Proscribing Right-Wing Extremist Organizations in Europe: Variations, Trends, and Prospects
2023; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 8 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09546553.2023.2240446
ISSN1556-1836
AutoresMichael C. Zeller, Michael Vaughan,
ResumoABSTRACTAmong the legal instruments that address organized right-wing extremism in Europe, proscription is one of the most severe. Yet there is scant comparative work on where, how frequently, and against which right-wing extremist organization proscriptions have been applied. This article presents a new dataset on Proscribed Right-wing Extremist Organizations (PREOs) in Europe. A typology of countries' proscriptive regimes illuminates how proscription by executive decrees is more frequent than proscription by judicial ruling, and how proscription by executive decrees appears to be more responsive to high-profile incidents of extremist violence. We complement this descriptive overview with a close investigation of patterns in Germany, the state that has most frequently used proscription against right-wing extremist organizations. Furthermore, the article presents paired case studies of the proscriptions of Blood & Honour in Germany (by executive decree) and the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland (by judicial ruling), which point to the causal factors underlying proscription of right-wing extremist organizations.KEYWORDS: ProscriptionbanninglistingextremismterrorismBlood & HonourNordic Resistance Movement AcknowledgmentsMichael Vaughan's work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (funding code 16DII125). We would like to thank the all country experts who participated in data collection for this project: for Austria, Vinicius Bivar and Manès Weisskircher; for Belgium, Ico Maly; for Bulgaria, Rositsa Dzhekova and Asya Metodieva; for Croatia, Maja Gergorić and Ivan Tranfić; for Czechia, Ondrej Kolár and Eva Svatonova; for Denmark, Richard McNeil- Willson and Anita Nissen; for Estonia, Stefano Braghiroli; for Finland, Lynda Gilby and Tommi Kotonen; for France, Jean-Yves Camus, Nicolas Lebourg, and Franziska Wagner; for Germany, Maik Fielitz, Jana Hitziger, Greta Jasser, Sabine Volk, and Michael C. Zeller; for Greece and for Cyprus, Andreas Dafnos and Vasiliki Tsagkroni; for Hungary, Katherine Kondor and Balša Lubarda; for Italy, Alessio Scopelliti and Micaela Musacchio Strigone; for Latvia, Valery Engel; for the Netherlands, Sarah de Lange; for Poland, Michael Cole and Justyna Kajta; for Portugal, Vinicius Bivar and Raquel da Silva; for Romania, Roland Clark and Cinpoes Radu; for Slovakia, Miroslav Mareš and Eva Svatonova; for Slovenia, Miroslav Mareš and Marko Milošev; for Spain, Carmen Aguilera-Carnerero and Bàrbara Molas; for Sweden, Tina Askanius and Patricia Rodi; and for the United Kingdom and for Ireland, William Allchorn, Andreas Dafnos, Callum Downes, and Daniel Jones. We also thank Alina Iltutmus for assistance in preparing this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. We refer to "proscription," though the practices we examine have been variously named banning, listing, blacklisting, exclusion, outlawing, sanctioning, or criminalisation in scholarly literature.2. For one example, see the mapping project supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the Khalifa Ihler Institute: https://antifascist-europe.org/.3. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe," Journal for Deradicalization 15, no. 3 (2015): 1–38.4. e.g., Iain Cameron, "European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting," Human Rights Law Review 3, no. 2 (2003): 225–56; Daniel Moeckli, "Stop and Search Under the Terrorism Act 2000: A Comment on R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis," The Modern Law Review 70 (2007): 659–70; Andreas Stegbauer, "Die Propaganda-und Äußerungsdelikte der §§ 86, 86a, 111, 130, 140 StGB," in Rechtsextremismus und Rechtsterrorismus, ed. Frank Lüttig and Jens Lehmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2020), 245–78.5. Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, "The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 216–35.6. Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, Submission No 2 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), (January 22, 2007).7. Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, "Yesterday's Law: Terrorist Group Listing in Canada," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 259–77.8. McGarrity and Williams, "The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia," 219.9. See also Chia-yi Lee and Yasutaka Tominaga, "The Determinants of Terrorist Listing," Journal of Conflict Resolution (in press): 1–27.10. Lee Jarvis and Tim Legrand, "The Proscription or Listing of Terrorist Organisations: Understanding, Assessment, and International Comparisons," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 199–215.11. Vicki Sentas, "Terrorist Organization Proscription as Counterinsurgency in the Kurdish Conflict," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 298–317.12. Suthaharan Nadarajah, "The Tamil Proscriptions: Identities, Legitimacies, and Situated Practices," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 278–97.13. Angela K. Bourne, "Securitization and the Proscription of Terrorist Organizations in Spain," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 318–35.14. See note 11 above.15. See note 7 above.16. See note 10 above.17. However, as Zeller reveals, non-state actors' counter-mobilization against RWE has often been necessary to push the state to apply these instruments. Michael C. Zeller, "Patterns of Demobilization: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2021): 267–84; Michael C. Zeller, "Demobilising Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns: Coercive Counter-Mobilisation, State Social Control, and the Demobilisation of the Hess Gedenkmarsch Campaign," Social Movement Studies 21, no. 3 (2022): 372–90.18. Gideon Botsch, Christoph Kopke, and Fabian Virchow, "Banning Extreme Right-Wing Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Right-Wing Extremism in Europe. Country Analyses, Counter-Strategues and Laboer-Marker Oriented Exit Strategies, ed. Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Forum Berlin, 2013), 255–80; Tommi Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland: Analyzing the Process and Its Outcome," Journal for Deradicalization 29, no. Winter (2021): 177–204.19. Michael Minkenberg, "Repression and Reaction: Militant Democracy and the Radical Right in Germany and France," Patterns of Prejudice 40, no. 1 (2006): 25–44.20. Graham Macklin, "'Only Bullets Will Stop Us!'—The Banning of National Action in Britain," Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 6 (2018): 104–22; Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland."21. Angela Bourne and John Veugelers, "Militant Democracy and Successors to Authoritarian Ruling Parties in Post-1945 West Germany and Italy," Democratization 29, no. 4 (2022): 736–53.22. Although PREOs were mostly classified as movement organizations—with few political parties and even fewer alternative media organizations—this typology broadly captures the contemporary organizational ecology of the proscribed right-wing extremism, while providing a foundation adaptable to future research on proscription.23. The full dataset is available from the corresponding author upon request.24. Some previous research has endeavored to provide such a legal survey. Bleich and Lambert provide a brief overview of the relevant laws in ten states they examine. More recently, a report by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime provides a thorough review of the legal frameworks applied to RWE in six countries—Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America—particularly affected by right-wing terrorism. UNODC, Terrorism Prevention Branch, "Manual on Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief" (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Terrorism Prevention Branch, 2022). Similarly, looking at practices in Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S., there are three types of approaches to prevention and countering violent extremism: Scandinavian, multifaceted, and counterintelligence and counter-crime. David Ibsen, Lara Pham, Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann, Kacper Rekawek, Joshua Fisher-Birch, and Marco Macori, "Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism—Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures" (Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2020). Still, a broader survey of laws applicable to RWE in European states remains undone.25. Cf. McGarrity & Williams, "The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia."26. David Art, "The Organizational Origins of the Contemporary Radical Right: The Case of Belgium," Comparative Politics 40, no. 4 (2008): 421–40.27. See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000007040971/.28. László Szôcs, "A Tale of the Unexpected: The Extreme Right Vis-à-Vis Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary," Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 6 (1998): 1096–115; Zsuzsanna Vidra andMichael C Zeller, "Hungary," in Routledge Handbook on Violent Extremism and Resilience, ed. Richard McNeil-Willson and Anna Triandafyllidou (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023), 181–95.29. As one of the country experts for Finland, Kotonen, noted there were as many as 3,327 Finnish organizations proscribed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War because the armistice between Finland, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union committed the country to disband all "Hitlerite" or "fascist-type" organizations as well as other groups that propagandized against the Allies.30. Accelerationism is the action-oriented view that governments and state institutions are irreversibly corrupted and therefore the optimal action is to "accelerate" their collapse through intentional disruption and creation of socio-political tension, thereby hastening the establishment of a white ethnostate.31. Richard McNeil-Willson, Michael Vaughan, and Michael C Zeller, "Critically Examining the Role of the Scholar in Policymaking on the Far Right," in The Ethics of Researching the Far Right, ed. Antonia Vaughan, Joan Braune, Meghan Tinsley, and Aurelien Mondon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, in press), 1–10.32. The proscription of Pride and Modernity has been imposed, so it is included in the list of PREOs in Table 2—but this case is still under judicial review at time of writing.33. We are indebted to the country experts for Denmark, Anita Nissen and Richard McNeil-Willson, for this observation.34. We thank the country expert for the Netherlands, Sarah de Lange, for this information.35. We thank the country experts for Sweden, Tina Askanius and Patricia Rodi, for this note.36. Anita Nissen, Europeanisation of the Contemporary Far Right: Generation Identity and Fortress Europe, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2022).37. Maik Fielitz and Karolin Schwarz, "Hate Not Found: Deplatforming the Far Right and Its Consequences" (Jena: Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, 2020).38. For example, one Identitarian group has sought to evade monitoring by operating in less restrictive context of Poland. See Marta Kasztelan and Denis Hruby, "Far-Right Group Builds Polish Shield from German Scrutiny," Politico, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-group-established-polish-foundation/.39. See note 37 above; Karolin Schwarz, Hasskrieger: Der Neue Globale Rechtsextremismus (Frieburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2020); Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, "Broadening the GIFCT Hash-Sharing Database Taxonomy: An Assessment and Recommended Next Steps" (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2021).40. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Madeleine Thorstensen, Anders Ravik Jupskås, and Graham Macklin, "RTV Trend Report 2021. Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990–2020" (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2021).41. Ibid., 5.42. Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland," 178.43. It is important to note that Golden Dawn has not been proscribed as a "right-wing extremist organization," that is on the basis of some ideological criteria, but instead as a "criminal organization," on the basis of organized violence and other criminal behaviour by its members. We are indebted to the country experts for Greece, Andreas Dafnos and Vasiliki Tsagkroni, for making this distinction clear.44. Maik Fielitz, Vasiliki Tsagkroni, and Andreas Dafnos, "The Banning of Golden Dawn," in CARR Organisation Research Unit Year in Review Report 2020, Ed. Michael C. Zeller (Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR), 2020), 27–29.45. See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23262406.46. See full comments in the interview with Le Figaro: https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/le-gouvernement-peut-t-il-dissoudre-generation-identitaire-20190404.47. Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043210363.48. By referring to "Britain," we exclude the special set of cases of loyalist paramilitaries that operated in Northern Ireland.49. Available online: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-action-becomes-first-extreme-right-wing-group-to-be-banned-in-uk.50. Gideon Botsch, "Die 'Hakenkreuzschmierwelle' 1960 Und Das Verbot Des Bundes Nationaler Studenten," Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft 65 (2017): 855–74.51. Though the first post-war German governments under Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963) implemented denazification in many areas, some implementation was conspicuously hollow. Most notably, several members of Adenauer's governments had held senior positions in the National Socialist regime, for example: Hans Globke, who was appointed Chief of Staff for the West German Chancellery, had helped draft the racialist Nuremberg Laws and worked closely with Adolf Eichmann to administer parts of the Holocaust; Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder had been a Nazi party member and storm trooper since 1933; the minister for refugees Theodor Oberländer had served in a SS battalion implicated in war crimes in Poland and Ukraine; and Reinhard Gehlen, a leading military intelligence officer in the Nazi regime, became the first president of the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachtichtendienst).52. Botsch et al., "Banning Extreme Right-Wing Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany"; Martin Lee, The Beast Reawakens (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), 331–37.53. For example, Zeller, "Demobilising Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns"; Fabian Virchow, "'Wem Die Strasse Gehört': Wunsiedel Als Symbolischer Ort Der Demonstrationspolitik Der Extremen Rechten," in Wunsiedel Ist Bunt—Nicht Braun! Die Auseinandersetzungen Um Das Hess-Grab Verändern Die Politische Kultur, ed. Julia Hasse, Gregor Rosenthal, and Joachim Twisselmann (Bad Alexandersbad/Berlin: bfdt/BPgR, 2013), 171–85.54. Figure 6 does not include Combat 18, which was active in many regions and not predominantly in any one.55. Ibsen et al., "Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism"; UNODC, Terrorism Prevention Branch, "Manual on Prevention of and Responses to Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief."56. See note 38 above.57. Timothy S. Brown, "Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and 'Nazi Rock' in England and Germany," Journal of Social History 38, no. 1 (2004): 157–78.58. Verfassungsschutz, "'Blood & Honour'-Bewegung," Verfassungsschutz, September 14, 2000, http://www.verfassungsschutz.bayern.de/service/mitteilungen/01572/ (accessed via WayBackMachine May 30, 2023).59. BBC News, "Germany Bans Neo-Nazi Group," BBC, September 14, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/925,009.stm (accessed May 30, 2023).60. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "The Emergence of Transnational Street Militancy: A Comparative Case Study of the Nordic Resistance Movement and Generation Identity," Journal for Deradicalization 25 (2020): 1–34.61. Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains Its Use of Violence," Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 6 (2020): 37–48.62. For more detailed treatment of the NRM, See ibid.; See note 60 above; Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland."63. Bjørgo and Ravndal, "Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains Its Use of Violence," 40–41.64. Kotonen, "Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland," 181.65. Ibid., 178, 180.66. See Marieke De Goede, "Proscription's Futures," Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 2 (2018): 336–55.67. Reinhard Wolff, "Finnische Neonazis töten Passanten: Der Angriff auf Jimi Karttunen," TAZ, September 21, 2016, https://taz.de/Finnische-Neonazis-toeten-Passanten/!5,338,937/ (accessed May 23, 2023).68. Daniel Sallamaa and Tommi Kotonen, "The Case Against the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland: An Overview and Some Explanations," Right Now! Blog, https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2020/the-case-against-the-nordic-resistance-movement.html (accessed May 23, 2023).69. See note 68 above.70. Ibid, emphasis in original.71. Including Towards Freedom! (Kohti Vapautta!), Nordic People's Socialists (Pohjoismaiset Kansansosialistit), National Socialist Youth (Kansallissosialistinuoret), Berkano, Northern Guard (Pohjanvartio), National Progress (Kansallinen Kehitys), and Law of the Blood (Veren Laki).72. Cf. Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism (Abington: Routledge, 2016).73. See note 19 above; Julia Gerlach, "Der Umgang mit politischem Extremismus auf dem Prüfstand–Vereinsverbote in Deutschland seit 1990," in Extremismus in Deutschland, Ed. Gerhard Hirscher and Eckhard Jesse (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2013), 527–48.74. In line with the distinction drawn by See note 5 above.75. Colin J. Beck and Emily Miner, "Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?" Social Forces 91, no. 3 (2013): 837–72.76. See note 9 above.77. Lee and Tominaga find some evidence that ally behavior may increase the likelihood of proscribing a group; for an overview of shared terrorist group bans, see Benjamin Freedman, "Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: A Comparison of Lists from Six Countries and Two International Organizations," Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 2 (2010): 46–52.78. Bourne and Veugelers's comparative case study—using the framework of a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) calibration exercise, though not in fact conducting a QCA—of RWE party proscription is an instructive example.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung [16DII125].Notes on contributorsMichael C. ZellerMichael C. Zeller is currently a postdoctoral researcher at Bielefeld University. He completed his Ph.D. at Central European University. He is a member of the Radicalisation Awareness Network Policy Support (RAN PS), the European Research Community on Radicalisation (ERCOR) Researchers' Directory. His research interests include far-right movements and politics, extremism and political violence, repression, and qualitative methods.Michael VaughanMichael Vaughan completed his Ph.D. at the University of Sydney before working as a postdoctoral researcher at the Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society in Berlin. He is currently a Research Officer at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research interests include digital political communication and participation, far-right politics and the communicative dimension of mobilisation around economic inequality
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