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Reaching the limit: access to remedy through nonjudicial mechanisms for victims of business-related human rights abuses

2023; Routledge; Volume: 28; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13642987.2023.2251002

1744-053X

Kari Otteburn,

Regulation and Compliance Studies

ABSTRACTDue to barriers to remedy through national and international legal fora, nonjudicial mechanisms (NJMs) are very often the only options for victims of transnational business-related human rights abuses (TBHRA) to seek remedy, even for serious and gross violations. Yet, it has been well-established that NJMs have been largely ineffective in providing access to remedy. Based on an assumption that improving the effectiveness of NJMs will result in better remedy outcomes for rightsholders, a variety of prescriptions have been put forth to make NJMs more effective. However, through a two-step empirical analysis of cases involving serious instances of TBHRA handled by the National Contact Points for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, this article demonstrates that, even when operating effectively, NJMs are unequipped to provide certain forms of remedy and are particularly ill-suited to provide remedy proportional to serious instances of TBHRA. This article therefore advocates for a more nuanced understanding of the degrees of various forms of remedy and what NJMs are truly capable of providing, in order to better situate NJMs within the overall remedial architecture and to aid selection of the appropriate forum.KEYWORDS: Access to remedynonjudicial mechanismsforced evictionOECD National Contact Pointsbusiness and human rightsgrievance mechanisms Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 UN Human Rights Council (HRC), ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011) (UNGPs), Commentary to Principle 27.2 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 25.3 See Benjamin Thompson, ‘Determining Criteria to Evaluate Outcomes of Businesses’ Provision of Remedy: Applying a Human Rights-Based Approach’, Business and Human Rights Journal 2, no. 1 (2017); Juho Saloranta, ‘The EU Whistleblowing Directive: An Opportunity for (Operationalizing) Corporate Human Rights Grievance Mechanisms?’ European Business Organization Law Review 22 (2021); Kinnari Bhatt and Gamze Erdem Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points as Sites of Effective Remedy: New Expressions of the Role and Rule of Law within Market Globalization?’ Business and Human Rights Journal 6, no. 3 (2021); Mark Wielga and James Harrison, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms in Providing Access to Remedy for Rightsholders: A Case Study of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’, Business and Human Rights Journal 6, no. 1 (2021).4 UNGPs, para 25.5 HRC, ‘Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuse’, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/32/19 (May 10, 2016); Axel Marx et al., ‘Access to Legal Remedies for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Third Countries’ (Brussels: European Parliament, 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2019)603475 (accessed April 18, 2023); Gwynne Skinner et al., ‘The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations of Transnational Business’ (International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, CORE, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, 2013), https://corporatejustice.org/publications/the-third-pillar-access-to-judicial-remedies-for-human-rights-violations-by-transnational-business/ (accessed April 18, 2022); Erika R. George and Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Access to Remedy’, in Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours, ed. Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Iman Prihandono, ‘Barriers to Transnational Human Rights Litigation against Transnational Corporations: The Need for Cooperation between Home and Host Countries’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 3, no. 6 (2011); Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2018).6 OHCHR’s ARP, launched in 2014, carried out a sweeping exploration of access to remedy through judicial mechanisms, state-based NJMs, and non-state-based NJMs, https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/ohchr-accountability-and-remedy-project (accessed April 18, 2023); see also G20, ‘G20 Leaders’ Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World’ (2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23955/g20-hamburg-leaders_-communiqu%C3%A9.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).7 Exceptions include Fiona Haines and Kate Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation and Community Access to Remedy’, Regulation & Governance 14 (2020); Martijn Scheltema, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes of Non-Judicial Mechanisms’, The Dovenschmidt Quarterly 1, no. 4 (2013); and the second and third reports of the ARP: HRC, ‘Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuse through State-based Non-judicial Mechanisms’, A/HRC/38/20 (May 14, 2018), 3; HRC, ‘Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Victims of Business-related Human Rights Abuse through Non-state-based Grievance Mechanisms’, A/HRC/44/32 (May 19, 2020).8 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 25.9 Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’, 192.10 HRC, ‘State-based Non-judicial Mechanisms’, 3; HRC, ‘Non-State-based Grievance Mechanisms’.11 Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’; Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’; HRC ‘State-based Non-judicial Mechanisms’.12 Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’, 842.13 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 27.14 Samantha Balaton-Chrimes and Fiona Haines, ‘The Depoliticisation of Accountability Processes for Land-Based Grievances, and the IFC CAO’, Global Policy 6, no. 4 (2015): 447.15 Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’, 842; Balaton-Chrimes and Haines, ‘Depoliticisation of Accountability’, 447.16 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 27.17 HRC, ‘State-based Non-Judicial Mechanisms’, para 24.18 Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’; HRC, ‘State-based Non-judicial Mechanisms’; Roxana Altholz and Chris Sullivan, ‘Accountability & International Financial Institutions: Community Perspectives on the World Bank’s Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’ (International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California Berkeley School of Law, March 2017), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Accountability-International-Financial-Institutions.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023), 4.19 Andi Baaij, ‘The Potential of Arbitration as Effective Remedy in Business and Human Rights: Will the Hague Rules be Enough?’ Business and Human Rights Journal 7, no. 2 (2022).20 Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’.21 Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’.22 Gierdre Jokubauskaite and David Rossati, ‘A Tragedy of Juridification in International Development Finance’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 43, no. 1 (2022): 43.23 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 26.24 HRC, ‘Non-State-based Grievance Mechanisms’, 8–9.25 Linda C. Reif, ‘Business and Human Rights: What Role for National Human Rights Institutions?’ in Research Handbook on Global Governance, Business and Human Rights, eds. Axel Marx, Geert Van Calster and Jan Wouters (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2022).26 CESCR ‘General comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities’, E/C.12/GC/24 (10 August 2017), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5beaecba4.html (accessed April 18, 2023), para 39.27 CESCR, General Comment 24, para 39, citing CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant’, E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998), https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079d6.html (accessed April 18, 2023).28 See Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’; MSI Integrity, ‘Not Fit-for-Purpose: The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and Global Governance’ (July 2020), https://www.msi-integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/MSI_SUMMARY_REPORT.FORWEBSITE.FINAL_.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).29 See Natalie Bugalski, ‘The Demise of Accountability at the World Bank?’ American University International Law Review 31, no. 1 (2016); Kinnari I. Bhatt, Concessionaires, Financiers and Communities Implementing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land in Transnational Development Projects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), cp 4.30 Caitlin Daniel et al., ‘Remedy Remains Rare’ (OECD Watch, June 2015), https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2015/06/Remedy-Remains-Rare.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023); Marian G. Ingrams, Joseph Wilde-Ramsing and Janna Fleuren, ‘Get Fit: Closing Gaps in the OECD Guidelines to Make Them Fit for Purpose’ (OECD Watch, June 2021), https://www.oecdwatch.org/get-fit-closing-gaps-in-the-oecd-guidelines-to-make-them-fit-for-purpose/ (accessed April 18, 2023); Karin Buhmann, ‘National Contact Points under OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Institutional Diversity Affecting Assessments of the Delivery of Access to Remedy’, in Accountability, International Business Operations and the Law: Providing Justice for Corporate Human Rights Violations in Global Value Chains, eds. Liesbeth Enneking et al., (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020); Samantha Balaton-Chrimes and Fiona Haines, ‘Redress and Corporate Human Rights Harms: An Analysis of New Governance and the POSCO Odisha Project’, Globalizations 14, no. 4 (2017); Bhatt and Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points’.31 Iman Prihandono, Nadirsyah Hosen, and Keely Boom, ‘Komnas HAM’s Human Rights Jurisdiction over Businesses Involved in the Haze Crisis’, Indonesia Law Review 11, no. 1 (2021); Rene Wolfsteller, ‘The Unrealized Potential of National Human Rights Institutions in Business and Human Rights Regulation: Conditions for Effective Engagement and Proposal for Reform’, Human Rights Review 23, no. 1 (2022).32 Sarah Knuckey and Eleanor Jenkin, ‘Company-Created Remedy Mechanisms for Serious Human Rights Abuses: A Promising New Frontier for the Right to Remedy?’ International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 6 (2015); Thompson, ‘Criteria to Evaluate Outcomes’.33 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations’, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 10 (2002); Antoine C. Buyse, ‘Lost and Regained? Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights Violations in the Context of International Law’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law (Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht) 68 (2008).34 Buyse, ‘Lost and Regained?’35 Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez, ‘The UN “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”: Methodological Challenges to Assessing the Third Pillar: Access to Effective Remedy’, Nordic Journal of Human Rights 36, no. 4 (2018); Buhmann, ‘Institutional Diversity’; Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’.36 For example, the OECD used the UNGP criteria to establish almost identical criteria for the NCPs, see section 5. The HRC also continues to use the UNGP definition of remedy in the ARP project (see note 8). See also Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’, 72.37 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 25.38 UNGPs, Principle 31.39 UNGPs, Principle 31.40 Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’; Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’; van Huijstee and Wilde-Ramsing, ‘Remedy is the Reason: Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms and Access to Remedy’, in Research Handbook on Human Rights and Business, ed. Surya Deva and David Birchall (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2020); May Miller-Dawkins, Macdonald, and Shelley Marshall, ‘Beyond Effectiveness Criteria: The Possibilities and Limits of Transnational Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms’ (Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Report Series, Non-Judicial Human Rights Redress Mechanisms Project, 2016).41 Altholz and Sullivan, ‘Accountability & International Financial Institutions’; Thompson, ‘Criteria to Evaluate Outcomes’; Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’; Bhatt and Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points’.42 See Haines and Macdonald, ‘Nonjudicial Business Regulation’; Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’; Bhatt and Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points’; Altholz and Sullivan, ‘Accountability & International Financial Institutions’.43 Bhatt and Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points’, 14.44 Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’.45 Bhatt and Türkelli, ‘OECD National Contact Points’; Thompson, ‘Criteria to Evaluate Outcomes’.46 Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘The Divergent Practices of NCPs under OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Time for a More Uniform Approach?’ International Labor Rights Case Law 7, no. 1 (2021); Scheltema, ‘Effectiveness of Remedy Outcomes’.47 Michele Ford, Michael Gillan, and Htwe Htwe Thein, ‘Supranational Grievance Mechanisms and Firm-level Employment Relations’, Industrial Relations Journal 51, no. 4 (2020); Juan Carlos Ochoa Sanchez, ‘The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation’, Nordic Journal of International Law 84, no. 1 (2015).48 UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 25.49 UN, ‘Basic Principles’.50 Ibid., para 22.51 The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), September 13, 1928, Permanent Court of International Justice, Merits, 47, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_09/28_Usine_de_Chorzow_Competence_Arret.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023); Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.52 UN, ‘Basic Principles’; UNGA, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, A/72/162 (July 18, 2017).53 See Katie Boyle and Edel Hughes, ‘Identifying Routes to Remedy for Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 1 (2018).54 UNGA, ‘Report of the Working Group’.55 Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’, 77.56 Thompson, ‘Criteria to Evaluate Outcomes’.57 OHCHR, ‘Forced Evictions’ (Fact Sheet No. 25/Rev.1, OHCHR, 2014), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FS25.Rev.1.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).58 One criteria, that NJMs be ‘rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally recognized human rights’, which assesses substantive outcomes, is not included in the analytical framework because the purpose of this step is to identify those NCPs that meet procedural effectiveness criteria. Outcomes are evaluated at a later stage.59 OECD, ‘Structures and Procedures of National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (OECD, 2018), 5.60 Sander van’t Foort, ‘The History of National Contact Points and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, Rechtsgeschichte 25 (2017).61 Kari Otteburn and Axel Marx, ‘Seeking Remedy for Corporate Human Rights Abuses: What Is the Contribution of the OECD National Contact Points?’ in Research Handbook on Global Governance, Business and Human Rights, eds. Axel Marx, Geert Van Calster and Jan Wouters (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2022).62 OECD, ‘Responsible Business Conduct: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ (accessed April 18, 2023).63 OECD, Providing Access to Remedy: 20 Years and the Road Ahead (Paris: OECD, 2020), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/NCPs-for-RBC-providing-access-to-remedy-20-years-and-the-road-ahead.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023), 7.64 ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition’ (OECD, 2011), 73.65 Axel Marx and Jan Wouters, ‘Rule Intermediaries in Global Labor Governance’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 670, no. 1 (2017); Birgitte Egelund Olsen and Karsten Engsig Sørensen, ‘Strengthening the Enforcement of CSR Guidelines: Finding a New Balance between Hard Law and Soft Law’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 41, no. 1 (2014); John Southalan, ‘Human Rights and Business Lawyers: The 2011 Watershed’, Australian Law Journal 90, no. 12 (2016).66 Ingrams, ‘Get Fit’.67 NCP Brazil, ‘Final Statement: Forum Suape et al. v. Van Oord et al.’ (June 5, 2020), https://www.gov.br/produtividade-e-comercio-exterior/pt-br/assuntos/camex/pcn/produtos/relatorios-finais/20200605_final-declaration-van-oord.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023), 29.68 Otteburn and Marx, ‘Seeking Remedy’.69 EC and IDI, ‘Specific instance under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises submitted to the Australian National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines by: IDI and EC Against ANZ, concerning financial services provided to Phnom Penh Sugar Company’ (October 2014), https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/dlm_uploads/2021/03/Specific%20Instance%20against%20ANZ%20(FINAL).pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).70 NCP Australia, ‘Final Statement’ (June 2018), https://ausncp.gov.au/sites/default/files/inline-files/11_AusNCP_Final_Statement.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).71 NCP Australia, ‘Final Statement’, 14.72 Eang Vuthy, qtd in IDI, ‘ANZ bank issued rare rebuke by Australian oversight body’ (Press Release, October 2018), https://www.oecdwatch.org/download/28743/ (accessed April 18, 2023).73 Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie, ‘ANZ Failed to Meet Human Rights Standards: Government Report’, The Sydney Morning Herald, October 11, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/anz-failed-to-meet-human-rights-standards-in-cambodia-government-report-20181011-p508z2.html (accessed April 18, 2023).74 Vuthy, qtd in IDI, ‘Rare Rebuke’.75 Johan Frijns (BankTrack) and Joseph Wilde-Ramsing (OECD Watch) to Shayne Elliot (ANZ), ‘Compensation for families displaced by Phnom Penh Sugar’ (October 29, 2018), https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/dlm_uploads/2021/03/Letter%20to%20ANZ%20by%20BankTrack%20and%20OECD%20Watch.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).76 Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry’, https://web.archive.org/web/20190116201002/https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx (accessed May 22, 2022).77 Holly Robertson, ‘ANZ Will Consider Compensating Cambodians Forced off Farms for Sugar Plantation’, ABC News (October 12, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-12/anz-rebuked-over-loan-to-cambodian-sugar-firm/10370648 (accessed April 18, 2023); Sarah Danckert, ‘‘I Misspoke’: ANZ Boss Backflips on Compensation Comments’, The Sydney Morning Herald, October 12, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/i-misspoke-anz-boss-backflips-on-compensation-comments-20181012-p509ai.html (accessed April 18, 2023).78 Shayne Elliott to David Pred (IDI) and Eang Vuthy (EC), ‘ANCP report regarding Phnom Penh Sugar Co.’ (December 17, 2018), https://www.oecdwatch.org/download/28287/ (accessed April 18, 2023); IDI and EC, ‘ANZ Declines to “Do the Right Thing” for Displaced Cambodian Farmers’ (Statement by IDI and EC for the ANZ Banking Group Annual General Meeting, 18 December 2018), https://www.oecdwatch.org/download/28745/ (accessed April 18, 2023).79 IDI and EC, ‘ANZ Declines’; Human Rights Law Centre, ‘ANZ to face questions from shareholders about its human rights record’ (December 19, 2018), https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/2018/12/19/anz-to-face-questions-from-shareholders-about-its-human-rights-record (accessed April 18, 2023).80 Australia NCP, ‘Follow Up Statement Regarding complaint submitted by Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive Development International on behalf of Cambodian families’ (February 27, 2020), https://ausncp.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-02/Complaint_11_statement.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023), 4.81 Australia NCP, ‘Follow Up Statement’.82 IDI and EC, ‘ANZ Agrees to Landmark Settlement with Cambodian Farmers Displaced by Sugar Company It Financed’ (Press Release, February 27, 2020), https://www.oecdwatch.org/download/28747/ (accessed April 18, 2023).83 OECD, ‘Providing Access to Remedy’; only three specific instances resulting in financial compensation are identified in the report.84 Fivas, ‘Murum and Baram: Norconsult’s non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in connection with hydropower development in Malaysia – Complaint to the Norwegian NCP’ (Press Release, August 2014), https://www.oecdwatch.org/download/28573/ (accessed April 18, 2023).85 Fivas, ‘Murum and Baram’.86 NCP Norway, ‘Final Statement Of The Norwegian OECD NCP: Mediated Outcome Between The Association For International Water Studies (Fivas) and Norconsult AS’ (June 2015), https://files.nettsteder.regjeringen.no/wpuploads01/blogs.dir/263/files/2015/11/Slutterkl%C3%A6ring-FIVAS-og-Norconsult_FINAL.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).87 Norconsult, ‘Finalised mediation process with the OECD National Contact Point’ (Press release, June 25, 2015), https://www.norconsult.com/press/news/finalised-mediation-process-with-the-oecd-national-contact-point/ (accessed April 18, 2023); Fivas, ‘Norconsult admits risk of violations of indigenous rights in hydropower project in Sarawak’ (June 23, 2015), https://fivas.org/frontsak/norconsult-innrommer-risiko-for-urfolksrettar-i-vasskraftprosjekt-i-sarawak/ (accessed April 18, 2023).88 NCP Norway, ‘Successful OECD mediation between FIVAS and Norconsult’ (June 23, 2015) https://www.responsiblebusiness.no/news/successful-oecd-mediation-between-norconsult-and-fivas/ (accessed May 22, 2022).89 Cristina Aibar-Guzmán, Isabel-María García-Sánchez and Celia Salvador-González, ‘Do Codes of Conduct Really Mean a Change in Corporate Practices with Regard to Human Rights? Evidence from the Largest Garment Companies Worldwide’ The International Journal of Human Rights 27, no. 2 (2022).90 NCP Norway, ‘Initial Assessment FIVAS vs Norconsult AS’ (January 2015), https://files.nettsteder.regjeringen.no/wpuploads01/blogs.dir/263/files/2015/11/20150106-Initial-assessment-Norconsult_final.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).91 Ola Norderhaug and Guro Cedell (Norconsult), ‘Complaint to the OECD National Contact Point Norway: FIVAS–Norconsult. Follow-up’ (October 10, 2014), https://files.nettsteder.regjeringen.no/wpuploads01/blogs.dir/263/files/2015/11/141010-Brev-til-OECD_en-FINAL.pdf (accessed April 18, 2023).92 NCP UK, ‘Initial Assessment: Complaint from RAID and ACIDH Concering ENRC Mining Sites in the DRC’ (September 2013), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/846983/bis-13-1220-initial-assessment-uk-national-contact-point-eurasian-natural-resources-corporation.pdf (accessed May 22, 2022).93 NCP UK, ‘Initial Assessment’.94 Ibid.95 Ibid., 9–10.96 NCP UK, ‘RAID and ENRC: Final Statement after Examination of Complaint’ (February 2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/846978/BIS-16-156-raid-and-enrc-final-statement-after-complaint.pdf (accessed May 22, 2022).97 NCP UK, ‘Final Statement’.98 Ibid., 9.99 RAID, ‘ENRC (Now Eurasian Resources Group) Failed to Respect Human Rights, Says UK Government Watchdog’ (March 12, 2016), https://www.raid-uk.org/blog/enrc-now-eurasian-resources-group-failed-respect-human-rights-says-uk-government-watchdog (accessed April 18, 2023).100 NCP UK, ‘Follow up statement: RAID complaint to UK NCP about ENRC’ (April 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/raid-complaint-to-uk-ncp-about-enrc/follow-up-statement-raid-complaint-to-uk-ncp-about-enrc (accessed April 18, 2023).101 NCP UK, ‘Follow Up Statement’.102 Wielga and Harrison, ‘Non-State-Based Grievance Mechanisms’.103 Jokubauskaite and Rossati, ‘Tragedy of Juridification’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsKari OtteburnKari Otteburn is a doctoral research fellow at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (KU Leuven). Her research is generally situated in the fields of business and human rights and global sustainability governance, with a focus on corporate accountability, access to remedy, labour rights, and compliance and the regulation of global economic activities.