Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive
2014; United States Army War College; Volume: 44; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0031-1723
Autores Tópico(s)World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact
ResumoClimax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive By Rhys Crawley Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014 363 pages $34.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] It has now been over one hundred years since the First World War broke out, and April 2015 is the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Gallipoli campaign. In this timely consideration, Rhys Crawley's Climax at Gallipoli provides an important revisionist account of that campaign's August 1915 final offensive by the British-led Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). Crawley maintains the August offensive never really had a chance of defeating Ottoman forces due to deeply flawed planning, a lack of necessary resources, and other important factors. Fie calls the campaign an utter failure rather than the brink of victory it has been described as by historians elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, he also disagrees with key allied leaders, including MEF commander General Ian Hamilton, who portrayed the August offensive as a near success (8). Consequently, Crawley's analysis goes against a deeply-rooted historical narrative, which he has challenged through a meticulous command of the facts in this very fine-grained analysis. Most senior British officers at Gallipoli had fought in the Boer War and learned lessons in South Africa that were badly outdated by World War I. As on the Western Front, most senior MEF officers had also been taught to accept the primacy of the offensive, and did not fully realize how new technology added to the advantages enjoyed by a defending force. While recognizing the bravery of the Ottoman troops, senior MEF officers considered them to be especially vulnerable to offensively-oriented movement involving surprise, deception, and speed. In a chauvinistic flourish on this mindset, General Hamilton characterized British troops as individuals who are animated with a superior ideal, and would ultimately prevail in any conflict with the Ottomans in which they led (67). Banal statements of national superiority seldom help military planning and may have partially caused the MEF leadership to overlook problems with many of sick, exhausted, and inexperienced troops. These soldiers had been worn down by constant work, lack of sleep, and woefully inadequate medical care. Crawley maintains this force was not capable of prolonged action, but it was nevertheless required to assault well-prepared defenders in mountainous terrain that did not lend itself to mobility or coordinated forward movement. Further complicating MEF problems, planners made a number of assumptions about Ottoman forces that were incorrect. In particular, British military leaders considered the Ottoman army to be weak, demoralized, and likely to crumble. General Hamilton stated the Ottomans favored trench warfare because their stupid men have only simple straightforward duties to perform (24). In this command climate, it is not surprising military intelligence repeatedly underestimated the Ottomans. Despite allied estimates to the contrary, Ottoman forces were not suffering massive health problems, morale was generally high, and many of these troops were prepared to die defending every inch of contested ground. Beyond miscalculations about the enemy, the MEF had huge gaps in its information about the terrain since ground reconnaissance was limited by forces encircling the beachheads. …
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