Present tense technological competition: Natural resources, information, and American national security
2023; Routledge; Volume: 42; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2023.2236491
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
ResumoAbstractContemporary debates surrounding emerging military technologies and international security tend to focus exclusively on the technical traits of such capabilities in an attempt to determine if, once operational, they will increase the likelihood of armed conflict in the future or not. This article argues, however, that the race to acquire the natural resources and information that are critical for developing, manufacturing, and operating emerging military technologies had become a major source of global discord and determinately contributed to the contemporary great power competition among the United States, China, and Russia. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Reuben Steff, Joe Burton, Simona R. 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Sayler, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 1.5 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow's Terrorists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).6 Bob Work, “Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy,” April 28, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/753482/remarks-by-d%20eputy-secretary-work-on-third-offset-strategy/ (accessed June 29, 2021).7 The share of private investements in Research and Development (R&D) in FY 2019 was more than 70% whereas the share of Federal investment was approximately 21%. See Congressional Research Service, U.S. Research and Development Funding and Performance: Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 1–2.8 Ina Fried, “Pentagon's Bridge to Tech's Private Sector,” Axios, August 19, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/08/19/pentagon-tech-private-sector-defense-innovation (accessed September 7, 2022).9 For example: Amy J. Nelson, “Innovation Acceleration, Digitization, and the Crisis of Nonproliferation Systems,” The Nonproliferation Review (March 2022), 1–21.10 See for example, Jon R. Lindsay, Information Technology and Military Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).11 Jim Garamone, “Esper Says Artificial Intelligence Will Change the Battlefield,” DOD News, September 9, 2020.12 “’Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day,” RT, September 1, 2017.13 For a good review of the literature on arms races, see Charles L. Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 251–76.14 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), 32–3.15 See for example: Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry and Holt, 2002) and Philippe Le Billon, “The Geopolitical Economy of ‘Resource Wars’,” Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 1–28.16 David S. Abraham, The Elements of Power: Gadgets, Guns, and the Struggle for a Sustainable Future in the Rare Metal Age (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 157.17 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Entanglement of Energy, Grand Strategy, and International Security,” in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 34.18 Jeffrey D. Wilson, International Resource Politics in the Asia-Pacific: The Political Economy of Conflict and Cooperation (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017), 8.19 Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 12.20 REEs include lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium (Pr), neodymium (Nd), promethium (Pm), samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), gadolinium (Gd), terbium (Tb), dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium (Th), yterrbium (Yb), lutetium (Lu), and the transition elements scandium (Sc) and yttrium (Y).21 Keith Veronese, Rare: The High-stakes Race to Satisfy Our Need for the Scarcest Metals on Earth (New York: Prometheus, 2015), 26.22 Jeffrey D. Wilson, “China’s Rare Earths and Global Resource Security,” Policy Background Paper, No. 5 (September 2011), 1.23 Ryan David Kiggins, “The Strategic and Security Implications of Rare Earths,” in The Political Economy of Rare Earth Elements: Rising Powers and Technological Change, ed. Ryan David Kiggins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Chap. 1.24 Vladimir Hizhnyakov et al., “Rare Earth Ions Doped Mixed Crystals for Fast Quantum Computers With Optical Frequency Qubits,” Optics Communications 485 (2021): 1–7.25 Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli, “China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements,” Parameters 52, no. 1 (2022): 57–72. For an excellent historical survey of the American rare earth industry, see Joanne Abel Goldman, “The U.S. Rare Earth Industry: Its Growth and Decline,” The Journal of Policy History 26, no. 2 (2014): 139–66.26 U.S. Department of Energy, Critical Materials Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, December 2010), 12.27 Gary A. 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This U.S. Mine Is Trying to Change That,” Politico, December 14, 2022.30 Tom Daly, “Minmetals Confirms China Rare Earths Merger, Creating New Giant,” Reuters, December 22, 2021.31 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021, 133.32 Ibid.33 United States Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, February 2016), 6.34 Alexandra Stevenson, “‘Weaponized’ Currency and Mining Limits: China’s Responses to Trump Take Shape,” New York Times, August 8, 2019.35 Department of Defense, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2018), 36.36 Timothy Puko, “Pentagon Invests in Strategic Metals Mine, Seeking to Blunt Chinese Dominance,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2020.37 Critical Materials Institute, Annual Report 2020 (Ames, IA: Critical Materials Institute, 2020), 7.38 Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “Trump Executive Order Targets Rare Earths Minerals and China,” Defense News, October 1, 2020.39 Demetri Sevastopulo and Aime Williams, “Joe Biden Orders Review of Critical Foreign Supply Chains,” Financial Times, February 24, 2021.40 House Armed Services Committee, Report of the Defense Critical Supply Chain Task Force (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, July 2021), 17–18.41 For a historical survey of China’s REEs policy, see: Yuzhou Shen, Ruthann Moomy, and Roderick G. Eggert, “China’s Public Policies Toward Rare Earths, 1975–2018,” Mineral Economics 33 (2020): 127–51.42 Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths.43 “Xi Requires New Advances in Rise of Central China,” Xinhua¸ May 22, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/22/c_138080944.htm (accessed June 3, 2021).44 “US Pressure Prompts New List System,” Global Times, June 9, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153518.shtml45 Sun Yu in Beijing and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth Export Curbs to Hobble U.S. Defence Industry,” Financial Times, February 16, 2021.46 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan: China Rare-Earth Ban Could Hurt Economy,” Associated Press, September 28, 2010.47 Jaebeom Kwon, “Taming Neighbors: Exploring China's Economic Statecraft to Change Neighboring Countries’ Policies and Their Effects,” Asian Perspective 44, no. 1 (2020): 112–13.48 See for example: Eugene Gholz and Llewelyn Hughes, “Market Structure and Economic Sanctions: The 2010 Rare Earth Elements Episode as a Pathway Case of Market Adjustment,” Review of International Political Economy 28, no. 3 (2021): 611–34.49 Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations After the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain (New York: Routledge, 2013).50 For an excellent analysis of American economic warafere against Japan during the interwar period, see Edward S. Miller. Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 2007).51 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” New York Times, September 22, 2010.52 Clinton Hopes Rare Earth Trade to Continue Unabated,” Reuters, October 28, 2010.53 Judy Dempsey, “U.S. and Europe Urged to Join Forces on Rare Earth Metals,” New York Times, October 25, 2010.54 Mark Landler, “Obama Files a Complaint Over China,” New York Times, March 13, 2012.55 A.S. Buynovskiy et al., “Current State of the Rare Earth Industry in Russia and Siberia,” Procedia Chemistry 11 (2014): 126–32.56 Yuliya Fedorinova, “Russia Holds Rare Earths But Mines Little. 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Kramer, “In the Russian Arctic, the First Stirrings of a Very Cold War,” New York Times, May 22, 2021.68 Nick Paton Walsh, “Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic,” CNN, April 5, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-nato-military-intl-cmd/index.html (accessed June 2, 2021).69 Sebastian Sprenger, “Russian Military Buildup in the Arctic Has Northern NATO Members Uneasy,” Defense News, April 12, 2021.70 “Russia Calls for Military Meetings Between Arctic States as Tensions Rise,” Reuters, May 20, 2021.71 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, January 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (accessed June 16, 2021).72 Karl Yan, “The Railroad Economic Belt: Grand Strategy, Economic Statecraft, and a New Type of International Relations,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23, no. 2 (2021): 262–79.73 United States Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, Chief of Staff Paper #3, January 2021, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/15/9944046e/regaining-arctic-dominance-us-army-in-the-arctic-19-january-2021-unclassified.pdf (accessed June 24, 2021).74 “Arctic Littoral Strike: Marines, Norwegian Military Conduct Exercise In Northern Norway,” April 8, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2565220/arctic-littoral-strike-marines-norwegian-military-conduct-exercise-in-northern/ (accessed June 15, 2021).75 Matthew Lee, US, Russia At Odds Over Military Activity in the Arctic, Associated Press, May 20, 2021.76 Edward Wong, “Bond Between China and Russia Alarms U.S. and Europe Amid Ukraine Crisis,” New York Times, February 20, 2022.77 Murray Brewster, “NATO Chief Warns Canada that Russia, China hHave esigns on the Arctic,” CBC News, August 26, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-stoltenberg-trudeau-russia-china-1.6563825 (accessed September 11, 2022).78 Jon Levine, “President Biden to Name Arctic Ambassador,” New York Post, August 27, 2022.79 In this paper, cyber espionage is defined as a form of cyberattack perpetrated or sanctioned by state-actors and designed to collect information about emerging technologies to enhance technological and/or military modernization. On cyber espionage as part of interstate rivalry, see Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 67–70.80 NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm (accessed June 21, 2021).81 Yu-Ming Liou, Paul Musgrave, and J. Furman Daniel, “The Imitation Game: Why Don’t Rising Powers Innovate Their Militaries More?” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 157–74.82 For a dissenting view, see Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43, no. 3 (2018/19): 141–89.83 On Soviet nuclear espionage, see: Gregg Herken, “Target Enormoz: Soviet Nuclear Espionage on the West Coast of the United States, 1942–1950,” Journal of Cold War Studie 11, no. 3 (2009): 68–90.84 Robert Farley, “Intellectual Property, Cyber Espionage, and Military Diffusion,” Global Security and Intelligence Studies 1, no. 2 (2016): 6–7.85 Emphasis added. See: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, October 2011), i.86 “UK to reform spy laws to tackle threats from cyber and state influence,” Reuters, May 10, 2022.87 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2020, Vol. 2 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Paris, 2021), 10.88 Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin, and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (ed.), Global Innovation Index 2020 (Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2020), xxxii89 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2018), 5.90 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, pp. 4, 7.91 On China’s various technology acquisition programs China has been executing, see: William C. Hannas and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, eds., China’s Quest for Foreign Technology: Beyond Espionage (New York: Routledge, 2021).92 Luna Sun, “China Will ‘Exhaust All Means’ to Lure Global Talent, Despite Push for Tech Self-Sufficiency, Xi Jinping Says,” South China Morning Post, December 16, 2021.93 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Survey of Chinese-linked Espionage in the United States Since 2000.” https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/210723_Chinese_Espionage_timeline.pdf (accessed September 14, 2022).94 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” Remarks delivered at the Asia Society, March 11, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-president-united-states-an (accessed June 8, 2021).95 Christopher Drew, “Stolen Data Is Tracked to Hacking at Lockheed,” New York Times, June 3, 2011.96 Demetri Sevastopulo and Geoff Dyer, “Obama And Xi In Deal On Cyber Espionage,” Financial Times, September 25 2015.97 Quoted in Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 8.98 Department of Justice, “First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue,” October 6, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china-law-enforcement-and-cybersecurity-dialogue (accessed June 8, 2021).99 Dennis C. 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Hodgson, Yuliya Shokh, and Jonathan Balk, Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: Case Studies in Response Options to Cyber Incidents Affecting U.S. Government Networks and Implications for Future Response (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2022), v.124 Michael O'Hanlon, Forecasting Change in Military Technology, 2020-2040 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018), 4.125 James Stavridis, “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg, March 4, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon (accessed June 4, 2021).126 “China, Russia agree to Jointly Build "Ice Silk Road",” Xinhua, July 4, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-07/04/c_136417241.htm (accessed June 16, 2021).127 On the role of the Arctic in the Sino-American-Russian triangle, see: Rebecca Pincus, “Three-Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 40–63.128 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2021), 20.129 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The DHS Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years, 2020-2024 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 26.130 White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” July 27, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/27/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence/ (accessed July 30, 2021).131 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (accessed September 15, 2022).132 Christian Lange, “Internationalism,” Nobel Lecture, December 13, 1921, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1921/lange/lecture/ (accessed June 30, 2021).Additional informationNotes on contributorsIlai Z. SaltzmanDr. Ilai Z. Saltzman (saltzman@umd.edu) is the Director of the Gildenrhon Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland at Collge Park. His scholarship and teaching focus on international security, Israeli foreign and security policy, US foreign policy, and political psychology. Dr. Saltzman is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (2012). He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and book chapters, and of commentaries in the Los Angeles Times, Ha’aretz, The Jerusalem Post, and other prominent outlets. Dr. Saltzman earned his Ph.D. in International Relations in 2010 from the University of Haifa, and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Security Program (ISP), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2009–2010).
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