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Wittgenstein on Representation, Privileged Objects, and Private Languages

1983; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00455091.1983.10715833

1911-0820

Meredith Williams,

Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism

In this paper, I shall investigate Wittgenstein's ‘private language argument,’ that is, the argument to be found in Philosophical Investigations 243-315. Roughly, this argument is intended to show that a language knowable to one person and only that person is impossible; in other words, a ‘language’ which another person cannot understand isn't a language. Given the prolonged debate sparked by these passages, one must have good reason to bring it up again. I have: Wittgenstein's attack on private languages has regularly been misinterpreted. Moreover, it has been misinterpreted in a way that draws attention away from the real force of his arguments and so undercuts the philosophical significance of these passages.