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Referendums and representation in democratic constitution making: Lessons from the failed Chilean constitutional experiment

2023; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09615768.2023.2248649

1757-8442

Samuel Tschorne,

Judicial and Constitutional Studies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.DISCLOSURE STATEMENTNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To point to just a few academic extended contributions, see: Peter Siavelis and Jennifer Piscopo, 'Chile's Constitutional Chaos' (2023) 34 Journal of Democracy 141; Eduardo Alemán and Patricio Navia, 'Chile's Failed Constitution: Democracy Wins' (2023) 34 Journal of Democracy 90; Guillermo Larrain, Gabriel Negretto and Stefan Voigt, 'How Not to Write a Constitution: Lessons from Chile' (2023) 194 Public Choice 233; Samuel Issacharoff and Sergio Verdugo, 'The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond' (NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 23-30, 11 January 2023) accessed 27 July 2023; Armin von Bogdandy, 'Chilean Insights for Progressive Constitutionalism' (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No 2023-07, 6 February 2023) accessed 27 July 2023.2 For a panoramic discussion on this sort of constitutional referendum, see Zachary Elkins and Alexander Hudson, 'The Constitutional Referendum in Historical Perspective' in David Landau and Hanna Lerner (eds), Comparative Constitution Making (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019).3 accessed 31 July 2023.4 accessed 31 July 2023.5 < https://2022.decidechile.cl/> accessed 31 July 2023.6 This statistical analysis leads to the clear conclusion that 'Votes on full constitutions almost never fail (they fail 6 percent of the time)': see Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 154–8, 162.7 Gargarella has elaborated his views on this topic in many places, but the most recent statements of his arguments can be found in Roberto Gargarella, 'Why are "Exit Referedums" Undesireable? The Case of Chile (2020–2022)' (2023) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 32. See also, Roberto Gargarella, 'Rejection of the New Chilean Constitution: Some Reflections' (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 14 September 2022) accessed 20 July 2023; Roberto Gargarella, 'El "plebiscito de salida" como error constituyente' (IACL-AIDC Blog, 6 September 2022) accessed 20 July 2023; Roberto Gargarella, 'Para continuar con el diálogo sobre el "plebiscito de salida" chileno' (IACL-AIDC Blog, 11 October 2022) accessed 20 July 2023.8 David Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' in David Landau and Hanna Lerner (eds), Comparative Constitution Making (Edward Elgar 2019) 567.9 For an elaboration of the thesis that 'negative models' had a particularly important role in the design of the 2020–21 Chilean constitutional process, see Sergio Verdugo and Marcela Prieto, 'The Dual Aversion of Chile's Constitution-Making Process' (2021) 19 International Journal of Constitutional Law 149.10 David S Law and Tom Ginsburg, 'Constitutional Drafting in Latin America: A Quantitative Perspective' in Colin Crawford and Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (eds), Constitutionalism in the Americas (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018).11 For an elaboration of this thesis, see Leah Trueblood, 'Are Referendums Directly Democratic?' (2020) 40 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 425.12 Matt Qvortrup and Leah Trueblood, 'Schmitt, Dicey, and the Power and Limits of Referendums in the United Kingdom' (2022) 42 Legal Studies 396.13 This label refers to the constitutions elaborated under the leadership of Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and Rafael Correa (Ecuador), which represented at the time an important move to the left in the region and which led to not only a shift away from market-based policies but inaugurated a 'direct, plebiscitary politics, as against the model of more indirect, "liberal" democracy that had characterized Latin American politics' see Zachary Elkins, 'Constitutional Revolution in the Andes?' in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 109; also Verdugo and Prieto (n 9) 157–60.14 David Landau, 'Constitution-Making Gone Wrong' (2013) 64 Alabama Law Review 923; David Landau, 'Abusive Constitutionalism' (2013) 47 University of California Davis Law Review 189.15 Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' (n 8) 570–1.16 Roberto Gargarella, The Law as a Conversation among Equals (Cambridge University Press 2022) 240–2. He had already deployed this general argument to criticise the inclusion of an exit referenda in the design of the Chilean constituent process early on, see Roberto Gargarella, 'Diez puntos sobre el cambio constitucional en Chile' (2020) 285 Nueva Sociedad 12, 14–6; Roberto Gargarella, 'De la Constitución de 1980 a la Constitución Democrática' (2020) 6 Derecho y Crítica Social 103, 107–11.17 Gargarella, The Law as a Conversation among Equals (n 16) 241, 243.18 ibid 241–2; Gargarella, 'Diez puntos sobre el cambio constitucional en Chile' (n 16) 15; Gargarella, 'De la Constitución de 1980 a la Constitución Democrática' (n 16) 110. This case according to Gargarella constitutes a perfect example of the strategy that is described by Rosalind Dixon, 'Constitutional Rights as Bribes' (2018) 50 Connecticut Law Review 767.19 Gargarella, The Law as a Conversation among Equals (n 16) 241.20 Gargarella, 'Why are "Exit Referedums" Undesireable? The Case of Chile (2020–2022)' (n 7) 34.21 ibid 33.22 ibid 33, 37.23 ibid 34.24 ibid 38.25 ibid 35.26 ibid.27 ibid 34.28 Law and Ginsburg (n 10); Elkins (n 13).29 Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' (n 8) 569–70.30 Jennifer Piscopo and Peter Siavelis, 'Chile's Constitutional Moment' 120 Current History 43.31 Scott Mainwaring, 'The Crisis of Representation in the Andes' (2006) 17 Journal of Democracy 13. At the time Chile seemed to offer more stable and well-functioning political institutions and party system, although signs of deterioration were already visible, Arturo Valenzuela and Lucía Dammert, 'Problems of Success in Chile' (2006) 17 Journal of Democracy 65; Juan Pablo Luna and David Altman, 'Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization' (2011) 53 Latin American Politics and Society 1.32 The 'crisis of representation' in Chile was years in the making and was widely studied and discussed during more than a decade, vid Juan Pablo Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation' (2016) 27 Journal of Democracy 129; Peter Siavelis, 'Crisis of Representation in Chile? The Institutional Connection' (2016) 8 Journal of Politics in Latin America 61.33 Kenneth Roberts, '(Re)Politicizing Inequalities: Movements, Parties and Social Citizenship in Chile' (2016) 8 Journal of Politics in Latin America 125; Nicolás Somma, 'Discontent, Collective Protest, and Social Movements in Chile' in Alfredo Joignant Rondón, Mauricio Morales Quiroga and Claudio Fuentes (eds), Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries: Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).34 Nicolás Somma and Rodrigo Medel, 'Shifting Relationships Between Social Movements and Institutional Politics' in Sofia Donoso and Marisa von Bülow (eds), Social Movements in Chile (Palgrave Macmillan 2017); Rodrigo M Medel, 'When Do Active Citizens Abstain from the Polls? Civic Associations, Non-Electoral Participation, and Voting in 21st-Century Democracies' [2023] Acta Politica accessed 27 July 2023.35 For an elaboration of the concept of constitutional rot, see Jack Balkin, 'Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot' (2017) 77 Maryland Law Review 147. As I have argued elsewhere, this distinction is particularly illuminating to understand the Chilean constitutional trajectory that led to the constituent process, Samuel Tschorne, 'Las claves conceptuales del debate constitucional chileno: poder constituyente, legitimidad de la constitución y cambio constitucional' (2020) 160 Estudios Públicos. This constitutes an expanding research field, with important conceptual instability and proliferation: see Tom Gerald Daly, 'Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field' (2019) 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 9.36 Nicolás M Somma and Sofia Donoso, 'Chilean Massive Protests (2019)' in David A Snow and others (eds), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements (Wiley 2023) 1; Claudia Heiss, 'Latin America Erupts: Re-Founding Chile' [2021] Journal of Democracy 33.37 Nicolás M Somma and others, 'No Water in the Oasis: The Chilean Spring of 2019–2020' (2021) 20 Social Movement Studies 495.38 Kirsten Sehnbruch and Sofia Donoso, 'Social Protests in Chile: Inequalities and Other Inconvenient Truths about Latin America's Poster Child' (2020) 11 Global Labour Journal 52; Somma and others (n 37); Somma and Donoso (n 36).39 Julieta Suarez-Cao, 'Reconstructing Legitimacy After Crisis: The Chilean Path to a New Constitution' (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 253.40 Somma and others (n 37); Somma and Donoso (n 36).41 Presidential statement (Moneda Palace, 12 November 2019) accessed 24 July 2023.42 Javier Couso, 'Chile's "Procedurally Regulated" Constitution-Making Process' (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 235, 242.43 'Acuerdo por la Paz Social y la Nueva Constitución' (15 November 2019) accessed 24 July 2023.44 Couso (n 42) 243–6.45 Somma and others (n 37) 6.46 Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' (n 8) 571.47 Elkins (n 13) 111.48 ibid 109; Verdugo and Prieto (n 9) 157–60; Landau, 'Constitution-Making Gone Wrong' (n 14); Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' (n 8).49 The only exception was the relatively new right-wing party Evopoli and, interestingly, the 2019 social outburst brought about a cabinet reshuffle that placed as minister of interior a leading member of that party (Gonzalo Blumel), who was instrumental in the political negotiations leading to the constituent process: see Suarez-Cao (n 39) 255.50 Alberto Coddou, 'The Chilean Constituent Process: A Long and Winding Road' (Int'l J. Const. L. Blog, 4 May 2016) accessed 13 April 2018.51 Jorge Contesse and Sergio Verdugo, 'The Rise and Fall of a Constitutional Moment: Lessons from the Chilean Experiment and the Failure of Bachelet's Project' (Int'l J. Const. L. Blog, 13 March 2018) accessed 25 July 2023. For a more extensive discussion of this process, Pablo Contreras and Domingo Lovera, 'A Constitued Constituent Process? Chile's Failed Attempt to Replace Pinochet's Constitution (2013-2019)' (2022) 13 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito 297.52 Thus, some scholars from the camp of progressive constitutionalism concluded that the lesson to be learnt from the failure of Bachelet's programme is that a constitutional transformation of this sort would require a 'dictatorial moment' led by a 'democratic prince', see Fernando Muñoz, 'Bachelet y la tradición constitucional: historia de una incomprensión' [2018] Revista Red Seca.53 'The concentration of power is a critical feature that will probably be absent from the Chilean constitutional debate. A transversal consensus on the need for decentralization and citizen participation and the ongoing deliberation on the political regime question indicate that potential reforms will be sharing rather than concentrating powers': Suarez-Cao (n 39) 255, 261.54 Alemán and Navia (n 1) 90–1. The government was also under the risk of being outmanoeuvred by the Association of Mayors which was already organising local consultations (of debatable legality) on the constitutional question.55 Emilios Christodoulidis and Marco Goldoni, 'Introduction: Chile's "Constituent Moment"' (2020) 31 Law and Critique 1; Fernando Atria, 'Constituent Moment, Constituted Powers in Chile' (2020) 31 Law and Critique 51; Octavio Ansaldi and María Pardo-Vergara, 'What Constitution? On Chile's Constitutional Awakening' (2020) 31 Law and Critique 7; Pablo Contreras and Lovera (n 51). However, this 'revolutionary narrative' was highly influential in the process itself and was clearly visible in the discourse and even the actions of several important parties, movements and actors, see Marcela Prieto and Sergio Verdugo, 'How Political Narratives Affect the Self-Enforcing Nature of Interim Constitutions' (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 265. For a critique of the use of this 'revolutionary' or 'sovereign' conception of the constituent power to understand the Chilean experience, vid Tschorne (n 35).56 As close observer put it: 'Even though party elites, heavily hit by citizen's mistrust, tied their hands and delegated the decision on constitutional change to the voters, the Agreement is still a product of consensual elite-based comprise' Suarez-Cao (n 39) 256.57 Even if the geographic and temporal data is expanded, the use of referenda in democratic constitution making is prevalent: they have been used in 64% of cases registered between 1900 and 2015, Gabriel Negretto, 'Constitution-Making and Liberal Democracy: The Role of Citizens and Representative Elites' (2020) 18 International Journal of Constitutional Law 206, 220.58 Landau, 'Constituent Power and Constitution Making in Latin America' (n 8). This importance of this difference is difficult to overstate. The impact of 'inclusive constitutional agreements at the level of representative elites' seems to have been more important for the democratic and rule of law content of the constitution, vid Negretto, 'Constitution-Making and Liberal Democracy' (n 57); Gabriel L Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy? Promises and Challenges of Chile's Road to a New Constitution' (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 335, 347–8.59 Gabriel Negretto, 'Constitution Making and Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Role of Procedural Rules' in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America (Edward Elgar 2017) 32.60 Suarez-Cao (n 39) 256.61 'When the ordinary legislature has lost public trust as a representative institution, as is usual in contexts of deep crisis of representation, special conventions are the only politically viable constitution-making body': Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy?' (n 58) 341.62 Couso (n 42) 244–6; Verdugo and Prieto (n 9) 160–5; Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy?' (n 58) 337–8, 341–2.63 For a discussion referring to the Chilean context of the different forms of constitutional change and the respective questions of legality and legitimacy that are raised, see Andrew Arato, 'Democratic Legitimacy and Forms of Constitutional Change' (2017) 24 Constellations 447.64 Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 149–50.65 Negretto, 'Constitution Making and Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Role of Procedural Rules' (n 59) 32.66 A recent account of this dual conception—albeit in an excessively executive-centred version—can be found in Qvortrup and Trueblood (n 12).67 The most important and controversial 'upstream constraint' was the requirement of a qualified majority of two thirds for the approval of both the provisions of the new constitution and the rules of procedure for adopting them. See Prieto and Verdugo (n 55) 269, 276–83, 287; Verdugo and Prieto (n 9) 163–4, 168.68 For the distinction between upstream and downstream constraints and its problems, see Jon Elster, 'Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process' (1995) 45 Duke Law Journal 364, 10–2.69 Negretto, 'Constitution-Making and Liberal Democracy' (n 57) 213; Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy?' (n 58) 349; Sergio Verdugo, 'On the Democratic (but Limited) Virtues of the Chilean Exit Referendum' (IACL-AIDC Blog, 4 October 2022) accessed 29 July 2023.70 Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 154–8.71 Suarez-Cao (n 39) 256.72 Heiss (n 36) 42.73 Echoing views widely shared at the time, 'reserved seats for indigenous people in the Constitutional Convention represented a historic milestone in Chile, such as gender parity meant a historic landmark worldwide': Suarez-Cao (n 39) 259. For example, as regards gender parity, this was seen from the start as a quest by feminist organisations, politicians and scholars for 'the first constitution ever written by an equal number of men and women': Verónica Undurraga, 'Engendering a Constitutional Moment: The Quest for Parity in the Chilean Constitutional Convention' (2020) 18 International Journal of Constitutional Law 466; see also, Piscopo and Siavelis (n 30) 46–7.74 Marcela Ríos, 'Chile's Constitutional Convention: A Triumph of Inclusion' (UNDP Blog, 3 June 2023) accessed 30 July 2023.75 Heiss (n 36) 45.76 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 236–7.77 Heiss (n 36) 43; Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy?' (n 58) 339; Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 237.78 Ivette Hernández and Margarita Rebolledo, 'Chile: Long Path towards a Democratic Constitution' (King's College London Feature) accessed 30 July 2023.79 Issacharoff and Verdugo (n 1) 33.80 Alemán and Navia (n 1) 91; Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 239.81 Couso (n 42) 247; also Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 239–40.82 Heiss (n 36) 34; Alemán and Navia (n 1) 96.83 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 238.84 See accessed 30 July 2023. The majority of the Convention and its supporters tended to distrust and disregard reports in the media and polls about the decline of public trust in the Convention and the increasing disposition to reject the new constitution that it was drafting, because they were seen as biased in favour to the interests invested in the status quo and subservient to the misinformation and scaremongering campaign led by the rejection camp. This view has persisted in some quarters even after the exit referendum, see Siavelis and Piscopo (n 1).85 Negretto, 'Deepening Democracy?' (n 58) 339; Alemán and Navia (n 1) 95–6; Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 234.86 Alemán and Navia (n 1) 94.87 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 240–1.88 Issacharoff and Verdugo (n 1) 35.89 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 234, 240.90 Issacharoff and Verdugo (n 1) 34–5.91 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 242; Alemán and Navia (n 1) 94–5.92 On this see Issacharoff and Verdugo (n 1) 37–40; Alemán and Navia (n 1) 96–9.93 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 239, 241.94 Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 161.95 ibid.96 For the affirmative response bias as a possible (partial) explanation of high rates of success, see Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 146, 161, 163.97 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 97–9, 101–3.98 Larrain, Negretto and Voigt (n 1) 240.99 This would confirm that this huge historical difference in the success rate of referenda might be, at least in part, an indirect regime-type effect, see Elkins and Hudson (n 2) 156, 161.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (ANID) [grant Fondecyt Iniciación number 11200294].