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Aristotelian Dialectic and the Discovery of Truth

2000; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1093/oso/9780198250814.003.0005

0265-7651

Marta Włodarczyk,

Medieval and Classical Philosophy

Abstract The main aim of this paper is to determine how, if at all, dialectic is able to lead to the establishment of true conclusions. Before giving a more detailed summary, I shall explain what Aristotelian dialectic is. Dialectic is introduced in Topics I. I as ‘a method by which we shall be able to reason from endoxa about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything contradictory’ (rooaI8–21). Dialectic, we are told, is about any problem. It is concerned with subjects which require no specialized knowledge and is based on things ‘which it is in a certain way common to everyone to know’ (Rhet. I354aI–6). This general characterization is, however, qualified at Topics, I. I o and I I, where we find out that subjects which are, or should be, manifest to everyone or to most people are unsuitable for dialectical debates: a man who doubts whether snow is white is to be supposed to lack perception; a man who proposes to discuss whether to love one’s parents or whether to honour gods deserves punishment and not refutation (I05a5–7). A dialectical problem must pose some doubts or difficulties in order to afford scope for discussion.