Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Preserving trust in democracy: The Brazilian Superior Electoral Court's quest to tackle disinformation in elections

2023; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 30; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10220461.2023.2274860

1938-0275

Rafael Rubio Núñez, Vítor de Andrade Monteiro,

Brazilian Legal Issues

ABSTRACTTrust is the foundation on which democracy is built. Not coincidentally, it is the main victim of attacks by disinformation merchants bent on undermining the electoral process and the democratic environment. This article outlines the efforts of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to tackle the effects of 'information disorder' on its democratic process, discussing its partnerships with digital platforms and civil society to guarantee transparency and to build trust and integrity in electoral processes in Brazil. The TSE aims to increase the electorate's access to information and its resilience to disinformation, as well as build official mechanisms to respond to these threats. Related decisions issued by the court will also be analysed. The article demonstrates how these initiatives have helped the TSE to reduce disinformation in the electoral information ecosystem and enabled a more informed exercise of the right to vote.KEYWORDS: Disinformationinformation disordersmisinformationelectionsBrazilelectoral justice system Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 'Information disorder' is a phenomenon of a complex nature that encompasses various manifestations, such as the propagation of inaccurate information, the decontextualisation of data with the purpose of conveying facts that do not correspond to reality, the presence of informative errors and manipulation of a political nature. In this context, Claire Wardle presents three distinguished categories of information disorder: misinformation, which refers to the dissemination of incorrect information without intent to cause harm; disinformation, which involves the combination of inaccuracies and a deliberate intent to harm; and malinformation, characterised by the absence of falsehood but the presence of an underlying interest in causing harm or damage (Understanding Information disorder. First Draft, 2022. Available at https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/understanding-information-disorder/). About the theme: C. Wardle and H. Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking (Council of Europe, 2017). https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-towardan-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c; Denise-Marie Ordway, 2018, Information disorder: The essential glossary, https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/internet/information-disorder-glossary-fake-news/2 Taboada, Carolina; Assis, Maria Eduarda; Alkmim, Marina de; Godoy, Camila. Disinformation pulse: Reviewing the Impacts of Disinformation in Brazil's 2022 Elections. (Igarapé Institute, 2013). Available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Disinformation-Pulse.pdf.3 The website of this important Brazilian Think Thank is https://portal.fgv.br/fgv-dapp.4 'Facebook posts with allegations of vote rigging have 111 million interactions in 15 months'- https://g1.globo.com/tecnologia/noticia/2022/02/11/postagens-no-facebook-com-alegacoes-de-fraude-em-urnas-eletronicas-tem-111-milhoes-de-interacoes.ghtml. Avaliable at https://g1.globo.com/tecnologia/noticia/2022/02/11/postagens-no-facebook-com-alegacoes-de-fraude-em-urnas-eletronicas-tem-111-milhoes-de-interacoes.ghtml (accessed June 10, 2023)5 Taboada, Carolina; Assis, Maria Eduarda; Alkmim, Marina de; Godoy, Camila. Disinformation pulse: Reviewing the Impacts of Disinformation in Brazil's 2022 Elections. (Igarapé Institute, 2013). Available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Disinformation-Pulse.pdf.6 Taboada, Carolina; Assis, Maria Eduarda; Alkmim, Marina de; Godoy, Camila. Disinformation pulse: Reviewing the Impacts of Disinformation in Brazil's 2022 Elections. (Igarapé Institute, 2013). Available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Disinformation-Pulse.pdf.7 Taboada, Carolina; Assis, Maria Eduarda; Alkmim, Marina de; Godoy, Camila. Disinformation pulse: Reviewing the Impacts of Disinformation in Brazil's 2022 Elections. (Igarapé Institute, 2013). Available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Disinformation-Pulse.pdf.8 Carter Center Electoral Expert Mission Concludes Assessment and Issues Initial Key Findings. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2022/brazil-110422.html9 Taboada, Carolina; Assis, Maria Eduarda; Alkmim, Marina de; Godoy, Camila. Disinformation pulse: Reviewing the Impacts of Disinformation in Brazil's 2022 Elections. (Igarapé Institute, 2013). Available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Disinformation-Pulse.pdf.10 Washington Post. The uncomplicated reason Brazil can count its ballots so quickly. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/10/31/brazil-elections-vote-count-united-states/, (accessed July 11, 2023).11 TSE. 'Você sabia? Urna eletrônica tem mais de 30 barreiras de segurança'. Available: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2020/Marco/voce-sabia-urna-eletronica-tem-mais-de-30-barreiras-de-seguranca (accessed July 19, 2023)12 SENADO. Há 26 anos em uso e sem casos de fraudes, urnas eletrônicas seguem alvo de boatos e fake News. Available at: https://www12.senado.leg.br/tv/programas/eleicoes-2022/2022/09/ha-26-anos-em-uso-e-sem-casos-de-fraudes-urnas-eletronicas-seguem-alvo-de-boatos-e-fake-news (accessed July 19, 2023). Also, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220901-five-things-on-brazil-s-voting-machines13 UOL. BRASIL é o 5° país com mais usuários de internet do mundo; veja lista, UOL. Available at: https://gizmodo.uol.com.br/brasil-e-o-5o-pais-com-mais-usuarios-de-internet-do-mundo-veja-lista/#:~:text=O%20Brasil%20%C3%A9%20o%205%C2%BA,da%20empresa%20de%20dados%20Statista (accessed June 21, 2023).14 Available at (accessed June 24, 2023)15 Available at: Digital News Report 2022. Disponível em (accessed July 20, 2023).16 CONVERGÊNCIA DIGITAL. No Brasil, 159 milhões usam redes sociais diariamente. YouTube é o campeão. Available at: https://www.convergenciadigital.com.br/Internet/No-Brasil%2C-159-milhoes-usam-redes-sociais-diariamente.-YouTube-e-o-campeao-59919.html?UserActiveTemplate=mobile (accessed July 19, 2023).17 Resolution TSE 23.714/2022 -https://www.tse.jus.br/++theme++justica_eleitoral/pdfjs/web/viewer.html?file = https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/arquivos/resolucao-desinformacao/@@download/file/TSE%20-%20Resolução%20-%20Desinformação%20-%20aprovada.pdf18 In this article, political violence is defined refers to actions and events characterised by the use of force, coercion, or aggression in the pursuit of political objectives or in attempts to influence political processes. C.A. Sousa, "Political Violence, Collective Functioning and Health: A Review of the Literature," Medicine, conflict and survival 29, no. 3 (2013 Jul-Sep): 169–97. doi:10.1080/13623699.2013.813109.19 Electoral Code (Law 4767/1965) – Art. 243: It will not be tolerated propaganda: (…) I – that provokes animosity among or against the Armed Forces, or against them, or of the Armed Forces against civilian classes and institutions; III – of incitement to attack against persons or property; IV – of instigation to collective disobedience to the enforcement of the law of public order;20 Elections Statute number 9.504 of September 30, 1997, available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9504.htm (accessed July 20, 2023)21 Elections Statute number 12.965/2014, available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2014/lei/l12965.htm (accessed July 20, 2023)22 Elections Statute number 13.709/2018, available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/lei/l13709.htm, (accessed July 20, 2023)23 Elections Statute number 14.197/2021, available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2021/lei/l14197.htm (accessed July 20, 2023)24 Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2019/resolucao-no-23-610-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2019?texto=compilado, (accessed July 20, 2023)25 Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2022/resolucao-no-23-714-de-20-de-outubro-de-2022 (accessed July 20, 2023)26 https://desinformante.com.br/negligencia-do-mpe-e-das-plataformas-levaram-judiciario-para-dianteira-do-combate-a-desinformacao/27 Ordinance 949/2017. Art. 2 The Advisory Council established by this ordinance will work with the Office of the President of the Court and will have the following attributions: (…). Available at .28 Rafael Rubio, Desinformación Electoral y retos para la democracia (Lima: Fondo Editorial, 2022)29 Ordinance 663/2019. Available at https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/prt/2019/portaria-no-663-de-30-de-agosto-de-2019.30 The 2020 programme results report is available in English at https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/desinformacao/arquivos/brazil-counter-disinformation-program-otimi.pdf.31 Different campaigns were launched from this network, such as #YoVotoSinFake, which had the support of more than 100 institutions (media associations, public and private entities and any citizen who wished to participate) and caused more than 23,000 publications on twitter; and the campaigns #NoDifundeFakeNews and #AVotar, with the participation of the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF for its acronym in Portuguese) and 18 Brazilian soccer clubs that published 2. 715 tweets, which between them reached 82,092,610 people, to educate voters about the phenomenon of disinformation and the dangers of spreading false news, and which also ran on radio and television, reaching around 130 million Brazilians.32 The data concerning the results of the programme can be accessed through the report available in English at https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/desinformacao/arquivos/brazil-counter-disinformation-program-otimi.pdf33 The 2020 Brazilian Program received an international award granted by the World Electoral Justice Network for its performance in the electoral process in an emergency situation. List of awardees available at: https://www.te.gob.mx/red_mundial/front/awards/index34 TSE. TSE reúne plataformas digitais e partidos políticos para debater o enfrentamento à desinformação. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Junho/tse-reune-plataformas-digitais-e-partidos-politicos-para-debater-o-enfrentamento-a-desinformacao (accessed July 20, 2023)35 TSE. Missão brasileira discute estratégias de combate à desinformação com a União Europeia. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Julho/missao-brasileira-discute-estrategias-de-combate-a-desinformacao-com-a-uniao-europeia (accessed July 1, 2023)36 TSE – Ordinance n° 510 (04/08/2021), Institutes the 'Permanent Program to Combat Disinformation within the scope of the Electoral Justice and disciplines its execution'. Available at https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/prt/2021/portaria-no-510-de-04-de-agosto-de-2021, (accessed July 12, 2023).37 TSE – Ordinance n° 510 (04/08/2021), Institutes the Permanent Program to Combat Disinformation within the scope of the Electoral Justice and disciplines its execution. Available at https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/prt/2021/portaria-no-510-de-04-de-agosto-de-2021, (accessed July 12, 2023)38 Available at: https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/desinformacao/arquivos/manual-versao-final.pdf (accessed July 10, 2023)39 No. 318/2022, Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/prt/2022/portaria-no-318-de-30-de-marco-de-2022 (accessed July 10, 2023)40 TSE. Presidente do TSE institui Frente Nacional de Enfrentamento à Desinformação. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Marco/presidente-do-tse-institui-frente-nacional-de-enfrentamento-a-desinformacao (accessed July 10, 2023)41 Harvard Kennedy School. Misinformation Review. Explaining beliefs in electoral misinformation in the 2022 Brazilian election: The role of ideology, political trust, social media, and messaging apps. Available at: https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/explaining-beliefs-in-electoral-misinformation-in-the-2022-brazilian-election-the-role-of-ideology-political-trust-social-media-and-messaging-apps/42 Available at: https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/desinformacao/#desinformacao-parceiros (accessed July 11, 2023)43 YouTube and Facebook letting Brazil election disinformation spread, NGO says – https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/20/brazil-election-disinformation-youtube-facebook44 TSE. 'MEGAFONE' incentiva usuários do Facebook a se prepararem para as eleições. Disponível em https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Abril/201cmegafone201d-incentiva-usuarios-do-facebook-a-se-prepararem-para-as-eleicoes (accessed July 1, 2023).45 On the Election Disinformation Alert System see: MONTEIRO, Vitor. O 'sistema de alertas' do programa brasileiro de enfrentamento à desinformação. Available at: https://www.ibericonnect.blog/2022/10/o-sistema-de-alertas-do-programa-brasileiro-de-enfrentamento-a-desinformacao/ (accessed June 30, 2023)46 Facebook. Sobre anúncios relacionados a temas sociais, eleições ou política. Available at: https://pt-br.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506?id=288762101909005 (accessed July 12, 2023)47 O GLOBO. Meta passa a proibir anúncios com 'questionamentos sobre legitimidade' da eleição brasileira. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/sonar-a-escuta-das-redes/post/2022/08/meta-atualiza-politica-e-proibe-anuncios-com-questionamentos-sobre-legitimidade-do-pleito-brasileiro.ghtml (accessed July 14, 2023)48 Global Witness. Meta continued to allow the dissemination of disinformation through paid advertising that promotes abstention or criticizes the credibility of the elections. Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/online-disinformation-threatens-integrity-brazilian-presidential-election/ (accessed July 14, 2023)49 Social Media Today. WhatsApp Adds New Payment Options for SMBs in Brazil. Available at: https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/whatsapp-adds-new-payment-options-for-smbs-in-brazil/647409/#:~:text=WhatsApp%20is%20the%20most%20popular,essential%20utility%20in%20many%20respects (accessed July 18, 2023).50 EBC. Telegram tem bloqueio suspenso no Brasil. Available at: https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/radioagencia-nacional/justica/audio/2022-03/telegram-tem-bloqueio-suspenso-no-brasil (accessed July 18, 2023)51 TSE. CANAL do TSE no Telegram alcança mais de 100 mil inscritos em uma semana. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Maio/canal-do-tse-no-telegram-alcanca-mais-de-100-mil-inscritos-em-uma-semana (accessed June 10, 2023).52 TIK TOK. Nosso trabalho antes, durante e após as eleições brasileiras de 2022. Available at: https://newsroom.tiktok.com/pt-br/nosso-trabalho-antes-durante-e-apos-as-eleicoes-brasileiras-de-2022 (accessed July 10, 2023)53 TIK TOK. Nosso trabalho antes, durante e após as eleições brasileiras de 2022. Available at: https://newsroom.tiktok.com/pt-br/nosso-trabalho-antes-durante-e-apos-as-eleicoes-brasileiras-de-2022 (accessed July 10, 2023)54 CNN. Twitter anuncia criação de ferramentas de combate a fake news nas eleições. Available at: https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/twitter-anuncia-criacao-de-ferramentas-de-combate-a-fake-news-nas-eleicoes/ (accessed July 18, 2023)55 UOL. Eleições: 16 iniciativas do Twitter e outras redes sociais contra fake News.Available at: https://www.uol.com.br/tilt/noticias/redacao/2022/09/16/iniciativas-redes-sociais-para-combater-fake-news-eleicoes-2022.htm?cmpid=copiaecola (accessed July 20, 2023)56 In 2022, on the day of the independence of the Brazilian republic, 7 September, there were demonstrations in the federal capital calling for the dismissal of ministers of higher courts and the Supreme Court, as well as demanding a military coup. On 8 January 2023, a group of people dissatisfied with the result of the presidential election stormed the offices of the three branches of government and destroyed public property. The criminal demonstration was contained on the same day and almost 2,000 people were arrested. As a result of these events, 1,345 criminal complaints were filed and, by the time this article was finalised, 12 people had already been convicted. On the subject see . (accessed October 18, 2023).57 More about the Brazilian Electoral Observation Program in SCANDIUCCI, José Gilberto. Observação Eleitoral: A Experiência Brasileira de 2022. Revista Estudos Eleitorais. v. 16, n. 1, p. 19–334, jan./jul. 202258 At the end of the programme, the official accounts Twitter (676,600), Facebook (311,000), youtube (394,000), Flickr (318,000), Tik Tok (151,100), Kwai (473,700), Instagram (423,000), Linkedin (12,755) and a Telegram channel with 311,100 followers. All of them experienced a large increase in the number of visits and followers since the implementation of the plan.59 Mobile Time. BOT do TSE no WhatsApp conversa com 6 milhões de pessoas. Available at: https://www.mobiletime.com.br/noticias/04/11/2022/chatbot-do-tse-trocou-176-milhoes-de-mensagens-no-whatsapp-nas-eleicoes-de-2022/ (accessed July 16, 2023)60 The agencies are Lupa, Estadao Verifica, Afp, Efarsas, Comprova, Uol, Aos Fatos, Fato Fake, Boatos.org61 'Fato ou Boato' Site – Available at: https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/fato-ou-boato/checagens/qr-code-no-titulo-de-eleitor-serve-para-autenticar-documentos-emitidos-pela-je>, acessado em 01/06/2023 (accessed July 17, 2023).62 TSE. OPERADORAS concedem 'zero rating' para site da Justiça Eleitoral. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2020/Setembro/operadoras-concedem-zero-rating-para-site-da-justica-eleitoral-eleitor-nao-usara-pacote-de-dados-para-navegar> (accessed July 1, 2023).63 TSE. TSE veste o Cristo Redentor com camiseta pela paz nas Eleições 2022. Available at: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/tse-veste-o-cristo-redentor-com-camiseta-pela-paz-nas-eleicoes-2022 (accessed July 9, 2023).64 TSE. TSE coloca 'urna inflável' dentro de campo antes de semifinal da Copa do Brasil. TSE. Available at https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/tse-coloca-urna-inflavel-dentro-de-campo-antes-de-semifinal-da-copa-do-brasil/, (accessed July 9, 2023).65 The podcast 'Tira-dúvidas eleicoes' (16 videos), 'Curiosidades sobre a justiça eleitoral' (90 videos), 'Então é Isso! 2022' (36 videos) or series such as those focused on electronic ballot boxes (7 videos) or on how to vote (13 videos).66 The Federal Supreme Court (https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Maio/tse-assina-com-o-supremo-acordo-para-combater-as-fake-news-sobre-o-judiciario) and the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Abril/tse-e-procuradoria-geral-eleitoral-celebram-acordo-para-enfrentamento-da-desinformacao) signed a cooperation agreement with the purpose of exchanging information and developing joint actions to strengthen the fight against disinformation.67 A) It is considered a serious disturbance of the democratic environment any form of expression capable of encouraging conduct aimed at the abolition of the democratic rule of law or the overthrow, by violent means or serious threat, of institutions or of a legitimately constituted government. B) It is considered violent or hate speech any form of expression capable of inciting a group to adopt behaviours that threaten the integrity of individuals or social groups, including, but not limited to, in contexts that discriminate against vulnerable or minority segments. C) It is considered disinformation any public manifestation based on incorrect information, assumptions or data, regardless of the intention of the person who made or sent it. D) It is considered inauthentic behaviour to send a message from a false or illegitimate account. Examples of this type of behaviour include creating an account in the name of a third party for the purpose of misleading users, using third-party photos or doctored images with the intent to mislead people, using accounts that exhibit behaviour that is unlikely to be performed by humans, among others.68 Telegram joined the programme once the Program was approved, and Whatsapp preferred to have an exclusive channel for reports for this type of behaviour. Although both were incorporated into the alert system and managed in the same way.69 After resolution 23,714/2022, the reports that affected the electoral campaign were also filed but were subject to a second review to request withdrawal in case there was already a jurisdictional decision on the same content.70 An example of this is the Spanish Central Electoral Board which has already ruled that, due to their impact on electoral campaigns, social media platforms cannot be considered politically irrelevant (Expediente 293/1215, in Judgment 146/2021).71 For more information about the 'Francischini Case': E. M. Ferreira, "Cassação de Mandato e Fake News: a Estratégia do Bolsonarismo Jurídico para Manter o Deputado Fernando Francischini no Poder," Rei – Revista Estudos Institucionais 9, no. 3 (2023): 854–76. https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v9i3.74172 RO-El 0603975-98/PR.73 The accusations, among other things, stated: (a) 'we already identified two ballot boxes that I say are either fraudulent or adulterated. […], I have here all the documentation from the Electoral Justice itself'; (b) 'we are bringing it out here first hand for all of Brazil […], the ballot boxes are adulterated or fraudulent'; (c) 'our lawyer has just confirmed […], identified two ballot boxes that I say were adulterated'; (d) 'we will not accept that a company from Venezuela, with a technology to which we have no access, defines democracy in Brazil'.74 the aforementioned electoral law (9.504/1997)75 REspEl n°. 06000243376 AIJE 0601968- 80.2018.6.00.0000 and 0601771- 28.2018.6.00.000077 TSE orders withdrawal of advertisements offensive to Bolsonaro and Lula – https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/tse-determina-retirada-de-propagandas-ofensivas-a-bolsonaro-e-a-lula78 Representation no. 0601372-5779 Representation no. 0601386-4180 The video was named '19.05.2011 – Kit gay causa polêmica MP4',81 DR 0601559-65.2022.6.00.000082 AIJE 0601522-38.2022.6.00.000083 AIJE 0601522-38.2022.6.00.000084 Representation no. 0600826-02.2022.6.00.0000,85 Representation no.0601328-38.2022.6.00.00.000086 Representation no. 0601352-66.2022.6.00.00.000087 Representation no. 0601469-57.2022.6.00.0000.88 Available in English at Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Proyectos TED del Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica, Técnica y de Innovación financiados por la Unión Europea, Spain: [Grant Number TED2021-130876B-100].Notes on contributorsRafael RubioRafael Rubio (PhD in Constitutional Law, Extraordinary Prize), is a Tenured Professor of Constitutional Law at the Complutense University of Madrid. Has been a visiting researcher at Georgetown University, Harvard University, George Washington University, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and Dublin City University. Teaches or has taught postgraduate classes at more than 35 universities around the world and researchers from Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Peru and Colombia are involved in his research projects. Member of the Academic Committee of the Global Network on Electoral Justice (2016-). Election observer in Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala and Costa Rica. Has served as legal advisor to the ODIHR/OSCE EOM in Ukraine and as head of mission of the EOM on disinformation for the presidential elections in Brazil. Has also appeared as an expert on disinformation and electoral campaigns before various committees of the Spanish Congress of Deputies, the European Parliament, European Council and the electoral bodies of Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica. As a member of the Venice Commission, participated as rapporteur in the preparation of two reports on the use of technology in democracy, and served as rapporteur at the Council of Europe Congress on Artificial Intelligence and Elections. Has been director of the Complutense Research Group on Technology and Democracy (2005–2021); deputy director of the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (2017/18); substitute member of the Venice Commission; (2018/22) and member of the Open Government Forum of the Government of Spain (2017/2021). Collaborator with various non-governmental organisations, including Transparency International, Amnesty International, Save The Children Spain, Unicef Spain, The Good Lobby and APRI, on issues related to transparency and political participation. President of the Community of Madrid's Council for Transparency and Participation.Vitor de Andrade MonteiroVitor De Andrade Monteiro is a PhD candidate in Constitutional Law at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, holding a Master's degree in Public Law from Universidade Federal de Alagoas, Brazil. He had conducted studies as a Visiting Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, in Heidelberg, Germany. he has almost 20 years of experience working in the Brazilian electoral judiciary. He is a researcher on the Observatorio Complutense de Desinformación and on the Democracia y Tecnologia (I + DEM) research group. He is a member of the Brazilian Academia for Electoral and Political Rights and the American Conference of Subnational Electoral Bodies for Electoral Transparency and also teach courses on Electoral and Constitutional Law. He has authored and co-authored various legal publications, including works on elections, political rights, humans rights and constitutional law.