Theater of India-China strategic rivalry: The Indian Ocean
2023; Routledge; Volume: 42; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2023.2236490
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)Maritime Security and History
ResumoAbstractThe strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is increasing in the world in general and in India’s sub-continent in particular. The Indian Ocean is world’s third largest water body on the surface of the Earth and has increasingly become an area of contention between India and China. As their power, interests, capabilities, and economy increases, the competition between the two Asian giants also increases. This competition has the potential to endanger the stability of the region, which is significant for all key players in the region. This article presents the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, gives an overview of India’s strategic interests and China’s growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), analyzes the current power dynamics and gives recommendations on how India should approach and prioritize this strategically significant region. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Beijing has recently announced that it hosted a 19-nation ‘China-Indian Ocean Region (IOR) Forum’ without inviting key player India, at Kunming in south-western Yunnan province on 21 November, 2022. It raises questions about China’s intentions in the IOR. N. S. Moorthy, “Beijing’s Growing Forays: The First China-Indian Ocean Region Forum,” Observer Research Foundation (2022). https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/beijings-growing-forays-the-first-china-indian-ocean-region-forum/2 E. Albert, “Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Council on Foreign Relations (2016).3 R. Tambi, India’s Ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region. Stimson Center. South Asian Voices (2023). https://southasianvoices.org/indias-ambitions-in-the-indian-ocean-region/ (accessed February 15, 2023).4 The largest island in the Chagos archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean. In 1966, US leased it from Britain and is now a key US military base and served as a Launchpad for Air Force Missions in the Middle East.5 As suggested during his speech at Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore in 2009. As cited in Anit Mukherjee, “India as a Net Security Provider: Concept and Impediments.” Policy Brief, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (2014).6 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (2010). Page 60. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf7 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. (2015). Indian Navy. Naval Strategic Publication. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf8 P. K. K. Hangzo, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region,” in ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The Key Maritime Links, edited by S. Bateman, J. Chan, and E. Graham (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), 28–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05921 (accessed March 18, 2023).9 S.S. Captain Parmar, “National Perspectives: India’s Maritime Outlook,” National Maritime Foundation (2022).10 Business Standard. (2019). MEA includes Madagascar, Comoros in Indian Ocean Division. https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/mea-includes-madagascar-comoros-in-indian-ocean-division-119122601252_1.html (Accessed February 8, 2023); The Wire. (2019). MEA expands Indian Ocean Division to include Islands off African Coast. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/external-affairs/ministry-external-affairs-indian-ocean (Accessed February 8, 2023); Hindustan Times. (2021). It is time to reimagine the Indian Ocean. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/it-is-time-to-reimagine-the-indian-ocean-101617111891839.html (Accessed February 8, 2023)11 Ministry of External Affairs. Indo-Pacific Division Briefs. Available at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf12 India Today. (2015). Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Seychelles on 3-nation tour of the region. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/pm-modi-seychelles-visit-victoria-james-alix-michel-ajit-doval-s-jaishankar-243755-2015-03-11 (Accessed on 8 February, 2023)13 Joint Press Statement of the 5th NSA level meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave held on 9-10 March, 2022 in Maldives. https://mfa.gov.lk/5th-nsa-level-meeting/#:∼:text=Delegations%20of%20the%20founding%20members. Participants were founding members- Maldives, India, and Sri Lanka with new member- Mauritius. Bangladesh and Seychelles participated as Observers.14 The policy evolves over a period of time, but especially after Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office in 2014, he enunciated the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy. 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The main objective is to ensure the safety, security, and stability of the maritime domain.17 Established by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President of France Francois Hollande on November 30, 2015, ISA’s objective is to scale up solar energy, reduce the cost of solar power generation through aggregation of demand for solar finance, technologies, innovation, research and development, and capacity building.18 Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a global Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) on 23 September, 2019, at the United Nations (UN) Climate Action Summit 2019 held in New York The Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) is a partnership of national governments, UN agencies and programmes, multilateral development banks and financing mechanisms, the private sector, and knowledge institutions that aims to promote the resilience of new and existing infrastructure systems to climate and disaster risks in support of sustainable development.19 A. 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Ministry of Defence. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1646978 (accessed February 10, 2023).22 Modernisation budget relates to capital outlay on aircrafts and aero-engines, heavy and medium vehicles, rolling stock, Rashtriya Rifles (Army); aircrafts and aero-engines, heavy and medium vehicles, Naval Fleet, Naval Dockyard/Projects, Joint Staff and Other equipment (Navy); and aircrafts and aero-engines, heavy and medium vehicles and other equipment (Air Force).23 Defence Budget Hiked 13% to Rupees 5.94 Lakh Crore Amid Tensions With China. (2023). NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/defence-budget-hiked-13-to-rs-5-94-lakh-crore-amid-tensions-with-china-3745578 (accessed March 18, 2023).24 S. S. C. Rajiv and A. K. Singh, “Defence Budget 2023-2024: Trend Analysis,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies And Analysis (2023).25 Ministry of Defence. http://www.mod.gov.in/faqs/q-1-what-are-current-force-levels-indian-navy-what-are-ongoing-projects-what-steps-are-being (accessed March 19, 2023).26 Ministry of Defence. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1884552. (accessed March 19, 2023).27 Ministry of Defence. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1856230 (accessed March 19, 2023).28 The agreements are administrative arrangements facilitating access to military facilities for exchange of fuel and provisions on mutual agreement simplifying logistical support and increasing operational turnaround of the military when operating away from India.29 LEMOA gives access, to both countries, to designated military facilities on either side for the purpose of refuelling and replenishment.30 It establishes the enabling framework for closer cooperation between the armed forces of both countries in reciprocal provision of supplies and services while engaged in bilateral training activities, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian International Relief and other mutually agreed activities. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002896.html31 The agreement will facilitate reciprocal access to military logistics facilities, allow more complex joint military exercise and improve interoperability between the security forces of the two nations.32 It is an administrative agreement that would enable the militaries of both the countries to access logistics and support facilities at each other’s bases and ports. RELOS agreement with Russia would grant access to Russian naval port facilities in the Arctic, thus enhancing Indian Navy’s reach and operational experience in Polar waters.33 D. M. Baruah, “Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (2022).34 D. Brewster, “A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean,” in India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean, edited by David Brewster (India: Oxford University Press, 2018).35 B. Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing Going to do with it?,” CNN (2021). https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/05/china/china-world-biggest-navy-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html (accessed March 18, 2023).36 K. Mizokami, “China just Commissioned Three Warships in a Single Day,” Popular Mechanics (2021). https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a36232947/china-commissions-three-warships-in-one-day/ (accessed March 18, 2023).37 China signed an unprecedented security pact with the Solomon Islands, sparking regional concerns of a future Chinese military presence there. B. Harding, and C. Pohle-Anderson, “China’s Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific Islands,” United States Institute of Peace (2022). https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/chinas-search-permanent-military-presence-pacific-islands38 High level visits have been taking place between the defence forces of China and Madagascar and a military base could be set up by Beijing in the island. D. R. Chaudhury, “China Eyes Military Base in Indian Ocean Region in Madagascar,” The Economic Times (2022). https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-eyes-military-base-in-indian-ocean-region-in-madagascar/articleshow/93008091.cms (accessed February 16, 2023).39 The island chain is a geographical security concept used to illustrate a defensive or offensive perimeter by linking islands and other larger land masses together. W. Vorndick, “China’s Reach Has Grown; So Should the Island Chains. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,” (2018). https://amti.csis.org/chinas-reach-grown-island-chains/40 S. K. Mishra, “The Colonial Origins of Territorial Disputes in South Asia,” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 3, no. 1 (2016): 5–23.Additional informationNotes on contributorsIndu KrothwalMs. Indu Krothwal (indukrothwal@gmail.com) is pursuing PhD in Political Science from Lovely Professional University, Punjab, India. She is currently working on her thesis titled China’s increasing influence in the South Asian Region and Emerging Regional Imperatives. She has Master’s Degree in Political Science from Delhi University. Academically, She has been awarded with a gold medal during her undergraduate program, apart from it, she is also awarded with National Eligibility Test (NET), which is the examination for determining the eligibility for the post of assistant professor and Junior Research Fellowship (JRF). JRF is a prestigious award, offering scholarship for conducting research work. She is now promoted to Senior Research Fellowship (SRF). She has written for various journals and contributed chapters in books. She is regularly engaged in attending conferences so as to understand and disseminate the research interests related to her topic. Her area of interests include India-China relations; Changing dynamics with the rise of China; South Asian Region; Security architecture in South Asian Region; Maritime Strategies of India and China.Neha KumarDr. Neha Kumar (nehafromjnu@gmail.com) has completed her PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, INDIA and Post Doc from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, INDIA. She has experience of working in various reputed think tanks which are located in New Delhi. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), United Service Institution of India (USI) and Center for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS), to name few. She has published more than 60 articles in various newspapers, journals, magazines and internet on the issues related to International Relations. She has also authored one book titled ‘The US Ballistic Missile Defence: International Chaos or Deterrence,’ Knowledge World, Delhi. Presently, She is working as Assistant Professor, Dept of Political Science, Lovely Professional University (LPU), Phagwara, INDIA. She is also working on a project titled “Global South, Nuclear Apartheid: Issues of Nuclear Security” which is funded by Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). Her areas of expertise include International Relations/Nuclear Strategy/Nuclear Security/Nuclear Deterrence/Ballistic Missile Defence.
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