Republicanism and the Politics of Citizenship in Germany and France: Convergence or Divergence?
2000; Volume: 1; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1523-9764
Autores Tópico(s)Political Systems and Governance
ResumoAbstract In this article it is argued the models of German citizenship are quite dynamic and evolving. The German tradition today is more in line with the French and U.S. republican model of jus soli citizenship than the ascriptive jus sanguinis. The analysis concludes legislation and public discourse about German citizenship politics have converged toward the French model during the 1990s. This means a normalization of the long awaited delayed in the field of citizenship politics. 1. Introduction: Is the distinction between Kulturnation and Staatsnation still adequate? The often simplified definition of two citizenship models is Jus sanguinis in Germany and Jus soli in the USA or France. Rogers Brubaker (1992) who analyzed the subject exhaustively in his book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, postulates Germany and France represent antagonistic ideas about the nation. In Germany, he argues, and state form two independent elements, which stand in tension to one other. In France, on the contrary, the national and the political-territorial unity have fused,[i] In the short formula Germany is therefore often called a cultural nation and France as state-nation. A classification, which was developed by Friedrich Meinecke as early as 1908.[ii] According to Brubaker, the antagonistic ideas of the nation-state continue to the present and find their expression in antagonistic citizenship models: Germany seems to prefer ethnic understandings of belonging, whereas France underlines a more republican and political belonging. How could one otherwise explain Brubaker posits that Germany and France have such a divergent citizenship policy, despite a very similar immigration history? French citizenship policy, orientated towards assimilation, is characterized to be generous, because it converts immigrants into French citizens by the second generation. On the contrary, German naturalization law seems to assign immigrants a permanent alien status and therefore accentuates the difference between alien residents and persons of German descendants (ethnic German migrants or Aussiedler).[iii] These considerations lead to the question, if the antagonistic citizenship models are really so stable and dogmatic as Brubaker predicted in 1992. The multiple legal changes took place in the 1990s in France and Germany suggest another view. Table 1: Major reforms of citizenship law in Germany and France in the 1990s Year Reform in Germany 1991 Creation of the Alien Act with a chapter titled Facilitated Naturalization 1993 Conversion from a discretionary procedure to a legal claim on German citizenship 2000 Automatic birthright citizenship for the second generation (optional model), reduction of the minimum residence time from 15 to 8 years Year Reform in France 1993 Introduction of the manifestation de volonte, abolition of the automatic naturalization for the second generation 1998 Abolition of the manifestation de volonte, re-intzoduction of the automatic system Were these only superficial modifications or signs of a paradigmatic change? Do French and German citizenship and naturalization policies continue to diverge or can a convergence be found in essential points? And what role does the Republic play in all this? I shall analyze these questions by considering the following: * laws and their implementation * outcomes of naturalization policies * political discourse. 2. Implementing Citizenship Laws 2.1 The naturalization of the first generation in Germany: From the 1913 RuStAG to the Alien Act of 2000. Until 1990 the Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (henceforth, RuStAG) of 1913 was the only legal basis for naturalization in Germany.[iv] In the 1980s, when it became evident guest-workers would not return to their home countries, the German government started to think about other solutions. …
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