts as a catalyst, leading to their rise from the political margins to the political mainstream.KEYWORDS: Far-right votemediaBalkan countriesGreecemediagenic leadersmediagenic eventfar-right redoxcatalystpolitical supplysocial demand Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes[1] More about the Big Bang at http://big-bang-theory.com (accessed 22 June 2022).[2] A popular expression, which was used repeatedly by Mao Zedong.[3] Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, Pinter, 2000.[4] Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 297.[5] See Hilde Coffé, Bruno Heyndel and Jan Vermeir, ‘Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: explaining the Vlaams Blok’s electoral success’, Electoral Studies 26(7), 2007, pp. 142–155.[6] See also D.G. Harisson, ‘The product of the oxidation of glucose by glucose dehydrogenase’, Biochem J. 26(4), 1932, pp. 1295–1299.[7] See also G.H. Schen, ‘The Use of Inorganic Redox Mechanisms in Analytical Chemistry’, J.Chem.Educ. 41(1), 1964, pp. 32–35.[8] See also A.G. Oblad, ‘The KEL-Chlor process’, Ind.Eng.Chem., 61(7), 1969, pp. 23–26.[9] See http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mediagenic (accessed 22 June 2022).[10] Other dictionaries have similar definitions: Attractive or well-suited to the communications media at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mediagenic (accessed 22 June 2022), Attractive and appealing to viewers and readers of the news media at http://www.yourdictionary.com/mediagenic (accessed 22 June 2022).[11] We note that the term mediagenic should not be confused with the term ‘charismatic’ which is often found in the literature. The term ‘charismatic’ has Weberian origins, is not particularly clear, and a strict definition of it would perhaps exclude all three of the leaders under consideration.[12] This was the central slogan of the Dutch Nederlands Blok. Cited in Vasiliki Georgiadou, Η άκρα δεξιά και οι συνέπειες της συναίνεσης [The Far Right and the Consequences of Consensus], Kastaniotis, 2008.[13] See in this regard, Antonis Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.[14] Antonis Ellinas, ‘Media and the Radical Right’, in Jens Rydgren (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the radical right, OUP, 2018, pp. 269–284.[15] Some of the literature on this topic include, Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann, The radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis, University of Michigan Press, 1997; Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart and Bruce Horsfield (eds), The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis, Praeger, 2003; Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right, op. cit. Overview of this scholarly debate with apt critical remarks in Mudde, Populist Radical parties, op. cit.[16] Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right, op. cit., p. 7.[17] Ibid., p. 16.[18] Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the emergence of the cartel party’, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, pp. 5–31.[19] The scholarly debate is summarized by the authors in a paper published 14 years later, Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair, ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009, pp. 753–766.[20] As noted in Iskra Baeva & Evgenia Kalinova, Σύγχρονη Βουλγαρία. Από το ανατολικό μπλοκ στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Modern Bulgaria. From the Eastern bloc to the European Union], Epikentro, 2011, p. 238, ‘the ATAKA also reached the electorate thanks to the electronic media, as its leader Volen Siderov, former editor-in-chief of the Democracjia newspaper,[…] promoted the party in the TV programme of the same name which was rebroadcast on the cable TV station SKAT’.[21] See in this respect, Nikolai Genov, ‘Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria’, Review of European Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, December 2010.[22] Thus, confirming what a supporter of Australian populist right-winger Pauline Hanson told a journalist: ‘you media people don’t get it: the more you criticize her, the more we support her’; Murray Goot, ‘Pauline Hanson and the power of the media’, in Ghassan Hage & Rowanne Couch (eds), The Future of Australian Multiculturalism; Sydney: Research Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences, 1999, p. 217.[23] Nick Thorpe, ‘Romania’s far-right contender’, 28 November 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1044023.stm (accessed 22 June 2022).[24] Marina Popescu, ‘The parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania, November 2000’, Electoral Studies 22(2), 2003, pp. 325–395.[25] Michael Shafir, ‘The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 elections in Romania: how obvious is the obvious?’, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics 1 (2), 2001, pp. 91–126.[26] Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, ‘Mainstreaming extremisms—The Romanian PDSR and the Bulgarian Socialists in Comparative Perspective’, in Andras Bozoki and John T. Ishiyama (eds), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2002, pp. 367–396.[27] For the ideological core of Vojislav Seselj’s positions, see Yves Tomic, ‘The Ideology of a Greater Serbia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/expert%20report%20-%20yves%20tomic.pdf (accessed 22 June 2022).[28] Ognjen Pribićević, ‘Changing fortunes of the Serbian radical right’, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1999, pp. 193–211.[29] Barbara Wiesinger, ‘The Continuing Presence of the Extreme Right in Post-Milošević Serbia’, Balkanologie, XI (1–2), 2008.[30] The disclosure was made by the weekly political journal Intervju. Cited in Philip J. Cohen and David Riesman, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History Texas, A&M University Press, 1996, p. 128.[31] The video of the broadcast at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5g8YifGqiA (accessed 22 June 2022).[32] Alain Badiou, Η πολιτική και η λογική του συμβάντος [Politics and the logic of the event], Patakis, 2008.[33] Andriani Regepi, «Η Ανείπωτη Ιστορία της Marfin: Καταγραφές ενός κατακερματισμένου γεγονότος», στο Β. Βαμβακάς – Τ. Καρατράντος – Π. Παναγιωτόπουλος (επιμ.), 05/05/10 - Ταυτότητες και Συναισθήματα της πολιτικής βίας στην Ελλάδα του 21ου αιώνα [‘The Untold Story of Marfin: Records of a Fragmented Event’, in V. Vamvakas, T. Karatrantos and P. Panagiotopoulos (eds), 05/05/10 – Identities and Emotions of Political Violence in 21st Century Greece, Epikentro, 2020.[34] Panagis Panagiotopoulos, Το Γεγονός [The Event], Vibliorama, 2003, p. 28.[35] S. Thomas Kuhn, Η δομή των Επιστημονικών Επαναστάσεων [The Structure of Scientific Revolutions], Synchona Themata, 2008.[36] Mudde, Populist Radical parties, op. cit.[37] Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right, op. cit., pp. 125–166.[38] Dimitris Psaras, Το κρυφό χέρι του Καρατζαφέρη. Η τηλεοπτική αναγέννηση της ελληνικής ακροδεξιάς [The hidden hand of Karatzaferis], Alexandria, 2010; Stathis Tsiras, Έθνος και ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. Νέα άκρα δεξιά και λαϊκισμός [Nation and LA.O.S.], Epikentro, 2012.[39] Tsiras, op. cit.[40] Ibid. Foreword.[41] Ibid.[42] Panagiotis Dimitras, «Ελλάδα Ελλήνων Χρυσαυγιτών» [Greece of Greek Golden Dawn supporters], The books’ journal, issue 21, July 2012. ‘The electorate gave Golden Dawn 7% and 21 seats. In the June 2012 elections they did the same, even though in the meantime there was extensive promotion of its Nazi positions and its violent methods, mainly against immigrants but also against two left-wing MPs in a TV show. Thanks to this TV attack by Ilias Kasidiaris to Liana Kanelli and Rena Dourou, Golden Dawn, as the post-election surveys showed, replaced the loss of 3% of voters in May 2012 with another 3%, in order to secure again 7% of the votes and 18 seats. Thus, 10% of the electorate voted for Golden Dawn at least once in 2012’ (p. 24).[43] See in this regard, John W. Veugelers and Roberto Chiarini, ‘The far right in France and Italy: nativist politics and anti-fascism’, in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay (eds), Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. New York: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 83–103, 83.[44] It is noteworthy that the then opposition party, SYRIZA, also irrigated part of its voters from the same pool, given that 16% of its voters had a positive opinion of the leader of Golden Dawn, Nikos Michaloliakos (VPRC poll for the newspaper Ellada Avrio, 30 July 2012) and 49% had a positive opinion of the leader of Independent Greeks, Panos Kammenos (VPRC poll for the magazine Epikera, 22 March 2012).[45] See Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou, The Golden Dawn’s ‘Nationalist Solution’: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece, Palgrave Pivot New York, 2015.[46] Mudde, Populist Radical parties, op. cit., p. 245.[47] In Greece there is a ban on the publication of polls 15 days before the date of the elections. Consequently, the data in the Figure 1 contain results of disclosed polls up to 1 June 2012 and ‘hidden’ polls from that date onwards. They come from GPO. I would like to express my sincere thanks to the company and its then Managing Director, Mr. Takis Theodoricakos, for their willing response to my request.Figure 1. Far-right redox - Kasidiaris’ slap.Source: GPO.Display full size[48] See https://www.cretadrive.gr/news/dimoskopisi-gia-episodio-kasidiaris-kaneli-dourou-ant1 (accessed 22 June 2022).[49] See https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%CE%9A%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%B9% CE%AC%CF%81%CE%B7%CF%82+%CE%9A%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%B7 (accessed 22 June 2022).[50] Jean-Marie Le Pen, 1984, quoted in Edward G. DeClair, Politics on the fringe: the people, policies and organization of the French National Front, Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, p. 76.