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Transient truths: an essay in the metaphysics of propositions

2013; Association of College and Research Libraries; Volume: 50; Issue: 10 Linguagem: Inglês

10.5860/choice.50-5429

1943-5975

Berit Brogaard,

Classical Philosophy and Thought

Reporting BeliefRecall that, on a broader Fregean criterion for being a proposition, propositions are thought to play a wide number of distinct theoretical roles (Frege 1952 ): Propositions are (i) the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences, (ii) the objects of the attitudes (e.g., belief, doubt, hope, wish, and so on), (iii) the objects of agreement and disagreement, (iv) what is transferred or shared when people communicate successfully, and (v) the contents operated on by intensional operators (e.g., 'It is possible that').Th e claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of sentences is relatively uncontroversial.Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker ( 1970 ), David Lewis ( 1980 ), Mark Richard ( 1981 , 1982 ), Nathan Salmon ( 1986 ), and Jason Stanley ( 1997a , 1997b ) have all defended this claim.However, such eternalists prefer to reserve the term 'proposition' for eternal content. 1 Th e most controversial claims made by temporalists are (i) that individuals may stand in belief relations to temporal contents, (ii) that temporal contents can be the objects of agreement and disagreement, and (iii) that successful communication may involve temporal contents.I defend the fi rst claim in this chapter and the second and third claims in the subsequent chapter. THE CLASSIC OBJECTIONSMark Richard ( 1981 ) has leveled a potentially devastating argument against temporalism. 2Th e argument runs as follows.Th ere are obviously invalid arguments that would come out valid if temporalism were true.So temporalism is false.Here is one such apparently invalid argument ( Richard 1981 : 4):(A) Mary believed that Nixon was president.1 Th is is why their view does not qualify as temporalism.Temporalists think that there are propositions that have diff erent truth-values at diff erent times.2 Th e argument can also be found in Kneale and Kneale ( 1970 : 235).